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EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE. THE CHALLENGE
AND THE OPPORTUNITY*
ORISON S. MARDEN t
I
The Challenge
Some eighty-five years ago, in the year 1877, John Randolph Tucker
urged the graduating law class of the University of Maryland:
"To prepare, by solemn consecration, to advance the right and
destroy the wrong; to promote justice and defeat inequity;-
to defend the oppressed and assail the oppressor; to protect
freedom and oppose tyranny; to uphold the institutional lib-
erties of our people and to guard them against all usurpa-
tion; * * *"
My text is drawn from those noble words of the great teacher and lead-
er of the bar in whose memory these lectures are given.
The specific problem which I venture to discuss is how best to
assure competent legal advice and representation for the millions
among us-and there are millions-who need the services of a lawyer
but cannot pay his reasonable charges. The importance of filling this
need is obvious to lawyers, for we know full well that our services are
essential to assure equal opportunity for a just result. This is true
in matters which never reach a court but involve legal questions, as
well as of proceedings in court.
Lawyers cannot guarantee that justice will be attained in a par-
ticular instance, but the skills and industry of lawyers can assure to
their clients equal access to justice. As Justice Jackson once said, legal
*These are the fourteenth annual John Randolph Tucker Lectures, delivered
at the School of Law, Washington and Lee University, on May 4-5, 1962. A few edi-
tional changes have been made in adapting the lectures for publication.
tPartner, White & Case, New York City. President, The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York.
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"rights are worth, when they are threatened, just what some lawyer
makes them worth."'
In a society which becomes more complex and soI isticated each
day, the need for legal advice and representation becomes ever greater.
In the simpler days of our forebears legal problems arose less fre-
quently and they were easier of solution. The average lawyer was able
to and in fact did handle legal matters for tle neighbor who could
pay little, if anything,' for his services. This is true today in many places,
particularly in rural areas; but in the more populous cities and coun-
ties, for a variety of reasons, many who need legal advice or representa-
tion, in civil and criminal matters, are not able to enlist the unpaid
services of a lawyer.
This is not because lawyers are less public spirited today; there are
few indeed who do not in practice serve needy clients and even strang-
ers without fee or at a token rate; but the great mass of those who need
the help of lawyers in the more populous areas do not know lawyers
as friends and neighbors. It is natural that they should hesitate to wait
on a strange lawyer, hat in hand, and ask for free representation. More-
over, lawyers have obligations to their families and regular clients
and there is a limit to the amount of free time they can give.
In civil matters, a survey conducted some years ago by the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association among legal aid offices, showed
that a national average of at least 7 persons out of every i,ooo need
a lawyer's help each year but cannot afford, or think they cannot
afford, to hire a lawyer.2 The percentage will, of course, vary from
state to state, from city to city, but it is probably higher today. In
criminal matters, the national average is approximately one-half of
all those accused of a criminal act.3
The leaders of our profession have long been alive to the difficult
problems involved. Entrusted by the people with a monopoly to
practice law, the profession recognizes that hand in hand with this
exclusive license goes the obligation to provide the services that
only licensed lawyers can lawfully render, to all those who need these
services, whether or not they can be paid for.
We have attempted to meet our professional obligation to in-
digent persons on a collective basis, through the so-called Legal
Aid Movement which began some eighty-five years ago in this coun-
'Jackson, The County Seat Lawyer, 36 AEAJ 497 (1950).
'Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 79 (1951).
3Equal Justice For The Accused 8o (1959).
1962] EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE 155
try. The central idea is to supply legal advice and representation for
the poor through a community law office manned by lawyers who
are employed by the organization or volunteer their- services. The
size of the office and staff and the method of operation will of course
vary with the requirements of the community served. Generally,
offices offering advice and representation in civil matters are known
as Legal Aid offices and those supplying legal services in criminal
matters, as Defender offices.
There are now 224 Legal Aid offices and 98 Defender services in
this country. Together they handle over 500,000 cases a year, at a
cost to the American people-mostly through Community Chest,
United Fund and tax funds-of nearly $5,ooo,ooo a year. About two-
thirds of these community law offices have been opened within the past
fifteen years, largely through the efforts of the organized bar, at na-
tional, state and local levels, with the expert assistance of the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association.
Despite the substantial progress already made we are very far in-
deed from meeting the actual need. On the civil side, there are still
nine central cities in this country of loo,ooo or more population
which are without any organized Legal Aid facilities whatsoever. Some
twenty cities of 75,ooo to ioo,ooo population have no Legal Aid ser-
vice. The existing Legal Aid facilities in twenty-four cities of iooooo
or more population do not meet even the minimum requirements
established by the American Bar Association and the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association.4 All too few of the existing Legal
Aid offices are actually covering the requirements of their own lo-
calities. Many are hampered by poorly paid and inadequate staff;
others are badly directed by disinterested or inactive boards of
directors.
On the criminal side, as Judge Prettyman has emphasized, the
need for competent defense counsel who will be available in court
when and as they are required is very great indeed. .  The Uniform
Crime Reports issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation show that
city and rural law enforcement agencies reported a rate of 3,640
arrests per ioo,ooo persons for all criminal offenses during 196o (a
total of 3,959,559). City arrest rates were almost three times higher
41961 Annual Report of the Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work of the
American Bar Association 2-6.
5Prettyman, The Problem of the Indigent (John Randolph Tucker Lectures,
1961), 18 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 202 (1961).
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than rural rates.6 Yet there are now some thirty-one counties of 400,000
population or more where no Defender office or other organized
service exists.7 In the federal courts, with few exceptions, there is
no organized service.
Moreover, the trend of judicial decisions, both federal and state,
indicates that the need for defense counsel in criminal cases is likely
to increase sharply in the future.8 'The rule of Betts v. Brady9 is ob-
viously being whittled away. The probabilities are that in the not too
distant future state courts, like the federal courts, will be powerless
to try a defendant on a criminal charge unless counsel. is provided or
there is an intelligent and understanding rejection of the offer of
counsel.' 0 As recently stated by Justice Black in his concurring opinion
in Carnley v. Cochran::"
"Twenty years' experience in the state and federal courts
with the Betts v. Bradv rule has demonstrated its basic failure
as a constitutional guide. Indeed, it has served not to guide
but to confuse the courts as to when a person prosecuted by
a State for crime is entitled to a lawyer. Little more could
be expected, however, of a standard which imposes upon courts
nothing more than the perplexing responsibility of appointing
lawyers for an accused when a trial judge believes that a fail-
ure to do so would be 'shocking -to the universal sense of justice.'
To be sure, in recent years this Court has been fairly con-
sistent in assuring indigent defendants the right to counsel.
As the years have gone on we have been compelled even under
the Betts rule to reverse more and more state convictions either
for new trial or for hearing to determine whether counsel had
been erroneously denied-a result that in my judgment is due
to a growing recognition of the fact that our Bill of Rights
is correct in assuming that no layman should be compelled to
defend himself in a criminal prosecution."
A society which boasts of "Equal Justice For All" should not be
forced by the courts or statute to do what is necessary to make the
promise a reality. Such steps should be taken voluntarily-even eager-
ly. There may be difference of opinion as to whether counsel must be
provided as a constitutional requirement, but most lawyers would agree
that equality of justice is not likely to be achieved in serious criminal
ODepartment of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States-Uniform Crime Reports-196o, 16, 89-103 (196i).
9ig6i Report of ABA Committee, op. cit. supra note 4, at 4.
'Prettyman, op. cit. supra note 5; See Beaney, The Right to Counsel in Amer-
ican Courts (1955).
116 U.S. 455 (1942).
'0Johnson v. Zerbst, So4 U.S. 458 (1937); Fed. R. Crim. Pa. 44.
11369 U.S. 506, 518 (1962).
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prosecutions unless the defendant is provided with a competent at-
torney.
No greater challenge faces our profession today than. this: millions
of our people will need lawyers in the years ahead but cannot pay
for the service they must have to be assured of equal access to justice.
These services will be needed in and out of court-in civil and crim-
inal matters-as legal advice, negotiation in legal matters and rep-
resentation in court.
Organized facilities are unavailable in many places and they are
inadequate, in varying degrees, in most cities and counties where
they now exist. Individual practitioners cannot be expected to pro-
vide the services needed; such a burden would be unfair to all con-
cerned and is impractical except in rural areas and the smaller towns
and counties. This is a community problem not unlike that involved
in providing medical and surgical services for the poor. Community
law offices must be provided, just as we accept and support community
hospitals and medical clinics.
There is no need to draw a picture of the great dangers to our
way of life which can flow from denial of this fundamental right
of every citizen. "Nothing rankles more in the human heart than
a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with; but in-
justice makes us want to pull things down." 12 This wise observation by
the Legal Aid pioneer, Reginald Heber Smith, was put even more
bluntly by Judge Learned Hand when he said: "If we are to keep our
democracy, there must be one commandment: 'THOU SHALL NOT
RATION JUSTICE'."13
But the distressing fact is that justice is being rationed because
of the unavailability in many instances and in many places of legal
services for those who cannot pay. When this occurs, as the immediate
past president of the American Bar Association, Whitney North Sey-
mour, observed just a year ago: "poverty and not the judge, may be de-
ciding the case."'
14
The responsibility is yours and mine. As Judge Prettyman put it,
speaking of the criminal side:
"[T]he organized bar has the responsibility-not just a respon-
sibility but the responsibility-for a solution to the basic prob-
lem and all the underlying subsidiary problems respecting the
representation of indigents in criminal cases in this coun-
"Brownell, op. cit. supra note 2, Xiii.
'-'Speech before 75th Anniversary Dinner of The Legal Aid Society of New
York (1951).1 i96i Report of ABA Committee, op. cit. supra note 4, at 7.
158 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
try; *** It is a big job, a personal one, a challenging one,
worthy of the power and the character of the American bar.
The organized bar ought to design the solution, direct it, supply
it, and man it."15
I have attempted to sketch the outlines of a challenge which our
profession must face and meet with understanding, intelligence and
courage. The problems raised are continuing ones and they can only
be evaluated through frequent reexamination of local conditions by
the bar.
If large segments of our bar continue to bury their heads in the
sands of complacency with the status quo, the public will have every
right to take the torch from our hands. The primary responsibility
is ours; it goes hand in hand with the exclusive license to practice
law. Society rightly looks to our profession for solutions to these pro-
fessional problems. It is indeed fortunate that we still have the op-
portunity to put our own house in order.
II
The Opportunity
The encouraging fact is that we know how to solve the great prob-
lem of providing legal counsel for the poor-in both civil and criminal
matters-in cities large and small. Over the past fifteen years the Legal
Aid and Defender movement has established with certainty that at
very reasonable cost it is possible to establish community law offices
which have the manpower and competence to handle the needs of most
indigent persons in the community for legal advice and representation
in civil and criminal matters.
Fifty years ago fewer than 50,000 persons were served by Legal
Aid offices, and less than $9o,ooo was spent in providing this service.
There was no Legal Aid Committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion nor of any state or local bar association. Not until 1921 did the
organized bar bestir itself-but the movement could have had no
better sponsors at the bar than Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root
and Reginald Heber Smith.
Beginning in 1946, under the leadership of Harrison Tweed and
Emery A. Brownell, and the continual prodding of Reginald Heber
Smith, the movement took on a new and dramatic impetus. The
American Bar Association, in partnership with the National Legal
2Prettyman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 218.
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Aid and Defender Association, undertook to provide promotional
leadership at the national level. With funds supplied by the bar, by
industry and labor, and the Ford Foundation, a national campaign
to establish new Legal Aid and Defender offices, and to strengthen
existing services, was under way.
Today-a bare fifteen years later-224 Legal Aid offices and 98
Defender services, three times as many as in 1945, handle over 5oo,ooo
cases a year. The rejuvenated National Legal Aid and Defender As-
sociation has assumed its rightful stature and is affiliated with the
American Bar Association. An interesting statistic is that from 1949
through 1959 Legal Aid and Defender offices handled nearly half as
many cases (3,740,144) as were handled in the preceding 71 years. 1
On the civil side, over 13o Legal Aid offices with a paid staff of
attorneys are now rendering service in 126 cities having a combined
population of approximately 63,500,000 people. In 77 other cities
there are Legal Aid offices operating with volunteer legal staffs serving
a combined population of 16,500,000 people. Volunteer panels of
lawyers are available to over 23,000,000 people in 128 other communi-
ties, large and small, throughout the country.'7
The most dramatic fact is the rate of growth in the last decade. In
the three decades 1920 to 195o the rate for both Legal Aid and De-
fender facilities had been roughly 40 per cent for each ten-year period.
From 195o to 196o, however, the rate was over 250 per cent.' 8
If we can maintain this momentum in providing new facilities and
if we can at the same time strengthen the inadequate facilities which
now exist, it is entirely possible to meet the challenge in a relatively
short period of time.
Experience throughout the country has shown -that in organizing
a new Legal Aid office it is generally desirable to establish it as a sep-
arate entity. The most practical form is that of a charitable corpora-
tion which will be eligible for tax-exempt gifts and will maintain con-
tinuity of service and uniform records. A board of directors of some
fifteen leading members of the community has been found to be effec-
tive and efficient. It is desirable to have representation from civic and
business interests and the social service field but the bar should re-
tain control.
Irrespective of the form of organization selected there are certain
fundamentals which are basic to successful operation and effective
"Brownell, Supplement to Legal Aid in the United States 46 (1961).
21Id. at io.
'sIbid.
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service. These are: (i) a definite place, accessible to the persons who
need the service, convenient to courts and social serv"-e agencies, and
well publicized; (2) a definite time-regular office hc-,rs which fit the
convenience of working people who cannot afford time away from
jobs; (3) a definite person, if possible-because it is customary
and natural for clients to repose confidence in a particular lawyer; (4)
a supervisory group-one which- assures sound legal policies and
represents the best interests of the community.
Most Legal Aid Societies in cities which have a Community Chest
or United Fund receive their support from this source. Some are
financed jointly by the municipality and Community Chest. The Legal
Aid office should be considered as a legal clinic for the poor, to be
integrated into the community pattern of social services in much the
same way as health and welfare services. There is no more reason for
lawyers to be the sole support of the legal clinic than for doctors to
finance the hospital and medical clinics.
The legal problems of poor people fall generally into well de-
fined channels: debt claims, family problems, installment contracts,
landlord and tenant cases, and the like. Such matters can be handled
far more efficiently in the community law office than if spread around
among individual lawyers. Greater efficiency is possible because of the
similarity of cases and the expert knowledge of the Legal Aid lawyer
as to how -they can best be handled. The Legal Aid lawyer's know-
ledge of community resources usually exceeds that of the private
practitioner. The effect of efficiency and special knowledge is shown
by the fact that the costs of a case range from $7 to just over $ii on
the average.19
Good legal counsel is often just as urgent a need for families
without means as medical care. The typical Legal Aid Society provides
this expert counsel for people who cannot pay a lawyer and when
necessary takes over the defense or the prosecution of their cases
without charge.
These simple acts of justice-petty as they may seem in individu-
al cases-add up to many dollars saved for people who need the money
desperately; they keep families together and renew their faith in
American justice; they enable people to retain their self-respect, un-
derstand their rights and so become better citizens.
Legal Aid and Defender offices do not compete with the private
lawyer in the slightest degree. On the contrary, they relieve the bar of
a substantial burden and through the referral of ineligible cases to
19Ibid.
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practicing lawyers through a Lawyer Referral Service or bar associa-
tion, actually build new business for lawyers.
It should be emphasized that the mere existence of Legal Aid and
Defender offices in a particular city does not mean that the needs of
that community are being served. It most cities the services provided
are probably incomplete in some degree. In too many places the
service is totally inadequate. Our objective of equal access to justice
will not be achieved until each local agency is organized and financed
and administered so as to provide full service to the community.
It is important that each community periodically undertake an
inventory of its full needs and of the organization's accomplishments
in meeting those needs. Such a study should involve representatives
of the organization's governing board, the judiciary, the bar associa-
tion and community welfare planning groups. Typical questions to be
considered in these studies are:
(i) Should the territory covered by the present Legal Aid
service be enlarged?
(2) Are eligibility standards and other intake policies fair
and equitable to the bar and the community?
(3) Is the present staff sufficient in number and quality to
give adequate and competent and courteous service to all
eligible applicants?
(4) If services are not provided in criminal cases what steps
should be taken to set up a Defender service. Should service in
criminal cases be financed privately or by public funds or by
both?
(5) Is the present office located in a central place so that it
may be conveniently reached by clients?
(6) Are decent salaries and working conditions provided
for professional and clerical employees?
(7) Are ineligible applicants referred to lawyers through the
lawyer referral service or a panel supplied by the bar associa-
tion?
(8) In what respects could relations be improved with the
bar association, the Community Chest and other welfare agen-
cies and the public generally?
On the criminal side the development of organized Defender
services has been disappointingly slow. Nevertheless, twice as many in-
digent persons have the services of a Defender office today as was the
case a decade ago. Most Defender services are operated as a public
office, entirely through tax support. There are, however, excellent vol-
untary services which receive financial support from private sources.
1962]
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For many years there has been active and often heated debate as
to whether a public or private defender system is -3reFerable. The po-
sition of the organized bar is that the method useci should be in accord
with local needs and wishes.2 0 We are concerned with the substance-
not the form. Whatever method is used, it should give representation
at least equal in quality and independence to that available to paying
clients in the community.
An interesting variant, and one believed to be promising for the
future, is the privately incorporated Defender service, with a Board
of Directors composed of community leaders, but deriving its financial
support partly from private sources and partly from the municipal-
ity. In this way the Defender himself is under the supervision of the
Board of Directors of a private organization and is not subject to
political or judicial direction in the performance of his duties.
Experience has shown that in the more populous cities and counties
the Defender office is far superior to the haphazard assignment of
counsel on an ad hoc basis 21 The organized service is better because
experienced attorneys are available in court when and as they are
needed. Representation is given at less cost and the private bar is
relieved of the burden of handling assigned cases. This is not to sug-
gest that the assignment system does not work well in some places.
But an organized service is far better in the larger cities and counties.
In February ig6o the House of Delegates of the American Bar As-
sociation adopted a set of standards for Defender services. These
standards, which are applicable to all forms of service, bear repeat-
ing:
"The Defender System of every state should:
"i. Provide counsel for every indigent person unable to
employ counsel who faces the p6ssibility of the deprivation
of his liberty or other serious criminal sanctions;
2'The position of the American Bar Association has been settled since 194o,
when the House of Delegates approved the following statement by its Committee
on Legal Aid Work: "In connection with Legal Aid in the Criminal Courts, the
Committee wishes to end any uncertainties that may have existed as to the position
of the American Bar Association in connection with the relative merits of public
and private Defenders. The position of the American Bar Association is that the
method and instrumentality of securing adequate representation. of poor defen-
dants in Criminal Courts is a local question for determination in the light of
local conditions, needs and wishes. The concern of. the Association is to secure
proper representation of poor defendants in the Criminal Courts as broadly and
as promptly as possible without preference or partiality as to method or instru-
mentality."
mBrownell, Supplement, op. cit. supra note 16, at 54.
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"2. Afford representation which is experienced, competent
and zealous;
"3. Provide the investigatory and other facilities .necessary
for a complete defense;
".t- Come into operation at a sufficiently early stage of the
proceedings so as to fully advise and protect the defendant;
"5. Assure undivided loyalty by defense counsel to the
client;
"6. Include the taking of appeals and the prosecuting of
other remedies, before or after conviction, considered by the
defending counsel to be in the interest of justice;
"7. Maintain in each county in which the volume of crim-
inal cases requiring assignment of counsel is such as to justify
the employment of at least one full-time lawyer to handle the
work effectively, a Defender office, either as a public office or
as a quasi-public or private organization; "
"8. Enlist community participation and responsibility and
encourage the continuing cooperation of the organized bar.--
Some have asked whether the Legal Aid movement is a step to-
wards "socialization" of the profession. On the contrary, the move-
ment represents the thoughtful effort of the organized bar to preserve
the independence of the profession. If we can properly implement
these plans-and do so with dispatch-the threat to our independence
will be greatly reduced. Fortunately, the choice is still ours-to pro-
vide, with comparatively little cost and effort, community law offices
which serve to assure equality before the law and, at the same time, to
preserve the moral and political strength of our heritage.
How can new Legal Aid and Defender services be established?
Not by the American Bar Association and its partner in this effort,
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Nor can existing
facilities be strengthened through national efforts alone. Interest and
leadership within the organized bar at state and local levels is a basic
requirement. Local bar leaders are needed to organize and inspire
other leaders of the community to survey local requirements and then
to take appropriate steps to establish and finance a community law
office suitable for the particular community or to strengthen or ex-
pand an existing office. Time and again one or two local lawyers have
been able to do this with the expert assistance of representatives of the
American Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association. No worthier cause can enlist the heart and talent of a
member of the bar. Legal Aid is the lawyer's "Red Cross."
By way of summary, I will close with bits of wisdom from three
Brownell, Supplement, op. cit. supra note 16, at 54.
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great leaders of our profession. My first quotation is taken from the
Commencement Address by Elihu Root before the , duating class at
Yale Law School just 58 years ago. Said Senator Root
"He is a poor-spirited fellow who conceives that he has no
duty but to his clients and sets before himself no object but per-
sonal success. To be a lawyer working for fees is not 'to be any
the less a citizen whose unbought service is due to his commun-
ity and his country with his best and constant effort. And the
lawyer's profession demands of him something more than
the ordinary public service of citizenship. He has a duty to
the law. In the cause of peace and order and human rights
against all injustice and wrong, he is the advocate of all men,
present and to come. If he fail in loyalty to this cause; if he
have not the earnestness and sincerity which come from a strong
desire to maintain the reign of law; his voice will ring false
in the courts and will fail to carry conviction to judicial minds."
My second quotation is from a great jurist who was also the first
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work of the
American Bar Association, Charles Evans Hughes:
"Whatever else lawyers may accomplish in public affairs, it is
their privilege and obligation to assure a competent adminis-
tration of justice to the needy so that no man shall suffer in the
enforcement of his legal rights for want of a skilled protector,
able, fearless, and incorruptible."2 3
And lastly, from Harrison Tweed, Chairman of the American Law
Institute and long a leader in legal aid work:
"Legal Aid needs help from every one but most of all it seeks
the passionate interest of younger men. They belong to to-day
and to tomorrow, not to yesterday, They see what is required in
the true perspective and with almost complete unanimity, where-
as in the older generation only a fringing few visualized the need
and worked its realization. The generation which is coming
to the bar recognizes that many of the -things which in the past
were given as benevolences are, in reality, rights to which men
are entitled and which they must have in full measure if our
system of government is to demonstrate its superiority. That
generation will see to it that the services of lawyers are avail-
able to all who need them."
24
Let us move forward together, young and old alike-lawyers all-
in this great crusade to make America's dream come true. Let us do
so while the choice of remedy is still open to our profession.
=Hughes, "Legal Aid Societies, Their function and Necessity," 43rd Annual
Report of the American Bar Association 234 (1920).
"Brownell, op. cit. supra note 2, at xx.
PRORATA CORPORATE RECOVERIES
PRORATA RECOVERY BY SHAREHOLDERS ON
CORPORATE CAUSES OF ACTION AS A
MEANS OF ACHIEVING CORPORATE JUSTICE
By EDWARD J. GRENIER, JR.*-
Ordinarily the entire recovery in a shareholder derivative suit goes
to the corporation. On occasion, however, in order to straighten out
the affairs of some closely held corporations, courts have decreed direct
recovery to sharehdlders in proportion to the number of shares held
by each. In 1955, in the landmark case of Perlman v. Feldmann,'
direct prorata recovery was decreed for the first time in a case in-
volving a publicly held corporation. This significant extension of the
prorata remedy opens the way to its use as a practical alternative to
a corporate recovery in a great variety of derivative suits. It also, how-
ever, is likely to raise a host of problems not previously faced by the
courts in dealing with closely held corporations. This article will
examine some of the problems and implications, largely unexplored
in Perlman, arising out of the extension of this remedy to publicly
held corporations. Chief among the problems seems to be working
out procedural rules which will assure reasonable protection to the
potentially conflicting interests of the several groups that make up the
large modern corporation. Some of the major implications arising
from the Pernman decision might relate to the very nature of the
corporation and the derivative suit.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRORATA RECOVERY
Originally, in the United States the shareholder's suit, although on
behalf of his corporation, was not based upon a strict concept of the
corporate entity.2 The plaintiff brought the action as representative
of all the shareholders, except any that might be defendants, even
*Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
tThe author wishes to express his thanks to Professor David R. Herwitz of
the Harvard Law School, who first led him to a consideration of this subject.
1219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1274,
on remand, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1559 (1958), 16o F.
Supp. 3io (D. Conn. 1958) (final order). This case is extensively discussed in Hill,
The Sale of Controlling Shares, 7o Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1957).
2See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 98o, 989 (1957).
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though the recovery inured to the corporation. When such actions
were brought against parties outside the corpor r, ton, courts began
stressing t.. fact that the cause of action belonged to the corporation
as a separate entity, and that the plaintiff was suing primarily as rep-
resentative of this entity.3 In this way the derivative suit came to be
rationalized on a theory of strict separation of the corporation from
its shareholders. 4 However, in order to prevent abuse, the equity courts
imposed certain requirements as to standing that had to be met to
entitle a shareholder to bring suit.5 Even with these procedural safe-
guards designed to prevents abuses, in certain situations a corporate re-
covery led to either inconvenience or injustice. Therefore, some courts
abandoning rigid formalism, granted recovery directly to the plain-
tiff-shareholders and other shareholders found entitled to damages
in proportion to the number of shares held by each.
A. Distinguished From Individual or Class Actions.
A prorata recovery of damages on a corporate cause of action must
be distinguished from recoveries on causes of action owned by share-
holders in their own right, and enforceable in either individual or
class suits.6 A suit by or on behalf of one of several classes of share-
holders is not based on a corporate cause of action, and therefore a
recovery therein is not "prorata" as the term is used herein.7 It may
be difficult, on occasion, though to distinguish between the two types
of suits. Over a strong dissent, one court has held that a suit to com-
pel declaration of a dividend is derivative in nature.8 On the other
hand, a shareholder has been permitted to bring an individual suit,
in his own name, against insiders for misappropriation of corporate
3id. at 990-92.
4See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1089, 1091, 1095 (5 th ed. i941).5For example, the contemporaneous-ownership rule. Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(i),
Hawes v. Oakland, 1o4 US. 450 (1882).
'See, e.g., Stevens, Private Corporations § 167, at 784, 796 (2d ed. 1949). But
see Comment, 46 ill. L. Rev. 937 (1952) (advocates nonderivative shareholders'
action for diminution in the value of their shares, reserving to the corporation
an action for the loss of assets). This recommendation, however, seems to ignore
the possibility of the shareholders benefiting twice. Compare General Rubber Co.
v. Benedict, 215 N.Y. 18, io9 N.E. 96 (1915).
7See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947). When used
alone, "pro rata" hereinafter means prorata recovery.
8Gordon v. Elliman, 3o6 N.Y. 456, 119 N.E. 331 (1954) (4-3 decision); cf.
Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd mem., 270
App. Div. 925, 62 N.Y.S.2d 760, aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d 88 (1946)
(derivative suit with prorata recovery).
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assets-the classical derivative-suit situation.9 Even if prorata recovery
would be appropriate in this latter situation, the nature of the suit
may be crucial if the plaintiff is unable to meet the procedural pre-
requisites for bringing a derivative suit.10 Generally, however, courts
have maintained the distinction between recovery by the shareholder
in his own right and recovery in a derivative suit of his prorata share of
damages payable to the corporation.11
B. Typical Situations in Which Prorata Recovery Has Been Decreed.
Prorata recovery on a corporate cause of action has been decreed:
(i) to provide a cbnvenient method for ultimate distribution when
the corporation is in liquidation or when its assets have been sold;
(2) to protect shareholders from dissipation of a corporate recovery
because of foreseeable future mismanagement by the defendants, who
will remain in control of corporate affairs; (3) to limit recovery to
"innocent" shareholders; and (4) to provide a remedy against those
who sell corporate control for an excessive consideration.
12
The liquidation situation presents no difficulties of theory or
policy. In the other situations, however, the corporation is a going
concern, and prorata recovery in substance effects a distribution of
some corporate assets to certain shareholders.'
3
9Equitable Trust Co. v. Columbia Nat'l Bank, 145 S.C. 91, 142 S.E. 811 (1928)
(action at law based on conversion of plaintiff's shares through taking of corporate
assets). The court appeared influenced in reaching its decision by the fact that all
parties below regarded the suit as properly an action at law; thus the defendants
should not now be permitted to change position. Id. at 133, 142 S.E. at 824.
10E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P 23(b)(1); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b (security-for-
expenses provision applicable to derivative suits).
uSee Dill v. Johnson, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 6o8 (igig); Note, 40 Calif. L.
Rev. 127, 131 n4o (1952). But see Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W
Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920) (some blurring of this distinction).
'-See Stevens, Private Corporations § 167, at 793-96 (2d ed. 1949); Developments
in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 946
0958) (hereinafter cited Developments-Multiparty Litigation); Note, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 1314 (1956); Note, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1935); 23 Minn. L. Rev. 973, 974
(1939). For the remainder of this article, these situations will be called, respectively
the liquidation situation; the foreseeable-mismanagement situation; the innocent-
shareholder situation; and the sale-of-control situation. These labels may give
more of an appearance of clarity than the cases warrant. There is considerable
overlapping, and they are intended to describe typical situations rather than to
be rigid categorizations. The term "innocent" herein refers to shareholders who
are free not merely from actual participation in the wrongful acts, but also from
acquiesence, laches, etc. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed, as is usual in
derivative suits, that the individual defendants are officers or directors of the cor-
poration.
2'2 The corporate cause of action is in a real sense a corporate asset, even
though it may not be shown on the balance sheet. This asset will cease to exist
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i. Corporation in liquidation.
Prorata recovery simply provides a procedural short cut in the
process of distribution of the corporate assets and is granted by the




When future gross mismanagement on the part of the defendants
can be readily predicted on the basis of past performance,' 5 prorata
recovery should be readily available, provided it is clear that the
plaintiffs will not be adequately protected by a corporate recovery.
Otherwise, a future derivative suit may be required because of an un-
lawful dissipation of of this corporate recovery. Perhaps the only ex-
ception to the granting of pro rata in such cases should be when the
recoverable funds are needed by the corporation to meet current lia-
bilities. It is arguable, of course, that if the record of past mismanage-
ment is so glaring as to require prorata recovery on that basis alone,
the long-term interests of the corporation may be better served by
granting a corporate recovery and appointing a receiver.' 6 Where a
closely held corporation is involved a court-decreed dissolution would
perhaps be the best solution.17
3. Limitation of recovery to "innocent" shareholders.
Situations in which prorata recovery is decreed in order to limit
recovery to ".innocent" shareholders 8 present more difficult ques-
after the suit in which prorata recovery is decreed, and the corporation will not
receive any of the proceeds as a substitute-for this asset. Furthermore, the balance
sheet may show assets which have been misappropriated and are the subject of the
action, thus emphasizing the fact that the cause of action is a corporate asset, a
substitute for the misappropnated assets. Therefore, it is realistic to consider prorata
recovery as an effective distribution of a corporate asset.
"See, e.g., Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 519 (1939); Alexander v. Quality
Leather Goods Corp., 150 Misc. 577, 269 N.Y. Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
"See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Fougeray v.
Cord, 5o NJ. Eq. 185, 24 Atl. 499 (Ch. 1892), Tev'd in part sub nom. Laurel
Springs Land Co. v. Fougeray, 5o N.J. Eq. 756, 26 At. 886 (Ct. Err. & App.) (lower
court's decree eliminated plaintiff as a shareholder in the corporation; upper court
gave him right to a reasonable dividend); cf. Eaton v. Robinson, 19 R.I. 146, 31
Ad. io58 (i895) (per curiam) (serious prior nsmanagement; prorata recovery
granted in order to obviate necessity of second suit to compel declaration of a
dividend).
:"See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1315 (1956). See generally Baker & Cary,
Cases and Materials on Corporations 7o6-o7 (3 d ed. 1958).
"1See Note, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1498, 1511-14 (1958).
"E.g., Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 11o W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (ig3i) (ratifiers
and shareholders with notice of the operations for the directors' benefit barred);
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tions of policy. Unlike the liquidation and foreseeable-mismanage-
ment situations, in which the only basic issue is whether or not a
corporate recovery should be decreed,19 there is the additional com-
plication that the wrongdoers may be permitted to retain funds pro-
portionate to the shares held by persons who, although innocent of
actual wrongdoing, either tacitly acquiesced in or expressly approved
the acts of the defendants. Perhaps when the defendants are directors
guilty of flagrant and wilful breaches of fiduciary duty toward the
corporation, full payment of the corporate damages should be ex-
acted.20 Even though such recovery may include a punitive element,
Brown v. DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897) (per curiam on opinion below)
(participator in wrong and acquiescer barred); Hams v. Rogers, igo App. Div. 2o8,
179 N.Y. Supp. 799 (1919) (shareholders who gave releases barred; some of plain-
tiff's shares "tainted" and thus barred, but affirmance based upon plaintiff's execu-
tion of judgment). The Illinois court later expressly declined to follow the rule of
the Brown case and granted corporate recovery. Voorhees v. Mason, 245 Ill. 256,
91 N.E. io56 (igo). In Hams v. Pearsall, 116 Misc. 366, 19o N.Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct.
5921), appeal dismissed on stipulation, 2o02 App. Div. 785, 194 N.Y. Supp. 942
(i922), the same plaintiff as in the Rogers case was permitted to bring a later
derivative suit against the then present directors, successors to those involved in
the first suit, for failing to sue the former directors.
n'This is not meant to indicate that the problems arising in the innocent-
shareholder situation could not also arise in the two situations discussed above,
if some shareholders were found to have acquiesced in the wrongful acts. However,
the above situations inherently and necessarily raise only the problem of corporate
versus prorata recovery, whereas the innocent-shareholder situation necessarily raises
the issues discussed in the text. Solely for the purpose of analysis, each of the situa-
tions is assumed to exist in its purest form. Thus, in the foreseeable-mismanage-
ment situation, the only shareholders who would be eliminated from sharing in
the recovery are the individual defendants themselves. Of course, these hypothetical
situations will rarely be found in pure form in actual cases.
! "Cf. Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, io4 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 823-26
(1956) who, speaking of sale-of-control cases, suggests a derivative suit with full
corporate recovery is preferable since recovery is "prophylactic" However, the
contention that corporate recovery should be granted because pro rata acts as a
pro tanto ratification of nonratifiable fraud, Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234,
252, 2 A.2d 9o4, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1938), 23 Minn. L. Rev. 937 (1939), Annot., 12o A.L.R.
238 (1939), seems highly formalistic. The acquiescing shareholders are not accepting
the fraud in the name of the corporation, but are merely forfeiting their right to
participate in any recovery.
In these cases, it seems that the breach of fiduciary duty involved is not enough
to show continual past gross mismanagement so as to give a basis for predicting
future mismanagement. Compare McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 1o3 (8th
Cir. 19o6) (corporate recovery; no prolonged history of serious and constant mis-
management). If, however, the breach is flagrant and willful and the defendants'
past conduct over a significant period justifies prorata recovery on the ground of
foreseeable mismanagement, perhaps the defendants should be required to pay all
shareholders other than themselves, including acqusescers or would-be ratifiers, thus
approximating a corporate recovery.
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it could be justified as providing a deterrent against such breaches
of fiduciary duty.
In less serious situations only prorata recovery miy be justifiable
even though the defendants violated a fiduciary Auty. When the lia-
bility of directors arises from negligence, from serious and exten-
sive misjudgments, or from authorization of now completed ultra
vires acts, it may be argued that they should not be required to account
to acquiescing shareholders. In these latter situations it is more likely
that the corporate funds paid out are in the hands of third parties
so that damages payable by the directors would not come from such
funds. Indeed, the directors may have derived no economic benefit at
all from the transactions. 21 Even in some situations in which the di-
rectors obtained corporate funds through a flagrant breach of fiduciary
duty, prorata recovery may be appropriate, because the shareholders'
acquiescence, under the circumstances, is equivalent to a compromise
agreement with the defendants. 22 In such instances, the strong policy
of the law in favor of settlements without litigation seems to swing
the balance in favor of the defendants. Furthermore, the acquiescers
merely receive the results of their bargain when recovery is denied
to them.
4. Sale of control in violation of'a fiduczary duty.
The use of prorata recovery as a means of providing a remedy
against those who sell corporate control for an excessive considera-
tion presents difficulties similar to those of the innocent-shareholder
situation. The primary emphasis in the cases is on holding the pur-
chasers of control to their contract with the defendant sellers and thus
denying any recovery to them. 23 Of course, in addition, there may be
other shareholders against whom the seller-defendants have personal
defences, as in the innocent-shareholder situation. Here, however,
a noncontrolling shareholder should not be found to have acquiesced
in the sale of control unless he had full knowledge of the material
2Ca. Harris v. Pearsall, i16 Misc. 366, i9o N.Y. Supp. 61 (Sup. Ct. i92i),
appeal dismissed on stipulation, 2o2 App. Div. 785, 194 N.Y. Supp. 942 (1922).
This factor should not be sufficient to cause a prorata, rather than a corporate,
recovery; however, it should be considered when the defendants' conduct is not
outrageous, even though it involves some sort of breach of fiduciary duty.
'See Chounis v. Laing, 125 W Va. 275, 23 S.E. 628 (1942) (however, no finding
of intent to defraud).
'See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U. S. 952
(1955). But see Leech, supra note 2o, at 823-26.
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facts. Mere failure to object within a reasonable time after the sale
should not be considered acquiescence, since sellers of control fre-
quently attempt to conceal such transactions from the noncontrolling
shareholders. 24 Shareholders with full knowledge, who have failed
to act for a long period, should be barred from recovery, for their
acquiescence must certainly be conscious. In some cases, it may even
be in the nature of a contractual compromise of liability.
Of course, the use of prorata recovery presupposes that a corporate
cause of action exists. Such a cause exists if some corporate "oppor-
tunity" or "asset" has been appropriated by the defendants for their
own benefit.2 5 However, in many cases the only real injury seems to be
to the noncontrolli'ng shareholders, who either were not permitted to
participate in the sale or were induced to sell at a price lower than
that received by the controlling shareholders. In logic, it seems that
in such situations an individual or representative action by such non-
controlling shareholders in their own right should be permitted.
26
Such an action avoids the conceptual difficulty of permitting per-
sons no longer shareholders to receive a portion of damages due to
the corporation.27 The ultimate result of such an individual action
should be the same as that of a derivative suit with prorata recovery,
for in either case an accounting for any excess "premium" will be
required since liability is based upon a breach of fiduciary duty.28
2 'See, e.g., Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76
Atl. 77 (191°) •
'See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 349 U.S.
952 (1955).
2See, e.g. Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 1o7, 179 N.E. 310 (1932). But see
American Trust Co. v. California W States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. ad 42, 66, 98
P.2d 497 (1940) (injury to the corporation). If injury both to the corporation
and to former shareholders is shown, probably both a derivative suit and an
individual action by the former shareholders should be permitted. But care should
be taken not to decree the equivalent of a double recovery against the defendants
(compare note 6, supra), except possibly in the very limited situation described
in note 71, infra, if it is found that the wrong to the corporation injured both a
former and present shareholder.
-1But cf. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956), 35 N.C.L. Rev. 279
(1957) (in nonderivative suit former shareholder in two-man corporation allowed
to recover prorata share of corporate damages).
'Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957) (prorata
recovery), with Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 10 7 , 179 N.E. 31o (1932) (nonderivative
suit). However, the measure of damages might be different if the action is based
upon deceit. See Baker & Cary, op. cit. supra note 16, at 596. Furthermore, it is
assumed in the text that no damages against the sellers for actual looting by the
purchasers, see Insuransbares v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1940), will be recoverable.
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C. Possible Use of Prorata Recovery to Bar "Subsequent" Shareholders
From Sharing in Damages Recoverable by the Co, poration.
Although in many jurisdictions a shareholder does not -have stand-
ing to bring a derivative suit unless he was a shareholder at the
time of the wrong,29 no court has decreed prorata recovery solely
because some of the shareholders at the time of suit were subsequent
shareholders. The purpose of the rule on standing to sue is to prevent
speculation in litigation and to reduce the likelihood of strike suits;' 0
it is not based on a feeling that it is unfair to permit subsequent share-
holders to benefit from a recovery.
It has been held, however, in the leading case of Home Fire Ins. Co.
v. Barber and in two other cases,3 ' that the corporation itself is barred
from recovery when all the present shareholders are subsequent share-
holders. In that situation, then, it is not possible, in jurisdictions adher-
ing to the Home Fire Ins. Co. rule, to bring a derivative suit either be-
cause subsequent shareholders have no standing to sue or because the
plaintiff in a derivative suit -cannot assert greater rights than those of
his corporation.3 2 On the other hand, the presence of just one contemp-
oraneous shareholder, perhaps the holder of only one share in a large
publicly-held corporation, can lead to the dramatically opposite result
of a full corporate recovery. In such an extreme situation, it seems more
2E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P 23 (b)(i); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61. A shareholder who
would qualify under these statutes will be referred to as a contemporaneous share-
holder. One who would not qualify will be called a subsequent shareholder.
3 See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 951-52, 967
(958).
3iPark Terrace, Inc. v. Burge, 249 N.C. 3o8, io6 S.E.2d 478 (1959), 37 N.C.L. Rev.
320 (1959); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (19o3); Capitol
Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.,d 291 (195o), aff'd
per curiam, So2 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951). In the Home Fire Ins. Co. case the
court specifically noted that the present shareholders had paid a fair consideration
for their stock and were thus not injured by the prior mismanagement. Home
Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, supra at 657, 663, 93 N.W. at io2g, o31. The court in
Pokrass relied upon the lack of standing in the jurisdiction of a subsequent share-
holder to bring a suit on behalf of the corporation. The fairness argument of the
Home Fire Ins. Co. case was relied upon in the concurring opinion. Capitol Wine
& Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, supra at 189-9o, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97.
"See Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances,
33 Yale L.J. 58o, 588 (1924). But see Di Tomasso v. Loverro, 250 App. Div. 2o6,
293 N.Y. Supp. 912, aff'd per curiam, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937) (corporation
barred because m pari delicto as party to contract in restraint of competition, but
shareholder allowed to recover from directors prorata share of corporate damages
on the contract). The Di Tomasso rule would not apply, however, when the bar
against the corporation arises only because of the unfairness of allowing the share-
holders to benefit from a recovery.
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logical and reasonable to decree prorata recovery, and so allow re-
covery only to the single contemporaneous shareholder.
33
Certain factors, however, may point toward the desirability of a
corporate recovery, even when all the present shareholders are subse-
quent shareholders. If the loss of corporate assets remains concealed un-
til shortly before the suit, the substantial injury really falls upon the
present shareholders, whether contemporaneous or subsequent. It is
likely that former shareholders sold out at prices higher than those
obtainable if the wrong had been known. If the suit is against direct-
ors or officers, there is no policy reason for releasing them from lia-
bility if their wrong has caused a present injury to present share-
holders. If the suit is against persons never within the corporation (for
example, persons who allegedly violated a contract with the corpora-
tion), the failure of a prior management to bring suit should not bar
an action regardless of when the breach was discovered and the status
of present shareholders. The rule of Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber*
4
seems inapplicable, since outsiders should be bound by their under-
taking and not be permitted to look behind the corporate entity.
The Home Fire Ins. Co. rule and its extension, through the use
of prorata recovery,35 to the situation where substantially all the
shareholders are subsequent may not be fully operative unless there
is but a single class of common shareholders. It is arguable that bond-
holders36 and preferred shareholders, whether "contemporaneous" or
"'See May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 314
U.S. 668 (1941).
167 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (i9o3). This case involved breaches of fiduciary
duty by directors and officers of a closely-held corporation. The court itself noted
that, since the "corporation is not asserting or endeavoring to protect a title to
property, it can only maintain a suit in equity as the representative of it stock-
holders...." Id. at 664, 93 N.W at 1o31-32.
3'The same prorata recovery can be obtained even if the corporation itself
brings the suit under a new management. See Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co.,
13o Md. 523, ioo At. 645 (1917).
36The ordinary trade creditor should not be afforded any special rights so long
as he still may enforce his primary cause of action against the corporation. Upon
insolvency in the equity sense, it seems that such a creditor should be able to
prevent any direct prorata recovery by the shareholders. See text after note 55 and
at notes 56-57, infra; Stevens, Private Corporations §§ 167, 168, at 797, 799 (2d ed.
1949). Similarly, the rule of the Home Fire Ins. Co. case itself should be inapplicable,
since in the insolvency situation a corporate recovery is really for the benefit
of creditors, and not the subsequent shareholders. But see Capitol Wine & Spirit
Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (195o), aff'd per curiam, 302
N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951) (amended complaint alleging that suit is solely for
benefit of creditors-government's for unpaid taxes-not permitted; but no indi-
cation of insolvency). It seems that a creditor's knowledge of the wrong when he
extended the credit should be immaterial. Cf. Easton Nat'l Bank v. American Brick
& Tile Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 732, 64 Atl. 917 (Ct. Err. & App. i9o6).
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"subsequent," as those terms are used-in this article, are always entitled
to a corporate recovery, i t least to the extent necearv to restore im-
paired capital.3 7 They might even be entitled to a, orate recovery
over and above this amount so as to provide suffick it ;orking capital
to prevent another impairment of capital as a result of current opera-
tions.
Bondholders especially have .strong ground for demanding a
corporate recovery. They are senior to all other interests, and they
cannot enforce their rights until their bonds are mature. Bondholders
as a group should have the continuing right to some corporate re-
covery when capital has been impaired even if all the bonds changed
hands between the occurrence of the wrong and the time of suit. This
argument possesses less force when extended to preferred share-
holders, even if they have a liquidation preference, for they are
corporate risk-takers and entitled to maintain derivative suits to
redress corporate wrongs.38 Nevertheless, they do seem entitled to a
"cushion" argument similar to that of the bondholders.
Even when the capital of the corporation consists entirely of a
single class of common stock and the suit is against corporate in-
siders, prorata recovery may be inappropriate if only a comparatively
small number of the shareholders are subsequent. Logically, the same
rules governing the availability, of prorata recovery should apply
whether a shareholder brings a derivative suit or new management
brings a corporate suit.39 A rigid rule requiring prorata recovery in
such situations would result in the diversion of a considerable amount
of assets away from the corporate treasuries. Such a rule would work
exceptionally great mischief in publicly held corporations with ac-
tively -traded stock; in such corporations some shareholders are almost
always bound to be "subsequent." Furthermore, the great majority
of the shareholders, especially in publicly held corporations, would
probably prefer to have such assets remain in the corporation in
order to produce long-term growth and profitability. Of course,
the amounts received in such a prorata distribution could be re-
invested, but this may not be practicable if each shareholder receives
nCf. Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., 13o Md. 523, ioo Ati. 645 (1917).
The court mentioned specifically that there was no showing that the corporation
needed the recovery in order to pay creditors, that the capital was impaired, or that
there would be any injury to the preferred shareholders if pro rata were decreed.
3See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 321 (1936) (voting
preferred); cf. Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
afl'd mem., 27o App. Div. 925, 62 N.YS.2d 76o, aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d
818 (1946) (nonvoting participating stock).
NSee note 35 supra.
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but a small amount, and it may be inconvenient if a charter amend-
ment is required for the issuance of any new shares necessary for
such reinvestment.
40
If the Home Fire Ins. Co. rule is extended in the breach-of~fiduci-
ary-duty case to the situation in which substantially all the share-
holders are subsequent, and rejected when substantially all the share-
holders are contemporaneous, there will remain difficult problems
of application in intermediate situations when the factors mentioned
above as strongly pointing toward a corporate recovery are lacking.
It is arguable that if no creditors or senior security-holders are preju-
diced, prorata recovery should be decreed whenever it is clear that
the wrongful acts 'could have damaged only the contemporaneous
shareholders. A showing that the subsequent shareholders purchased
at a price depressed because of the wrongs is some evidence of this,
although it is difficult to devise a reliable method for isolating the
impact of the wrong on the price of the shares. The defendants
should have the burden of proving clearly that all the elements justify-
ing prorata recovery, including the clear financial solvency of the
corporation, are present. At some point the number of subsequent
shareholders would be sufficiently large so that the burden be shifted
to those who oppose pro rata to show that the wrong actually injured
subsequent shareholders or that the financial condition of the corpora-
tion requires a corporate recovery. This type of adjustment in the
burden of proof should provide a reasonably workable method for
achieving desirable corporate-law results. Subject to all the foregoing
conditions, therefore, in some circumstances a decree awarding pro-
rata recovery solely because of the presence of subsequent shareholders
in the corporation would be justifiable.
II. RIGHT To REQUEST, OBJECT To, AND SHARE IN PRORATA RECOVERY
A. Standing to Request and Object.
There is no objection to allowing either party to request prorata
recovery in the liquidation situation, since the primary reason for
the request is to afford greater convenience, 41 but in the foreseeable-
"Furthermore, registration of a new issue of shares with the SEC might be
required under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (1958), as amended, 15 US.C. § 77b (Supp. II, 1961).
"Compare Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 519 (1939) (requested by the
plaintiff), with Shanik v. Empire Power Corp., 58 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
aff'd mem., 27o App. Div. 925, 62 N.Y.S.2d 760, aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 664, 69 N.E.2d
8M8 (1946) (requested by the defendant).
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mismanagement situation only the plaintiffs or intervening plaintiffs
should be permitted to make this request. Even though prorata re-
covery appears to diminish the amount of damages recoverable from
the defendants, in most instances the defendants are large shareholders
as well as managers and thus derive proportionate benefit from any
corporate recovery.4 2 Of course, this need not be the case; especially in
a large publicly-held corporation these manager-defendants may own
no shares at all, so that the full amount of damages will be recoverable
regardless of the type of recovery. In any event, it is unlikely that a
court will accept an argument by the defendants in a foreseeable-
mismanagement situation that prorata recovery should be decreed
because "our past terrible record shows we are likely to mismanage
in the future." Furthermore, prorata recovery in this situation is
granted because of the possibility of future losses from mismanage-
ment, rather than because of any right in the defendants to limit the
recovery on the basis of defenses against some of the plaintiff group.
The decreeing of prorata recovery because recovery should be
limited to innocent or contemporaneous shareholders depends en-
tirely upon personal defenses against some shareholders, so that only
the defendants should be permitted to request pro rata" Furthermore,
no policy interest is served by allowing some shareholder-plaintiffs
to allege that other shareholders should be barred from recovery.
Similar considerations apply in the sale-of-control situation. If
the action is conceived of as a corporate cause of action, only the de-
fendants should be able to request prorata recovery. Of course, some
of these suits may be in the nature of individual causes of action
possessed by the noncontrolling shareholders 44
"See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927); Henry G. Davis &
Co. v. Gemmell, 73 Md. 530, 21 Ad. 712 (1891). As noted in footnote ig, supra, in
the "pure" foreseeable-mismanagement situation, the only shares barred from
participation in the recovery are those held by the individual defendants them-
selves.
"See, e.g., Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 i921); Brown v.
DeYoung, 167 Ill. 549, 47 N.E. 863 (1897) (per curam on opinion of court below).
But see Note, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 322 n.28 (1935) (interpreting a comment made
by one court).
"Such suits might be considered "spurious" class suits under Federal Rule
23(a)(3), and thus not binding on absentees, since each shareholder would possess
his own separate cause of action. See Moore, Federal Practice par. 23.io, at 3442-5o
(2d ed. 1948). However, in this type of suit there seem to be no reasons of policy
for refusing to permit the common questions arising from the sale to be determined
once and for all in the class suit, provided the test of adequacy of representation
is met, with each member of the class then permitted to come in and prove his
claim. See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 28o-88 (ig5o); Developments-Multi-
party Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 936-39 (1958).
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Shareholder-plaintiffs should have standing to object to prorata
recovery requested by a defendant, whereas it would be incongruous
to honor such an objection by a defendant. 45 Some might agrue that
the plaintiffs should have no standing to object, since they will bene-
fit as much if the recovery goes directly to them rather than to the
corporation. However, even apart from other considerations, 46 a dol-
lar in the hands of the shareholder is not the same as a dollar in the
corporate treasury. The latter possesses a certain dynamism, the pos-
sibility of producing more dollars in profits. The plaintiffs may well,
therefore, as investors prefer a corporate recovery, especially if the
recovery forms a substantial part of corporate assets. 4 7 Furthermore,
plaintiffs should be permitted to ask for a corporate recovery in order
to benefit shareholders not parties, since the representative character
of the suit becomes even more apparent once prorata recovery has
been requested.
The plaintiffs, though, are not likely to represent adequately the
interests of all the absent shareholders. They have no standing to re-
fute the defendants' allegations of personal defenses against some of
the absentees, the basis of the defendants' request for pro rata. More-
over, they may be quite content with prorata recovery, possibly be-
cause they have no interest in a long-term investment 48 or because
they would recover a sizeable sum of money which would then be
available for more profitable investment elsewhere.. Consequently
the personal interests of the plaintiffs may be antagonistic to the
"This incongruity was pointed out in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178
(2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (19 5 5)- Of course, a defendant may use incon-
gruous arguments, even those pointing to increased liability, in order to ward off
the evil day for payment of any damages-hardly a position that would appeal to
a court of equity. See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 9o (7 th Cir. 1941).
In the liquidation situation, there is no point in permitting anyone to argue
for a corporate recovery, for presumably the court will insure that the rights of
creditors are upheld before allowing shareholders to receive any of the fund after
a prorata recovery is decreed.
'8For example some courts have denied recovery of attorney's fees to the
plaintiffs because the recovery does not benefit the corporation. See, e.g., Joyce v.
Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29 (192i). However, these cases did not involve
a group of shareholders eligible to share in the recovery large enough to be con-
sidered a class. In at least one case, ibid., the recovery for the plaintiff "class" was
so small that an attorney's fee could not have been taken out of it; thus any suzh
fee would have required an additional recovery from the defendants. However,
if a large enough group of shareholders is involved, the suit should be treated
like any other class suit, with the fees being taken from the fund recovered. See
Perlman v. Feldmann, i6o F. Supp. 31o (D. Conn. 1958); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev.
1314, 1319 (i956).
"See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 947 (1958).
4sSee ibid.
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interests of many of the absentees. A fortiori, the plaintiffs may fail to
represent adequately the interests of others, such a,, I "dholders, with
interests in the corporation.
B. Notification to Persons or Classes not Before the Court.
In view of these possibilities, notification should be given to absent
shareholders of the pendency of the action and the possibility that
prorata recovery will be decreed. 49 When the plaintiffs do not ade-
quately represent all interests any attempt to bind inadequately
represented absentees on the issue of whether prorata recovery should
be decreed may violate due process.5 0 Such notification, with an in-
vitation to intervene, should satisfy due process,51 for it affords an
40See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1316 (1956). But see Chounis .v. Laing, 125 W
Va. 275, 23 SXE. 628 (1942) (notice not necessary because shareholders can intervene
after the decree and still recover); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 Atl. 320
(1937) (court holds failure of shareholders to join in suit is assent to defendants'
acts or waiver of rights). Both of these cases overlook the considerations in favor
of pre-decree notice.
5OCf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Representation may not be adequate
unless the claims and defenses of absentees are actually litigated. See Note, 46
Colum. L. Rev. 8i8, 831 (1946); cf. Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1059, 1o65 (1954). It has
been stated that the adequacy of representation and the question of whether to
permit the suit to be maintained as a class suit is or should be within the trial
court's discretion. See Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants,
ig Cornell L.Q. 399, 433 (1934); Editorial Note, 2 How. L.J. iii, 127 (1956) (by impli-
cation); Comment, 25 Texas L. Rev. 64, 70 (146). But see Weeks v. Bareco Oil
Co., 125 F.2d 84, 93 (7 th Cir. 194i) (dictum) (if facts are undisputed appellate court
can exercise its own judgment). Of course, the trial court's determination is subjecct
to review for abuse of discretion. For suggested tests of whether the representation
is adequate, see Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 938
(1958); Note, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 120, 141-42 (1953).
5 See Chafee, op. cit. supra note 44, at 231 (though should not grant binding
effect to all class suits on basis of notice alone, id. at 276-77); Keeffe, Levy & Dono-
van, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Cornell L.Q. 327, 345-49 (1948) (notice alone should
make class suit binding on absentees); Note, 46 Colum. L. Rev. gig (1946) (if noti-
fication is given, all class suits should have collateral estoppel effects against
absentees). But see Note, 7 Okla. L. Rev. 472 (1954) (advocates some notice, but
it is not decisive of due process).
In the pro rata situation, notice should be sufficient, since, even if no absentees
enter the suit, their rights will receive some sort of rough representation, provided
some arguments are made both for and against pro rata. Notification will give the
absentees a greater opportunity to enter and have their arguments presented more
sharply. Even if the absentees form sub-classes, notice should suffice, for there will
probably be only a few arguments available to each group; these can be gotten
before the court if only a few out of each group come in. The same reasoning seems
applicable to such special groups as bondholders and preferred shareholders, both
of whom may present only narrowly confined arguments, as indicated in the text.
In any event, on the issue of whether to grant pro rata, the pro rata situation may
be differentiated from other types of class suits from the point of view of most of the
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adequate opportunity to be heard. Stockholders' lists will facilitate
this notification, 52 although these lists may not be fully adequate to
insure notice to all interested parties, for example when prorata re-
covery may be decreed to former shareholders. ,3 If this is a possibility,
in fairness, such former shareholders should be notified and offered the
opportunity to argue for prorata recovery. The best available type
of notification should be used, with publication used only when
identity or whereabouts are unknown.54 Failure to notify a former-
shareholder group may not be as seriou's as failure to notify present
shareholders, some of whom might wish to argue for a corporate re-
covery, since, by hypothesis, the defendants will present arguments
for pro rata,55 and so former shareholders will receive at least rough
representation by the defendants.
Certain groups other than shareholders and former shareholders
should receive notification. In the liquidation situation, of course
all types of creditors should be notified after the decree, but there
is not much point in permitting them to argue for a corporate re-
covery before the decree; thus, they do not need to receive the notice
here under consideration. In the remaining pro rata situations,
ordinary trade creditors probably should not be given standing to
object to prorata recovery, unless they are unable to realize on the
primary obligation of the corporation; insolvency in the equity sense
should be sufficient basis for giving standing to these creditors. Of
course, it is unlikely that either party to the litigation will present
evidence of such insolvency. Even so, no elaborate system to give
absent shareholders: The difference between a direct prorata recovery and a corpor-
ate recovery does not seem as crucial as retaining or losing a cause of action,
as in the usual class-suit situation. Even shareholders who might be in a group
barred by pro rata may be better off than absentees in other class-suit situations,
since they will be able to contend individually after the decree that they should
be within the claimant group, whereas in other class suits once the class loses no
member gets a second chance. Therefore, it seems that notice should suffice to
bind absentees to the court's determination to grant pro rata, even if such notice
without more would not be sufficient in other class suits.
i2See Perlman V. Feldmann, 16o F. Supp. 31o (D. Conn. 1958).
OSee text at notes 68-72, infra.
rCf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
sln the foreseeable-mismanagement situation, it is true that the plaintiffs would
present the argument for prorata recovery, but only the defendants could argue
for barring subsequent shareholders from participation in the recovery. If the
defendants so argue, the former shareholders would most likely receive notice after
the decree to-come in and claim, if appropriate. See text at notes 85-86 infra. If only
the plaintiffs argue for prorata in this situation, the subsequent-shareholder issue
would not arise; therefore, as a matter of sound judicial administration, it seems
that if former shareholders want to obtain part of the recovery, they should be left
to whatever right to intervene that they might have.
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notice to such creditors is necessary, since hidden insolvency does
not occur frequently, and courts are likely to prot, creditors when
insolvency is known or suspectedV3 Perhaps it would be desirable to
give a general notice by publication of the suit and the possibility of
prorata recovery.57 If a creditor does appear before the decree is
rendered, he should be permitted to argue for a corporate recovery
solely on the ground of insolvency.
Bondholders seem to be in a stronger position to object to pro-
rata recovery, since they have no present right of action against the
corporation. They should be permitted to demand elimination of any
impairment of capital.58 If the jurisdiction permits "nimble dividends"
to be paid from the net profits of the current or recent accounting
period,59 the question may arise whether such a statute destroys the
bondholders' standing to object to a prorata recovery.60 It might be
argued that the statutory term "net profits" should be construed to
mean profits arising from the operations of the business; thus a re-
covery in the suit would not be "net profits." Even if this term is
broad enough to encompass recoveries in litigation, however, such
6See, e.g., Matthews v. Headley Chocolate Co., i3o Md. 523, 19o Ad. 645
(1917) (court mentions that there was no allegation that the money was needed for
creditors); Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods Corp., 150 Misc. 577, 269 N.Y.
Supp. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (corporation dissolved; court mentions that creditors have
been paid).
57Cf. Johnson v. Waters, iii Us. 640 (1884) (notification to creditors by news-
paper after decree in creditors' bill); Berger, "Disregarding the Corporation Entity"
for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 8o8, 823 (1955).
"See text at notes 36-37, supra. Normally there could not be a fresh impair-
ment of capital through prorata recovery, since the asset involved, the cause of
action, is not likely to appear on the balance sheet. Moreover, if the corporate
assets involved in the suit still appear on the balance sheet even though no longer
possessed by the corporation, pro rata still would do no more than to confirm an
existing impairment.
"0E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 15oo(b); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 17o(a)(2) (1953).
See generally Dodd & Baker, Cases and Materials on Corporations 1157-63 (2d ed.
1951).
8"Such recovery has been characterized as a "forced" payment of a dividend.
See Miller v. Crown Perfumery Co., 125 App. Div. 881, io N.Y. Supp. 8o6 (igoB);
Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1315-16 (1956). This statement seems to envision pro-
rata recovery as if the funds go first to the corporation, usually contrary to actual
fact. However, the contention appears to have much force if the corporate cause of
action is shown on the balance sheet, or if the misappropriated assets are still
shown thereon. It has force in any event if the term "dividend" is not taken in
a technical sense. See note 13 supra. Perhaps the dividend statute would not liter-
ally apply to pro rata unless the cause of action were shown on the balance sheet,
and perhaps not even then because of the absence of corporate action. However,
the party requesting pro rata might attempt to argue by analogy from the statute
so as to defeat the objections of the bondholders-probably without too great a
chance for success in view of the bondholders' contract with the corporation.
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a statute may refer only to dividends paid through normal corporate
action, and not to distributions, possibly analogous to dividends,
ordered by a court. Therefore, it seems that such a statute should not
affect the standing of the bondholders to object. As in the case when
equity insolvency is present, it is unlikely that either side in the suit
will offer evidence of an impairment of capital.61 Consequently, bond-
holders should receive some sort of personal notice.
62
Similar arguments relating to an impairment of capital are avail-
able to preferred shareholders. They have an analogous "cushion"
argument, especially when they have a liquidation preference. In ad-
dition, their standing to object to prorata recovery for the common
shareholders should be absolutely clear when there are arrearages
on cumulative preferred dividends. Any such recovery to the common
without providing for the payment of such arrearages violates the
contract among the shareholders inter sese. Even the holder of non-
cumulative preferred without a liquidation preference should have
standing to object to prorata recovery in order to insure that assets will
be available in the future to pay his noncumulative dividend and to
give him something on liquidation. This last argument is especially
cogent if a preferred shareholder is permitted to share in a prorata
recovery only to the extent that he is entitled to dividends under his
contract with the corporation. Alternatively, provided no senior securi-
ty is prejudiced, perhaps the preferred shareholders should receive
so much of the prorata recovery as will return to them capital pro-
portionate to the amount by which the common is impaired. How-
ever, this compounds the evil of a capital impairment and may under-
mine the notion of a capital measuring rod. Permitting the preferred
to argue for a corporate recovery seems preferable. In a sale-of-control
case, it might be argued that a holder of nonvoting preferred should
have no standing to oppose pro rata since he has no voice in control.
This argument has force if used to prevent such a holder from join-
ing in a nonderivative class suit by noncontrolling shareholders, seek-
ing an individual recovery. However, the use of the derivative suit in
this situation presupposes the existence of some corporate asset or
61This is true, unless, of course, impairment of capital is involved in the actual
litigation.
"Since a hidden capital impairment seems not likely to occur frequently, per-
haps notice by mail should be sent to only a fraction of the bondholders, with the
remainder being notified through publication, if that would be less expensive.
In the foreseeable-mismanagement situation, it seems that courts should be
very sympathetic to the bondholders' request for a receivership to protect whatever
corporate recovery they manage to obtain.
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opportunity as the basis of the sult,6 3 and so a preferred shareholder
should have the same standing he has in any othei p - rata situation,
and should receive individual notice.
Even though all these notifications appear desirable, the cost of
providing them, even by ordinary mail, may be high, especially in a
large publicly-held corporation. The allocation of this cost might well
have a practical effect on the type of remedy sought. In the first in-
stance, it would seem that the cost of such notice should be borne
by the party requesting prorata recovery, since it is his request that
produces the need for the notice.64 However, since the purpose of the
notice is to give absentees the opportunity of arguing for a corporate
recovery, it may be argued that the corporation should bear the ex-
pense of notice.65 Actually, though, the notice is not given for the
benefit of the corporation, but rather for the benefit of absentees
who may be interested in a corporate recovery. On the other hand,
since the parties to the suit and the persons receiving notice repre-
sent virtually the totality of interests in the corporation, perhaps at
least some part of the burden should be borne by the corporation. 66
When the defendants request pro rata, perhaps the cost of notice
should be divided equally between them and the corporation. The de-
fendants should bear some of the burden because they made the
original demand for pro rata and stand to benefit 'from decreased
damages; yet, at least some of the expense should fall upon those
'3See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955)-
"Cf. Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1o59, 1o65 (1954) (in class suits, burden should
always be on the plaintiff); Note, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 12o, 136 (1953). But cf. Gordon,
The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules and in Illinois, 42
Ill. L. Rev. 518, 529 (1947); Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
874, 938 (1958) (might in some circumstances m class suits shift burden to the
defendants).
e6Cf. d. at 938 n.462 (corporation bears expense of notice in ordinary derivative
suit). Cases which deny to the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees because the recovery
does not go to the corporation, e.g., Joyce v. Congdon, 114 Wash. 239, 195 Pac. 29
(1921), may not be in point here, since the primary import of the notice is to enable
persons not otherwise before the court to present arguments for a corporate
recovery.
"Even though all interests in the corporation may be affected to some extent
because of corporate payment of such expenses, the burden of such costz
appears to fall most heavily on the common shareholders, for bond interest and
preferred dividends must be satisfied prior to payment of dividends on the common.
However, senior interests could be burdened considerably if the corporation is in
difficult financial circumstances. In any event, bondholders and preferred share-
holders should bear a lesser part of the burden, since they are likely to gain less
from a corporate recovery than the junior interests and may oppose prorata recovery
on only limited grounds and to a limited extent.
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who will benefit from the notice. Even though not exact, this division
of the expenses will approximate the desired result and will be easy to
administer. When the plaintiffs seek pro rata in the foreseeable-mis-
management situation, the corporation should bear the entire ex-
pense. Both sides to the litigation are likely to derive benefit from
prorata recovery-albeit for differing reasons. Since the defendants
are frequently substantial shareholders, allocating the entire burden
to the corporation will be equitable, yet easy to administer. 67 In the
liquidation situation, notice prior to the decree seems unnecessary;
but if any is required, the cost should be taken out of the fund before
the court, since th decreeing of pro rata is a. matter of convenience
and is merely a short cut to the ultimate result of a corporate recovery.
In any event, in all these situations the court should be empowered
to allocate this expense according to the equities in the individual case.
C. Right to Share in a Prorata Recovery
Prima facie, the plaintiffs and all other common shareholders not
barred because of personal defenses of the defendants against them
should be entitled to share in a prorata recovery. However, at least
two questions concerning the common shareholders must be an-
swered: (i) Assuming that prorata recovery is decreed on some ground
other than mere presence of subsequent shareholders, should subse-
quent shareholders be barred from recovery? (2) Even if subsequent
shareholders are not barred as a group, should some former share-
holders be substituted for some present subsequent shareholders?
67ln this situation, if the defendants own no shares, they will not benefit from
any reduced liability (unless they too can claim prorata recovery on another
ground). By charging the corporation with the entire cost, the burden will fall
predominantly upon the real beneficiaries of the recovery-the common shareholders
represented by the plaintiffs-although indirectly. When the defendants do own
shares, they would share in this indirect burden, but they receive the benefit of
not being forced to pay some of the damages. This is a real advantage, especially if
the financial condition of the corporation is not very strong, even though they
would have a proportionate interest in what they restore to the corporation if
a corporate recovery were decreed.
When it is the defendants who request pro rata, it does not seem inequitable
to charge one half of the expense to them even if they are substantial shareholders
in the corporation. The bulk of the burden will thus fall upon the defendants,
but they have the most to gain through pro rata. It is true that this arrangement
would not place any of the burden upon former shareholders. However, the de-
fendants may- benefit from the arguments for pro rata offered by such persons
and may need them in order to prove that the impact of the wrongful acts fell
solely upon the former holders. This will benefit the defendants if they can thus
bar some present shareholders and still cut out some of the former holders through
various personal defenses.
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Since pro rata is decreed anyway, there is no need to consider the
subsequent shareholders as a group, and thus the analysis used to de-
termine whether pro rata should be decreed solely because of the
presence of subsequent shareholders68 is inappropriate. Any number
can be excluded without inconvenience, and therefore each share-
holder's case should be examined on its merits.
Because of the wrongful acts, some of the present shareholders
may have purchased at a lower price than they would otherwise have
paid. If so, it may be argued that a former contemporaneous share-
holder, who sold without knowledge of the wrong, should share in
the recovery rather than his purchaser.69 This can be rationalized on
the ground that, if permitted to recover, the subsequent shareholder
will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the innocent, unknowing,
contemporaneous shareholder. Such a substitution should not depend
upon the subsequent shareholder's knowledge of 'the wrong,70 but
the case for substitution is even stronger if the subsequent share-
holder had knowledge of the wrong while his seller did not. The
right to substitution becomes more doubtful if both purchaser and
seller had knowledge of the wrong at the time of sale. It is possible
that, even though the purchase price was lower than it would have
been had there been no wrong, part of the consideration was for
the possibility that the corporation might some day 'recover for the
wrong. If so, it seems that the former shareholder should be excluded.
Of course, it may be impossible to determine whether any of the
consideration was so allocated. The court must then weigh the equities
between the parties. If it is found that the former shareholder was
fully aware of his personal loss because of the wrong and that he
sold because he did not want to risk further loss, it seems more equi-
table not to allow him to be substituted for the present subsequent
6 See part I C., supra.
"oCf. Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956) (factor of lack of knowledge
stressed in nonderivative suit by former shareholder to recover his proportionate
share of corporate damages).
"'The result of any given case should not differ solely because the shareholder
at the time of the suit is removed by several mesne conveyances from the holder
of the shares at the time of the wrong. Unless otherwise indicated, the "subsequent
shareholder" referred to in the text is the actual purchaser from the contempor-
aneous shareholder. Except as indicated, a later subsequent purchaser stands in the
shoes of his predecessor. For a discussion of this problem, see Developments-
Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 948-49 (1958).
Even if pro rata is decreed solely because of the presence of subsequent share-
holders, the question of whether the contemporaneous shareholders should be sub-
stituted for any or all of the present subsequent holders must be considered on an
individual basis. Moreover, it is possible that some of the subsequent shareholders
might recover, even though their group as a whole is prima facie barred.
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shareholder. If the court finds that the former shareholder, although
he knew of the wrong, was not fully aware of its effect upon him,
perhaps the equities point toward a recovery for him. Similarly, if
the seller had full knowledge of the wrong, but the subsequent-share-
holder-purchaser had no knowledge, the subsequent shareholder may
prevail over him; but less than full knowledge on the part of the
seller may lead to the opposite result. In any event, if the defend-
ants can show that recovery by the subsequent shareholder would in-
volve a windfall and that the former shareholder waived his rights or
relinquished them to his purchaser, the defendants should not be re-
quired to pay either claimant. The defendants. should be liable to the
present shareholder only to the extent that the wrongful act injured
him.
If the subsequent shareholder paid a consideration to the con-
temporaneous shareholder equal to what would have been paid had
there been no wrong, it seems that the subsequent shareholder should
recover.71 A recovery by the former shareholder would unjustly en-
rich him, whereas denial of all recovery whatsoever would seem to
enrich the defendants unjustly; for, by paying a full consideration, the
subsequent shareholder has taken upon himself the impact of the
defendants' wrong against the corporation. In all these variations of
this situation, very difficult problems of valuation are likely to be
presented to the court.72 Yet, this approach seems more likely to
2Compare text following note 33 and at note 34, supra. If the present share-
holder is one removed by several mesne conveyances from the contemporaneous
shareholder, an attempt should be made to determine whether he paid a full con-
sideration, as described in the text. If so, this should be determinative rather
than the consideration paid by the original subsequent shareholder. Perhaps the
most difficult case would anse when the present subsequent shareholder has paid
a full consideration, but the former contemporaneous shareholder received a
price depressed because of the wrong, the real gain thus going to some intermediate
subsequent shareholder. In this case, the court should strive to protect the present
shareholder, for example, by placing a greater burden upon the contemporaneous
shareholder to show that he did not fully understand the impact of the wrong-
ful acts upon him and did not merely want to avoid further risk of loss. If the
equities are perfectly balanced, however, perhaps the defendants should be com-
pelled to recompense both for their loss, since the wrongful acts have in fact injured
both. This is likely to occur so infrequently that it does not seem unfair to im-
pose this burden upon the defendants. However, the defendants might be given
a defense against the present shareholder, although liable to the contemporaneous
holder, if they can prove that the price paid by the present holder depended
solely upon independent market factors operating after the wrong was known or
could have been known by buyers and sellers.
"'Courts, though, have solved difficult valuation problems. See, e.g., Perlman
v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
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achieve substantial justice than a blanket rule of excluding or includ-
ing subsequent shareholders.
Trade creditors of the corporation should have no right to share in
any prorata recovery, but if the corporation is insolvent in the equity
sense, they should be able to prevent such recovery until they are
paid.73 Although bondholders may be able to prevent prorata recovery
until an impairment of capital is corrected, it does not seem that
they would be entitled to any of the principal on the bonds under the
bond indenture until maturity. However, they should be permitted
to collect arrearages in interest payments before any payments are
made to the shareholders. Preferred shareholders may be in a some-
what different position; they are equity holders and risk-takers. But
since they are entitled to receive only limited dividends, whether
cumulative or not, they should share in a prorata recovery only to
the extent of such dividends, payable at the time of suit but not yet
paid, and should not be entitled to any return of capital. 74
III. PROCEDURE AFTER THE DECREE
If a closely-held corporation is involved in the suit, no substantial
mechanical difficulties should arise after prorata recovery is decreed.
Normally only a single class of common shares exists, and all the share-
holders either are parties or can be easily joined.j 5 In such cases,
courts have had no difficulty in making the distribution of damages,
usually through a master.70 No unfamiliar problems are presented.
As previously noted, Perlman v. Feldmann77 was the first pro rata
case involving a corporation whose shares were widely held. The
73See text at notes 56-57, supra. For a fuller discussion of the rights of bond-
holders, see text at notes 58-62, supra.
7lSee text at and around note 63, supra. This right would extend to any divi-
dends not paid at the time of decree and arguably might include dividends for
the entire current year, even though not yet payable, if it appears that they might
not otherwise be paid. In the liquidation situation, these shareholders should re-
ceive out of the fund collected only what they are entitled to by contract on
liquidation; of course, all senior security interests and trade creditors must first be
satisfied out of the fund if they are not otherwise paid.
5See, e.g., Spaulding v. North Milwaukee Town Site Co., 1o6 Wis. 481, 81 N.W
1o64 (i900).
"'See, e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357 (D. Minn. 1927). In Eaton v. Robin-
son, ig R.I. 146, 31 Atl. io58 (1895) (per cunam), the court avoided problems
of distribution by awarding judgment only to those shareholders before the court.
However, this would force the remaining shareholders to commence future actions,
with possible statute-of-limitations difficulty.
79ig F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 349 U.S. 952 (i955). This case, apparently,
did not present any of the problems arising from the existence of bondholders, pre-
ferred shareholders, or ordinary creditors.
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final order merely provided for the clerk to send notice to all stock-
holders appearing on a list submitted to the court, apparently without
in examination of the status of those holders.7" Thus; the problem
of effecting the distribution remained simple.
When the distribution is more complex, it may be possible to
include in the notice given prior to the decree 79 a statement of when
to present claims after the decree. However, the exact date of the
decree will be very difficult to estimate, especially if many persons
appear to contest the granting of prorata recovery. Therefore, a sec-
ond notice-after the decree-will probably be needed. Since a pro
rata case after the-,decree is not different from an ordinary class suit,
the normal class-suit rule placing the burden of giving notice upon the
plaintiffs, with the costs being taken from the fund recovered, should
be followed.8 0 Unlike notice before the decree, when the primary issue
is whether or not to grant pro rata, the corporation as a whole is not
involved; this notice after decree is entirely for the benefit of those
who might claim a share in the recovery.
The actual machinery for effecting distribution could be the same
as that worked out for use in an ordinary class suit:81 (i) The court
enters an interlocutory order or decree for the plaintiffs of record
and all similarly situated who come in prior to a specified deadline.
(2) A master is appointed, to whom the defendants are compelled
to give whatever names and addresses of absentees they have in their
possession. This is important if former shareholders are to partici-
pate in the recovery, for the defendants may be able to provide records
giving their identity. Of course, the defendants will be compelled to
turn over the current stockholder lists, if in their possession and if
they have not done so for the purpose of prior notification. (3) The
plaintiffs' attorney or the master submits the forms for proof of claims
with explanatory material to the judge for approval and then mails
them to the absentees. (4) The absentees are required to file their claims
716o F. Supp. 3io, 311 (D. Conn. 1958). The court did not raise the problem
of the existence of subsequent shareholders, although in fact almost all the shares
were held by one subsequent shareholder at the time of the decree. Jennings,
Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Review. 1, 3 n.i2 (1956).
7See part II B., supra.
"See Perlman v. Feldmann, 16o F. Supp. 31o, 312 (D. Conn. 1958); Wheaton,
supra note 5o, at 438-39, 440 (the class-suit rule).
81See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 693-94 (1941). The main outlines of the authors' proposal are
presented in the text. The authors regard this procedure as the "maximum com-
plexity" permissible for class suits. Id. at 694. See also Backus v. Finkelstein, 23
F.2d 357, 366 (D. Minn. 1927).
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within a prescribed period. The defendants are permitted to file ob-
jections raising personal defenses, but not the common questions
settled in the main suit. (5) The master hears objections and de-
termines the individual damages. (6) Upon submission of the master's
report, the court hears objections and then renders a final decree
ordering the defendants to pay. The court reserves jurisdiction until
the end of the distribution.
The use of this machinery presents no great difficulty when the
extent of the damages recoverable from the defendants depends en-
tirely upon the number of present shareholders who prove their
claims, only the liability per share having been determined during
the suit. The defendants should have the burden of proving per-
sonal defenses against the claimants, who are merely required to es-
tablish their identity as shareholders. In most instances, the defendants
should be able to prove acquiescence readily enough through the
records of shareholders' meetings; it seems that once such records
are introduced, the claimants should have the burden of going for-
ward to show that their apparent acquiescence was not real. The de-
fendants, however, should have the ultimate burden of persuasion
since they stand to benefit from a reduced recovery. 2
More difficulty will be encountered if former contemporaneous
and present subsequent shareholders compete for the recovery. In
order to prevent a double recovery (by both the former and present
shareholders), it may be necessary for the court to ascertain the total
amount of damages that could possibly be recovered from the defen-
dants.83 The court might then merely pay out the fund on a first-
come-first-served basis. This haphazard system, however, would hardly
carry out the equitable purposes of prorata recovery. It has been
suggested that a presumption against recovery by the subsequent
shareholders should be established until they show that they are en-
titled to the recovery in a proceeding of which the former share-
holders have notice.8 4 However, since it will usually be predictable
that some former shareholders will be entitled to recover,85 and this
can be indicated in the interlocutory decree, the general post-decree
"But see Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 948 (1958).
The result should be the same in the foreseeable-mismanagement situation: All
the shareholders other than the defendants would recover directly from the
defendants unless they prove personal defense against some.
"'Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955), on remand, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957). However, in one
situation a double recovery might be desirable. See note 71 supra.
8'Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 949 (1958).
This is especially true in the sale-of-control cases.
1962] PRORATA CORPORATE RECOVERIES 189
notification to all possible claimants should suffice. If the identity
of some of the former shareholders is unknown, presumably because
of sales on stock exchanges, notice by publication could be used; such
a notice would identify the period during which the shareholders
could be considered "contemporaneous." Of course, every effort should
be made to trace a chain of title back from a present shareholder to a
contemporaneous holder. If, however, the original post-decree notice
by publication presents the only means of finding the contemporan-
eous holder, that notice should specify the date by which such a holder
must come forward.8 6 After that date, the court should determine the
equities as between the remaining present subsequent shareholders
and the defendanis; s7 if it is determined that these shareholders suf-
fered no injury from the defendants' acts, the defendants' liability
would be reduced pro tanto.
IV SOME EFFECTS OF GRANTING PRORATA RECOVERY
The preceding discussion has focused upon some of the implica-
tions arising from the possibility of a prorata recovery. Now some
inquiry must be made into the nature of the suit once pro rata is de-
creed. Does the suit remain essentially derivative in character, or does
it become some type of class action? If the latter, at least in situations
in which the plaintiffs can request pro rata initially, should the plain-
tiffs be excused from complying with the procedural requirements for
derivative suits?s s The first question may be somewhat misleading,
for the ordinary derivative suit is certainly a type of representative
suit.8 9 Nevertheless, at least for the purpose of notification to ab-
sentees and distribution of the recovery, the suit seems to be treated
'See Wheaton, supra note 50, at 439. If the contemporaneous holder does
come forward, the defendants should be allowed at that time to argue against
recovery by either claimant, provided they do not rely on defenses already decided
against them in the main suit.
87If prorata recovery is decreed solely because of the presence of subsequent
shareholders, this question would have been settled during the main suit, unless
some, but not all, such shareholders can prove that they were the ones harmed
by the wrongful acts. See text at notes 68-72, supra.
"This may be especially crucial in states which require security for costs from
certain plaintiffs in derivative suits. E.g., N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 61-b. See Gold-
stein v. Weisman, 185 F. Supp. 242, 250-51 (S.D.N.Y. 196o) (problem hinted at,
but not faced).
"'See Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit; Notes on Its Derivation, 32
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 98o, 989 (i957); Glenn, The Stockholder's Suit-Corporate and
Individual Grievances, 33 Yale L. J. 58o, 583 (1924) (but it is primarily derivative, id.
at 584). But see McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representative Suit, 26 Geo. L.J.
878, 901-04 (1938); Note, Shareholder Derivative Suits; Are They Class Actions?,
42 Iowa L. Rev. 568 (1957).
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the same as other kinds of class suits.9 0 On the other hand, even when
the plaintiffs are entitled to requst prorata recovery in their com-
plaint, the action must still be viewed as brought i the right of the
corporation, and not in the right of individuals. 91 I- _.ems, therefore,
that the plaintiffs should be required to comply with the requirements
for bringing a derivative sUit.9 2 Otherwise, plaintiffs could. avoid these
requirements simply by requesting, direct prorata recovery. Of course,
it could be argued that if the plaintiffs failed to obtain pro rata
under such a complaint, they should simply be thrown out of court;
thus the action might be viewed as nonderivative. However, this would
be a poor method of judicial administration. It would be preferable
to dispose of the corporate cause of action completely once it is brought
before the court, especially in view of the possibility that the plain-
tiffs may be the only shareholders who desire a prorata recovery.
Since the derivative suit with a prorata recovery, though initially
treated as an ordinary derivative suit, is best treated after decree in the
same manner as nonderivative class suits, there is good reason to view
this as a sui generis type of action.93 Because the prorata remedy reach-
es more equitable results in certain cases,94 categorization into any rigid
form after the decree is undesirable; in particular, rigid categoriza-
tion according to the types of class suits provided in Federal Rule 2S(a)
should be avoided. Thus, if a closely-held corporation is involved,
there is no need to apply any kind of class-suit concept to the action
after prorata recovery has been decreed. 95 Furthermore, even though
in the ordinary derivative suit a single shareholder who prosecutes
the suit with proper competence and vigor96 quite adequately repre-
"OSee Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 81, at 692 n.26.
'See Stevens, Private Corporaitons § 167, at 784, 796 (2d ed. 1949); Note, 40
Calif. L. Rev. 127, 131 n4o 0(1952). But see Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate
Entity" for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 8o8 (1955); Comment, 46
Ill. L. Rev. 937 (1952).
"2See Note, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 127, 131 (1952); cf. Berger, supra note 91, at 823
(some procedural safeguards in derivative suits should be applied to the individual
class suit proposed therein).
"Compare Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 854 (3 d Cir. 1945); Rahl,
The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 119, 134 (1942) (FLSA class suits are a sui generis type of
action).
"See, e.g., May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (ist Cir.), cert. denied,
314 US. 668 (i94i) (large long-settled interests in former corporate assets pro-
tected through use of pro rata).
9In fact, it may be improper to do so. Cf. Developments-Multiparty Litiga-
tion, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 937 (1958) (size of class).
"See Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 233, 43 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1942) (by implica-
tion).
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sents the interests of all the shareholders, the court should make a fresh
analysis of the plaintiff's ability to represent the possibly many di-
vergent interests in the corporation concerning the very issue of
whether pro rata should be decreed.97
For the purpose of the statute of limitations the normal derivative-
suit rule should apply;98 then a claimant is not barred because the
statute had run on the corporate cause of action prior to the time
when he individually submitted his claim.99 The opposite rule would
permit the defendants to escape liability to many, if not all, claimants
simply because the court declared prorata recovery at or near the
expiration of the period of limitations. The policy against stale claims
certainly would not require this windfall to the defendants, since
the commencement of the suit informs them of the possibility of these
claims, and indeed of the possibility of the larger liability of a cor-
porate recovery.
The res judicata effects flowing from the pro rata suit must simi-
larly be worked out apart from a preconceived mold. Issues relating
to the merits of the claim against the defendants should follow the
normal rules of res judicata in derivative suits; that is, absentees
should be bound on issues relating to the merits whether or not act-
ually litigated and regardless of the notice sent to them.10 0 However,
only those to whom notice is sent should be bound by the court's
determination to grant prorata recovery.101 If the court rejects pro
ITFor a discussion of these possibly divergent interests, see part II B., supra.
Thus among those who would ultimately oppose the defendants on the merits
there may hardly be a single homogeneous class represented by the plaintiffs. Cf.
Comment, 25 Texas L. Rev. 64, 70-73 (1946) (discussion of problem of sub-classes).
risSee generally Baker & Cary, Cases and Materials on Corporations 683-86 (3d
ed. 1958) (no statutes distinguished between derivative suits and suits by the corpor-
ation, though the former raise special problems); Note, Statute of Limitations and
Shareholders' Derivative Actions, 56 Colum. L. Rev. io6 (i956).
9nThis same rule is advocated for all class suits: The statute is tolled once suit
is brought, and each class member can share in the recovery even though the
statute would bar his separate individual suit. See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra
note 51, at 339-42; Gordon, supra note 64 at 531 n.79 (advocates tolling even if suit
is later dismissed or compromised).
There might be such a bar if the pro rata suit were viewed as resulting ulti-
mately in a kind of "spurous" class action like the suit under federal rule 23(a)(3).
See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 267-68, 283 (i95o). But see Moore, Federal
Practice par. 23.12, at 3476 (2d ed. 1948).
icoSee Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 956 (1958);
Note, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 118, 136-37 (1934). However, notice is required in some
jurisdictions when the suit is compromised or dismissed. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P
23(c).
"'iSee note 51 supra; cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Edwards, 134 S.C. 348, 132 S.E. 824
(1926). Notice by publication should be sufficient to bind unknown persons. See
Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, supra note 51, at 347-48 (alternative suggestion to jurisdic-
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rata, this determination should bind the absentees whether or not
notice has been sent, for the primary purpose of this notice is to en-
able those who oppose the pro rata remedy to argue for a corporate
recovery; thus when a corporate recovery is decreed, the ordinary
derivative-suit rules should apply.'0 2 On the issue of damages no
tion by notice alone that the court might take jurisdiction in rem, the res being
the class claim, id. at 348 n.53); cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950) (quasi in rem suit). But see Letter from George W. Pepper to
Arthur J. Keeffe, 33 Cornell L.Q. 349, 35 (1948) (may need more individualized
notice). In the pro rata situation, the only group likely to contain many unknown
persons is that of former shareholders, who cannot be harmed by the court's
granting prorata recovery, since, without a prorata recovery, they could not share
at all in the recovery; furthermore, they will be given the best available post-decree
notice. Therefore, binding such persons to a grant of pro rata through notice by
publication does not appear prejudicial or unfair.
It is difficult to conceive of a workable remedy for. a shareholder who is en-
titled to individual notice, but does not receive it, and is thus not bound by the
decision to grant prorata, rather than corporate, recovery. Perhaps he could seek
to enjoin the distribution to the shareholders if it has not yet occurred until he is
heard on the question whether to grant prorata recovery; however, this situation
is unlikely to occur because such a shareholder is not likely to receive post-
decree notice either. Perhaps he could bring a later derivative suit against all who
received part of the recovery and against the former defendants for the balance due
the corporation on the original cause of action. If the number who received the
recovery is large, the suit might be maintained as a class suit against a defendant
class. Even if this solution might be accepted as workable-which seems doubtful,
a rule of law permitting the question of whether to grant prorata recovery to be
relitigated by a single shareholder seems dubious. The corporation itself, which
was a party to the original suit, might be held bound by the determination not to
grant a corporate recovery. In any event, it does not seem that such a shareholder
should be permitted to make any kind of a collateral attack on the judgment in
the original suit, whether such attack be made in the same state where the original
judgment was rendered or in some other state. However, in order to give some
teeth to the notice requirement, perhaps the prorata decree itself should provide
for reopening within a given time (e.g., one year) by a shareholder who was entitled
to individual notice, but did not receive it. This would not only give effect to
the notice requirement, but would provide a definite date for the final termination
of the litigation. The foregoing analysis applies with equal force to any other type
of individual, such as a bondholder, who might be held entitled to receive individ-
ualized notice.
'Ihis question of binding effect could arise only if the court failed to give
the pre-decree notice that should normally be available if pro rata is requested.
Some courts, though, might prefer to avoid the bother of notice if they determine
that the case for pro rata is very weak.
Normally it would seem that a corporate recovery would not. harm any of the
absentees. However, it is true that some absentees might want to argue for pro
rata on the ground of foreseeable mismanagement. If the plaintiffs fail to argue
properly for pro rata, the proper remedy appears to be intervention on the ground
of lack of adequacy of representation. Cf. Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 874, 955 (x958). Furthermore, a corporate recovery prima facie pro-
tects all the interests in the corporation. On the other hand, if pro rata is decreed
and some of the absentees are barred from recovery, these absentees suffer an
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problem should arise: if pro rata is decreed, the pre-decree notice
should be sufficient to bind all the absentees; if pro rata is not decreed,
the ordinary derivative-suit rule that all are bound regardless of no-
tice may be applied.
The question remains whether nonresident absentees, even if they
receive proper notice, can constitutionally be bound by a state-court
determination whether or not to grant prorata recovery. In the or-
dinary derivative suit, this problem has never arisen, probably because
of the requirement of actually bringing the corporation itself into
the suit. However, on the issue of whether to grant pro rata, the use-
fulness of relying upon the corporate entity vanishes, and divergent
interests within the corporation must be considered separately. If the
issue of pro rata is raised but a corporate recovery is decreed, the
ordinary derivative-suit procedure should be followed. If pro rata is
decreed, it may be argued that, even if in some class-action situations
state courts could not constitutionally bind nonresident absentees,
the state court should be able to bind all here, provided proper notice
is given, since it initially acquired plenary jurisdiction over the corpo-
rate cause of action. This argument may fail, however, since there
is nothing to bar a nonresident from commencing his own deriva-
immediate and irrevocable loss. Therefore, the need for pre-decree notice is far
greater when pro rata is ultimately decreed.
It is true that former shareholders might want to argue for prorata, since
this is their only way to benefit from the recovery, unless they are restored to the
status of present shareholders, for example, though rescission of a sale, see, e.g.,
Goodliffe v. Colonial Corp., 107 Utah 488, 155 P.-d 177 (1945) (plaintiffs in deriva-
tive suit permitted to reestablish selves as shareholders of record). The former share-
holders might seem more in need of notice that a corporate recovery is to be
granted than do the present shareholders who wish to argue that the case presents
a foreseeable mismanagement situation. Nevertheless, they do not seem to have
standing to raise the defendants' personal defenses against some present share-
holders, even if they might compete with some of the present shareholders after
a pro rata decree; and the foreseeable-mismanagement argument is clearly not open
to them. Therefore, they should be entitled to pre-decree notice only in the sale-of-
control situation and possibly in the subsequent-shareholder situation. In the
latter situation, notice might not be essential since the defendants will most likely
make the same arguments for pro rata as those available to the former shareholders.
However, testimony from some of the former shareholders might be necessary in
order to establish the defendants' contention that the injury was done only to the
former shareholders, although notice given for this purpose to only some of these
former holders should not be determinative of the binding effect of the court's de-
termination upon these absentees. In any event, the former shareholders might have
some recourse through ordinary intervention. For discussion of the need for notice
to these former holders in order to bind them when pro rata is ultimately granted,
see text at notes 53-55, supra.
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tive suit in another jurisdiction prior to the decree in the first suit.103
Moreover, to contend that a court has acquired "p, .ry ju;risdiction"
is to beg the question of whether the court has the power to bind
the absentees once conflicts of interest because of pro rata become
possible. In any event, even though there may be some doubt, indi-
cations seem to be that state courts can bind nonresident absentees
in ordinary class suits, 104 and thus should have the same power here.
V. SOME PROBLEMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Application of the Rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.1 05
In cases in which the corporate cause of action is based upon a
state-created right, the question arises whether a federal court that
has jurisdiction solely because of diversity of citizenship must follow
state law in determining whether to grant prorata recovery. First,
let us assume that the highest court of the state in which the federal
district court is sitting has held squarely that prorata recovery will
not be granted in the type of case before the federal court. 106 It may be
argued that the pro rata device is simply one remedy available to a
federal court of equity,107 and that the federal court is free to grant
an equitable remedy even though the state court would not.108 Thus
when the case involves a choice among different remedies-corporate
recovery versus prorata recovery-rather than the question of the
availability of any remedy at all, it might be contended that the fed-
tmCf. Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 39 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 194o)
(several suits commenced in federal and state courts within the same state); Whea-
ton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants, 19 Cornell L.Q. 399, 426
(i934.) Wheaton would not permit separate suits by members of the class during
the pendency of the class suit. Id. at 438. A similar suggestion has been made con-
cerning derivative suits. See McLaughlin, supra note 89, at 9o3 . However, there
may be some difficulty in preventing a nonresident from beginning another suit in
another jurisdiction, a point not discussed by either author.
:'"See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940) (dictum); Developments-Multi-
party Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 940 (1958); Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. io5g,
i067"68 (1954).
'13o4 U-S. 64 (i938).
O'eSuch a situation might occur in Delaware. See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del.
Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 9o4 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
'Cf. Spaulding v. North Milwaukee Town Site Co., 1o6 Wis. 481, 496, 81 N.W.
1o64. io69 (igoo) (dictum) (granting of prorata recovery involves an equitable
power of the court). Even though pro rata is a type of remedy, it does not follow
that it must be classified as "procedural" for the purpose of the Erie doctrine.
Cf. Sampson v. Channell, 11o F.2d 754 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 31o U.S. 650 (194o).
"6See Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. loi (1915); cf. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen,
261 U-S. 491 (1923).
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eral court should be able to mold its remedy independently. 10 9 How-
ever, it seems that the granting of prorata recovery is not based upon
remedial standards, that is, upon a determination of how best to carry
out the policy of the underlying liability-determining law Rather,
except in some liquidation situations, the desirability of prorata re-
covery depends upon prelitigation conduct. In other words, the de-
cision is not as to the desirability of one remedy or another in a given
factual situation,110 but rather a determination of whether to transfer
the substantive right to the recovery from the corporation to some of
its shareholders upon finding certain facts to exist."' Furthermore,
even if prorata recovery is considered merely one type of remedy
available to a court of equity, its unavailability in the state court may
be grounded upon a strongly felt state policy, 112 which should be
honored in the federal court.113 Moreover, the state legal rule regard-
ing prorata recovery directs the outcome of the litigation and should
therefore bind the federal court."
4
This same analysis should lead the federal court to attempt to
follow state law when the state decisions have refused prorata recov-
ery in some situations, but are silent concerning the situation before
the federal court. Conversely, if in a situation similar to that before
the federal court, a state court would grant prorata recovery, it seems
that the federal court should be obliged to do the same. This is not
a situation in which the federal court would merely close its doors to
the plaintiffs, remitting them to the state court." 5 Rather, the federal
court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore
"'See Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 652 (1953).
The unavailability of any remedy in the state courts, however, closes the doors of
the federal courts sitting in the state in diversity cases. See Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1947).
mSee Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 1o (1915).
"'See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1317 (1956).
"'See Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 9o4 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
"3Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1958)
(some indication that in some areas the strength of the state policy may determine
whether the federal court must follow the state under Erie).
"'C. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). It is not clear what law
was followed in the Perlman case. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 178
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). In May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121
F.2d 431 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (i4i), in denying the equitable relief
requested and substituting a prorata recovery, the court did refer to the law of
the state of incorporation, but it is not clear that this law was determinative.
"'For indications that such door-closing may be permissible, see Hart & Wech-
sler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 658; Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 874, 964-65 (1958).
196 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
should be required to follow the state rules regulating liability."16
However, if prorata recovery is urged in a liquidation situation solely
as a matter of convenience, the federal court should be free to mold
the remedy, provided no person shares in the recovery who would not
share if the suit were brought in the state court.11 7 When the courts
of the state have been completely silent, the federal court must at-
tempt to work out its results in accordance with whatever relevant
state law it can find.i' s
If the derivative suit could not have been brought in the state
court because of the inability to obtain service upon a nonresident
corporation, 1 9 it might be argued that the federal court should not
be limited by the state's rules concerning prorata recovery. This ar-
gument might prevail if this were a question of whether a particu-
lar type of multiparty litigation should be permitted in the federal
court when the device is unavailable in the state courts. 20 In this sit-
uation, however, the derivative suit device itself is available in the
state courts. Furthermore, since the issue of whether to grant pro
rata should be determined by state rules governing the underlying
liability, the inability to bring the action in the courts of the state
in which the federal court is sitting, solely because of service-of-process
problems, does not render the Erie doctrine inapplicable.121
A similar argument for federal independence in granting prorata
recovery might be made when the federal court obtains jurisdiction
of a state-created claim solely through the doctrine of pendent juris-
diction. 2 2 However, even though jurisdiction is not based upon diver-
"'Cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U-.S 541 (1949) (rationale
that state security-for-costs statute creates a new liability).
"1 Cf. Developments-Multiparty Litigation, Pi Harv. L. Rev. 874, 996-98 (1958).
usSee generally Hart & Weschler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 628-29.
1191f venue is laid in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (1958), extra-
territorial service over the corporation in whose behalf the suit is brought may
be obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1958). See Developments-Multiparty Litiga-
tion, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 963 (1958).
"*See id. at 997-98. But cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (i941).
aIt is possible that the substantive law of a state other than that of the forum
should be applied, since venue may be laid under 28 U.S.C. § 14oi (1958) only
because the real defendants reside in the forum; the forum may have had no
connection with the alleged wrongful acts. It is arguable that in this situation the
federal court should ascertain the proper state law through an independent applica-
tion of conflict-of-law rules. Cf. Hart & Weschler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 633-36.
However, Griffin v. McCoach, supra note i2o, may require the federal court to
apply the conflicts rule of the forum. If this is true, the federal court would be
obliged to apply the law of the forum state if that state regards the rules governing
prorata recovery as "procedural." Cf. Sampson v. Channell, 11o F.2d 751 (st Cir.),
cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (194o).
"mSee Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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sity of citizenship, Erie requires the application of state substantive
law in deciding the state-created right, for state law here operates in-
dependently and of its own force, and not merely through adoption
by federal law. '2 3 Therefore, the right of the federal court to make an
independent determination of the prorata issue, once the federal
claim has dropped out of the case leaving only the state claim for de-
cision, must be denied on the same reasoning as that applied in the
situation in which the suit could not have been brought in the state
court. However, if the federal claim is determined upon a trial, it
seems that federally developed rules on pro rata should govern even
though the state claim is incidentally adjudicated.
B. Federal Jurisdiction.
Since the derivative suit with prorata recovery should be con-
sidered sui generis, with some elements governed by the rules of the
ordinary derivative suit and others by the rules of ordinary non-
derivative class suits, 12 4 some question may arise as to the power of the
federal court sitting in a diversity-of-citizenship suit to permit non-
diverse shareholders to enter the suit to share in a prorata recovery. It
seems, though, that once the federal court has obtained jurisdiction
over the derivative suit, it should retain jurisdiction until the final re-
lief is granted. 125 However, since the granting of pro rata involves more
than the mere fashioning of a remedy, it might be argued that, for the
purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction, the entire suit must be gov-
erned by ordinary class-suit rules. Even so, diversity between the origin-
al parties of record should be sufficient even though non-diverse class
members enter later; this idea of minimal diversity will probably be
accepted.
26
More difficult is the question of jurisdictional amount-especially
"'See Hart & Weschler, op. cit. supra note iog, at 697. If the plaintiff brings a de-
rivative suit based on a state-created cause of action, but can obtain federal-question
jurisdiction because he must rely on federal law in order to prove his case, see Smith
v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 18o (1921), it still seems that the federal
court should be obliged to follow the state rule on pro rata, since the primary
duty involved in the case is determined by state law. When, however, the cause of
action is based upon federal law, the federal courts should be free to develop
their own rules governing prorata recovery.
"See text at notes 93-102, supra.
I . Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (bill ancillary
to earlier bill maintainable without diversity).
2"See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 933 (1958).
Professor Moore indicates that nondiverse members of a class can intervene in a
spurious class suit after the commencement of the action. 3 Moore, Federal Prac-
tice par. 23.1o, at 3443 (2d ed. 1948).
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in view of the recent increase in the requirement.127 While it is true
that a federal court does not lose jurisdiction of an action simply be-
cause the plaintiff fails to recover the jurisdictional anuant,1
28 it
might be argued that the decreeing of prorata recovery ..ianges the
suit into a new type of action for which an independent showing
of jurisdiction is required. 129 If this argument is sound, not only
might an aggregate prorata recovery in excess of $1oooo be required,
but possibly each claimant might be required to claim this amount.
In other words, solely for the purpose of deciding whether the mone-
tary requirement has been satisfied, the court may have to determine
whether the suit has become a "true," "hybrid," or "spurious" class
action under Federal Rule 23(a). Only if the suit is considered a
"true" class action could the various claims be aggregated.'3a It is
arguable that the shareholders comprising the plaintiff class share a
"common" right in the recovery within the meaning of Rule 23(a)(1)
relating to true class actions.' 3 ' However, when the defendants may
have personal defenses against some of the claimants and when the
total amount of the recovery will depend upon the number of share-
holders who qualify to share in the recovery the rights of the claim-
ants should be viewed as "several," thus rendering the suit "hybrid" or
"spurious"-probably the latter, although the matter of classification
is often extremely difficult. 3 2 Even so, in such class suits only the in-
dividual claims of the original parties of record need meet the
jurisdictional amount. 33 Thus small claimants would not be barred
from intervening, or participating without intervention, 34 although
there is some indication that in spurious class suits absentees can come
in only through intervention.
135
In order to avoid this tangle, the federal court should look only
to the amount claimed by the plaintiff in the complaint, subject to
'--28 U.SC. §§ 1331, 1332 (1958).
'See Hart and Wechsler, op cit. supra note iog, at 994-95-
L'See Developments-Multiparty Litigation, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 874, 960 (1958).
' See id. at 933; Moore, Federal Practice par. 23A3, at 3477-78 (2d ed. 1948).
1
3
1Cf. Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 57 (U.S.) 288 (1853) (suit concerning dis-
position of a pre-existing fund).
"See Chafee, op. cit. supra note 99, at 251-56.
mSee, e.g., Ames v. Mengel Co., 19o F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1951); Moore, Federal
Practice par. 23.1o, at 3443 (2d ed. 1948).
"See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 712-13 (1941) (advocates participation after the decree, ap-
parently differing from formal intervention).
' See Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (1944) (by impli-
cation); Rahl, supra note 93, at 126, 130 (by implication). Such intervention must
probably be before the decree. See Chafee, op. cat. supra note 99, at 285.
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whatever criteria apply in other actions.136 Thus the possible corporate
recovery would be determinative. 137 However, when the plaintiff prop-
erly requests prorata recovery in the complaint, the actual prorata share
demanded should control. This approach seems justified, since the
whole purpose of the action is to dispose of the corporate cause of
action once and for all, whatever the kind of recovery ultimately
granted. The federal courts could use this sensible approach by
viewing the action as sui generis and not necessarily within any cate-
gory of Rule 23(a). Alternatively, if it is felt that, apart from specific
statutory authority,138 Rule 23 occupies the entire field of class-suit-
type actions in the federal courts, the same result can be reached by
relying on the categorization of the derivative suit as a true class suit
within Rule 23(a)(i). Thus, when the plaintiff properly requests
prorata recovery in his complaint, the court could treat the suit as a




The availability of prorata recovery may cast some light upon the
nature of the derivative suit, and even of the corporation itself. The
prorata remedy does not seem to fit in with any rigid concept of the
corporation as an entity distinct from its shareholders, nor with a
corresponding conception of the derivative sUit.'
40 If the corporation
possesses a legal personality completely distinct from its shareholders,
logically it seems that the status of its shareholders, often the basis for
pro rata, should be irrelevant. The slight divergence from the rigid
entity approach introduced by the contemporaneous-ownership rule
in derivative suits does not appear to preclude the use of the entity
theory because the recovery is for the corporation. However, direct
'6See generally Hart & Wechsler, op. cit. supra note lo9, at 994-95.
-,See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 5i8, 523-24
(1947) (dictum).
"'E.g., Fair Labor Standards Act § 16 (b), 52 Stat. 1o69, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b); Rahl, supra note 93, at 132, 134 (class suit here a sm generis action).
'Cf. Kaufman v. Societe Internationale Pour Participatians Industrielles et
Commerciales, SA., 343 U.S. 156 (1952) (rationale that the corporation should
state a corporate claim on behalf of intervening nonenemy shareholders for the
proportion of the assets due to such intervenors). This case is discussed extensively
in Berger, "Disregarding the Corporate Entity" for Stockholders' Benefit, 55 Colum.
L. Rev. 8o8 (1955).
110See 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ io89, iogi, io94, 1095 (5 th ed. 1941)
for a presentation of the entity theory of the corporation and derivative suit. The
pro rata problem is apparently ignored. Professor Stevens points out that the pro-
rata cases should lead to a "reassessment of the merit of the inherited concepts of
corporateness" Stevens, Private Corporations § 167, at 789 (2d ed. 1949).
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recovery by the shareholders through prorata recovery can result only
from a disregard of the corporate entity.141 The efore, rather than
attempting to justify the use of pro rata merely on he ground that
a court of equity should be able to mold this remedy because of the
necessity of an exceptional case,142 it would seem preferable to fit it in
with some general theory of the nature of the corporation and the
derivative suit. Thus the corporation should be considered an asso-
ciation of persons "united for a common purpose and permitted by
law to use a common name."' 43 The shareholders thus possess a dual
legal personality-individual and corporate. 4 4 The plaintiff share-
holder in a derivative suit acts in the latter capacity, the derivative
suit being a convenient procedural device designed to avoid a multi-
plicity of suits by shareholders and to insure that the rights of credi-
tors are safeguarded.145 Under this view of the corporation and the
derivative suit, prorata recovery may be used whenever a more equit-
able result can be reached by doing so, provided that the supervening
rights of creditors are protected.
This equitable device, though, should not be used too freely, since
a corporate recovery generally tends to insure that all the interests in
the corporation are protected.146 Furthermore, when the corporation
is a going concern, the management of the corporate funds should
generally remain in the hands of the corporate managers-the persons
appointed by the shareholders to manage their investment. 4T How-
ever, prorata recovery should be used to protect the investment of in-
nocent shareholders, as in the foreseeable-mismanagement situation,
and to bar shareholders against whom defendants clearly have equit-
able defenses.
If pro rata is so used, the objection that it tends to encourage
fraud 14 seems weak. If the defendants practice fraud or concealment
"'See Berger, supra note i39. See also Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 343 (947) (courts will disregard corporate entities to look to
the real enterprise in order to reach realistic results).
"'See May v. Midwest Ref. Co., 121 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941); Ballantine, Corporations § 143, at 336 (rev. ed. 1946).
'"Berle, supra note 141, at 352.
"'See Stevens, Private Corporations §§ 8, 9 (2d ed. 1949).
"'See Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847) (these practical reasons
urged as well as those based upon a strict view of the corporate entity).
'"In the liquidation situation, pro rata would afford the same protection. In
the sale-of-control situation especially, pro rata may be the only way to protect
the interests of a large group, the former shareholders.
'Cf. Glenn, The Stockholders' Suit-Corporate and Individual Grievances, 33
Yale L.J. 58o, 587-88 (1924).
"'Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 253, 2 A.2d 904, 912 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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in order to obtain the shareholder acquiescences relied upon for pro
rata a court of equity could hold that the acquiescences were inef-
fective because not all the facts were known, and thus award a cor-
porate recovery. 149 In the foreseeable-mismanagment situation, it
would be highly unrealistic to suppose that the defendants would feel
utterly free to mismanage in a grand manner, expecting the plaintiffs
to request pro rata in later litigation; there is always the risk that
a corporate recovery and a receiver might be demanded. In the sale-
of-control situation, it is true that the defendant sellers do keep part
of the unlawful "premium" when pro rata is decreed. Thus there is
force to the argument that there is some incentive to practice fraud
or concealment because of the availability of pro rata; perhaps the
suggestion that a full "prophylactic" corporate recovery should be had
against the sellers has some merit.1 0 However, the rights of former
shareholders must be protected, probably through some kind of direct
recovery. If prorata recovery is to be allowed solely because of the
presence of subsequent shareholders, the defendants may tend to
take risks, especially in a corporation with actively traded stock. How-
ever, it seems that they could not rely on the availability of pro rata,
since many factors might lead to a corporate recovery.15 1
On balance, prorata recovery, under certain circumstances, pro-
vides a useful and desirable method for redressing wrongs to the cor-
poration. Through it, the derivative suit is likely to become a far
more refined instrument for achieving corporate justice.
'"Cf. Holland v. Presley, 168 Misc. 942, 6 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1938), rev'd
on other grounds, 255 App. Div. 667, 8 N.YS.2d 804, affd mem., 28o N.Y. 835,
21 N.E.2d 884 (1939).
25°See Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 1o4 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 823-26
(1956).
IaSee text at notes 34-4o, supra.
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STATE CRIMINAL CONFESSION CASES:
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CASES
REVERSED BY U S' SUPREME COURT AND
SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS*
WiLFRED J. Rrrz-
In the past quarter century the U. S. Supreme Court has reviewed
thirty-one cases, not counting denials of petitions for certiorari, in-
volving state convictions allegedly based on the use of involuntary
confessions in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court reversed twenty-two convictions and affirmed
nine.1 This article will describe the subsequent developments in the
twenty-two cases reversed by the Supreme Court and consider some
current problems in state criminal prosecutions involving confes-
sions.
When the Supreme Court in 1936 for the first time in Brown v.
Missjssippi2 reversed a state criminal conviction on the ground that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment had been violated
by the admission of an involuntary confession into evidence, it may well
have been influenced by the then recently issued Wickersham Report,
in which it had been said that "the third degree-that is, the use of
physical brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary
confessions or admissions-is widespread."3 Explicit note was taken
of this report in Chambers v. Florida, decided four years later.
4
The Wickersham Report provided the authoritative showing that
a need existed in the 193o's to eliminate the third degree in law en-
forcement, a need which the U. S. Supreme Court undertook to meet
by reviewing state confession cases, and, where appropriate, reversing
*The first part of this article was published in 19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35
(1962) under the title, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
tProfessor of Law, Washington and Lee Umversity, Lexington, Va.
"Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme
Court, i9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35, 35-36 (1962). This survey covers cases through
the i96o Term. The Supreme Court reviewed one state confession case during
the 1961 Term, reversing a Colorado conviction of murder. Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49 (a962).
2297 U.S. 278 (i936).
3National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Law-
lessness in Law Enforcement 4 (1931).
'309 U.S. 227, 238 n.ii and 24o n.15 (1940).
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state convictions. It is less easy to justify the continued reliance on the
Wickersham Report as the principal, virtually the sole, empirical
evidence demonstrating that the third degree is still used in law en-
forcement so that there is a continuing need for Supreme Court re-
view of state criminal convictions allegedly based on the use of coerced
confessions. 5
The United States Civil Rights Commission 6 relies heavily on
the Wickersham Report for its finding that the third degree is an evil
in the United States in 1961,7 and beyond this single 1931 report the
Commission points to little in the way of unimpeachable evidence of
present widespread. use of the third degree. About the only data the
Commission educes are two convictions under the Civil Rights Act s
of police chiefs for violating the civil rights of accused persons by
obtaining confessions by the use of physical violence;9 a hearsay state-
ment by the Alabama Advisory Committee to the Civil Rights Commis-
sion that "police in their area allegedly have been known to make use
of force and intimidation in order to extort confessions from prison-
ers"; 10 and self-serving complaints made by inmates of New Jersey pris-
ons in interviews with an investigator." Although the Civil Rights
Commission found no evidence of racial discrimination in the use of
the third degree to obtain confessions, 12 on the basis of this sketchy evi-
dence the Commission concluded, "Police brutality-the unnecessary
use of violence to enfore the mores of segregation, to punish, and to
coerce confessions-is a serious problem in the United States."13
1E.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 n.2 and 579 n-17 (1962).
61961 United States Civil Rights Commission Report No. 5, Justice.
71d. at 16.
818 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
OPool v. United States, 26o F.2d 57, 59-63 (9th Cir. 1958). The report of this
case indicates that after being coerced by physical violence into confessing, the
accused persons pleaded guilty in the state court to the burglaries charged against
them, and they were sentenced to confinement for from one to fifteen years, sen-
tences afterwards commuted to ten months. United States v. Lowery, Crim. No.
13,235 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 1958), Report of the Attorney General of the United
States for the Fiscal Year Ended June 3o, 1958, at 177.
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), also involved a conviction under
the Civil Rights Act for brutality in obtaining confessions. However, the defen-
dant was a special policeman hired by a lumber company to ascertain the identity
of theives, a somewhat different situation from that in which duly organized law
enforcement agencies use the third degree to obtain confessions.
"Justice, supra note 6, at 17 n.68.
UTrebach, Defendants and Defenders, discussed in Justice, supra note 6, at 18.
"Justice, supra note 6, i6-18.
21d. at 28. Literally, this definition of police brutality sanctions the use of vio-
lence if necessary to obtain a confession.
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Physical torture was involved in Brown v. Mississippi, the first
coerced confession case. Since 1936 when that case was decided, there
have been no others reaching the Supreme Court in which the Court
has found as a fact that physical violence had been used,14 although
the question is raised in the state courts with a fair degree of fre-
quency.' 5 This fact may give rise to quite different inferences.
It could be argued that the Supreme Court decision in Brown v.
Mississippi was extraordinarily effective, and that state courts taking
it to heart have faithfully applied the decision so that convictions
based on confessions obtained by physical violence are being re-
versed at the state level, without any reaching the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, it is also possible that Brown v. Mississippi was
something of a freak, a unique case of physical violence that slipped
through the state judicial screen. Prior to the Brown decision, Missis-
sippi had reversed convictions based on confessions obtained by phy-
sical violence.' 6 Other states were following the same rule.' 7
It is also possible that law enforcement officials, forewarned by the
Brown decision, have developed techniques that are more or less ef-
fective in concealing the use of physical violence to obtain confessions.
It is always possible to claim that the evidences of physical violence
were present when the accused was taken into custody or that they are
the result of the defendant's own actions in seeking to escape from
custody.' 8 In any event, under the self-imposed "uncontradicted facts"
rule being followed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the police can, by tes-
tifying falsely and denying ,the use of physical violence, sterilize the de-
"'Justice, supra note 6, at 17 and n.66, says: "It is noteworthy that, with two
exceptions, all Supreme Court confession cases since 1942 have involved psychologi-
cal coercion alone." It is not clear why the" Commission uses the date 1942, rather
than 1936 when Brown was decided, as a starting point. The two exceptions cited
are Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165 (1952), and Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
Rochin involved the use of a stomach pump to recover narcotics swallowed by
the defendant, but no involuntary verbal confession, and so the case is not in
point. In Reck v. Pate there -was a claim of physical violence, but the opinion of
the Supreme Court was expressly based on the premise "that the officers did not
inflict deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck during the period they held
him in their custody." 367 U.S. at 440.
1Supplements to the annotation, Confession by one who has been subjected to
or threatened with physical suffering, 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923). The A.L.R. Blue Book
of Supplemental Decisions, 1946-1952 (Permanent Vol. 2, 1952) lists 47 state cases;
the 1952-1958 supplement (Permanent Vol. 3, 1958) lists 27 cases; the 1962 supple-
ment lists ii cases.
"2White v. Mississippi, 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903 (1922).
The cases are collected in Annot., 24 A.L.R. 703 (1923).
2BE.g., Pool v. United States, supra note 9.
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fendant's claim so that it will not be open to review in that court.19
The haunting feeling remains, though, that in spite of disclaimers and
the uncontradicted facts rule, disputed claims, particularly of physical
violence, do influence the Court's judgment, on the basis of the old
adage that where there is smoke there is fire.20 Otherwise, why does the
Court recite the details of the defendant's allegations, which are
disputed by the state, and so presumably not considered by the Su-
preme Court?
21
Still another possibility is that the astute prosecutor, who has
other sufficient evidence to convict, withholds the dubious confession,
lest it bring about an automatic reversal without regard to the guilt
of the accused.
22
The cases the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that involun-
tary confessions had been used in obtaining convictions came from
thirteen states. In order of number of cases, they were: Alabama,
four; New York and Texas, three each; Connecticut and Pennsyl-
vania, two each; and Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Ohio,
South Carolina, and Tennessee, one each. The cases in which the state
judgments of conviction were affirmed came from seven states. They
were: California, three; and Arizona, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, Oklahoma, and Utah, one each.
Obviously, there is no pattern. The largest number of cases came
from Alabama and New York, with four each, and yet it can hardly
be maintained that New York is following higher standards in crim-
inal law enforcement simply because only three of the New York
convictions in comparison with all four of those from Alabama were
reversed. Nor do the three California affirmances, all by divided courts,
prove that California is following higher standards than Texas with
three reversals. The thirty-one states that have never had a state con-
viction reviewed on the ground that an involuntary confession was
"This rule and its effect is discussed in Ritz, supra note i, beginning at 51.
For another criticism of the rule see Supreme Court Review of State Findings of
Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 328, 339-41 (1962).
This also is the conclusion reached by the writer of the article cited in
note ig supra, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 351.
21E.g., in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), the Court said: "As the district judge
further noted, the record 'carries an unexpressed import of police brutality...'
Reck testified at length to beatings inflicted upon him on each of the four days
he was in police custody before he confessed. His testimony was corroborated. The
police, however, denied beating Reck, and, in view of this conflict in the evidence,
we proceed upon the premise, as did the District Court, that the officers did not
inflict deliberate physical abuse or injury upon Reck during the period they held
him in their custody." Id. at 44o.
22See text infra beginning after note ioo.
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admitted into evidence cannot smugly assert claims to higher stand-
ards in law enforcement than exist in the other ni" -c, -n states. Their
time may come soon.
23
The first confession case came from Mississippi in 1936, but since
then the Supreme Court has not reviewed another case. from that state.
Connecticut never had a confession case reviewed by the Supreme
Court until the 196o Term, when two were reviewed and both con-
victions reversed. This hardly demonstrates that standards *of law en-
forcement have declined in Connecticut in comparison with those in
Mississippi, although Judge Clark of the Second Circuit so interprets
the appearance of Connecticut cases on the Supreme Court calendar.
In still another Connecticut case, in the federal courts on habeas
corpus, Judge Clark said:
"It is unfortunate that so many cases of illegally coerced con-
fessions of a like nature are now appearing in this state, so
generally renowned for its fair administration of the law; thus
see Rogers v. Richmond... Culombe v. Connecticut.... It
would seem that legislation setting forth the constitutional
rights of the accused would be helpful as directives to the police
and prosecutors ....24
The conclusion seems inescapable that the pattern of states repre-
sented in confession cases reviewed by the Supreme Court bears no
relationship to the standards of law enforcement being followed in
individual states. "Chance" must be a factor of undeterminable weight.
The state court opinion in the case reviewed by the Supreme Court is
sometimes undistinguishable from the opinion in another case not
reviewed. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut wrote:
"Here again, the question for the court to decide was whether
this conduct induced the defendant to make an involuntary
and hence untrue statement." 25
It was told that "this is not a permissible standard under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."26 Two months later
the Supreme Court of Montana approved the following statement from
an earlier decision of its own:
23Colorado has now been added to the lists of states that have a conviction
reversed in the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that an involuntary confession
was admitted into evidence, See note i supra.
"Reid v. Richmond, 295 F.2d 83, 91 n.i (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied (Douglas,
J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
2State v. Rogers, 143 Conn. 167, 174, 12o A.ad 409, 412 (1956).
"Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (g6).
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"'The only fair test, if such it can be called.... is this:
Was the inducement held out to the accused such as that there
is any fair risk of a false confession? For the object of the rule
is not to exclude a confession of the truth, but to' avoid the
possibility -of a confession of guilt from one who is in fact
innocent.' 2,
In spite of the fact that the Montana test, in light of the Rogers
opinion seems clearly wrong, when review was sought in the U.S.
Supreme Court, Dryman's petition for certiorari was denied.28
Actually, there is no evidence of substance as to the effectiveness of
federal review of state criminal convictions as a deterrent to the use
of the third degree, other than that counsel of despair that every
reversal of a criminal conviction represents a triumph of justice.29 It
cannot be established that federal review of state criminal proceedings
has been helpful in eliminating the third degree, by holding over
state officials the threat of reversals of convictions, or whether the
federal action has been harmful, by promoting more sophisticated
forms of the third degree, falsification of the facts, and particularly
a lowering of the sense of local responsibility for the fair adminis-
tration of criminal justice.
Subconsciously, most people probably feel that the third degree is
used less frequently today than a quarter-century ago. The cause for
the improvements, though, may well be found in a general raising of
ethical and moral standards, rather than in forced improvements
brought about by pressure from the federal judiciary.
When the Supreme Court reverses a criminal conviction on the
ground that it was obtained in a proceeding in which a coerced con-
fession was admitted into evidence, the case is remanded for further
proceedings, which may mean, and usually does mean, a new trial on
the same charge with the "coerced confession" excluded. It is useful to
consider the results of these subsequent proceedings, which, for the
most part, do not find their way into the law reports.
27Dryman v. State, 361 P.2d 959, 961 (Mont. 1961). This opinion was handed
down on May 12, 1961. Rogers v. Richmond was decided March 20, ig6i, so the
opinions in the case were available to the Supreme Court of Montana.
2'Dryman v. Montana, 368 U.S. 990 (1962).
'OAl1 convictions based on coerced confessions will be rectified if all convictions
are reversed, and so it follows as a matter of logic that the more convictions re-
versed the greater the chances are that no convictions based on coerced confessions
will go urireversed. Since the federal judiciary never convicts of state crimes,
but only releases, its activities can never initiate injustice, but only correct injustice,
or at the worst, leave injustice uncorrected.
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I. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN REVERSED CASES
Information on subsequent developments in cases reversed by the
U.S. Supreme Court was collected in the following manner. Data for
cases through 1942 had been collected by Boskey and Pickering from
reported cases and newspaper accounts and published in a law review
article in 1946.30 For cases reversed after 1952, Shepards was checked
for subsequently reported cases. A list of cases and a summary of the
information so obtained was sent to the Attorney General of each state
from which a case had come, with a request that the information so
obtained be checked for accuracy, and that supplemental information
be supplied on unreported proceedings. Most Attorney Generals
generously responded to an initial letter, and all except one to a
follow-up letter. While a few of the-Attorney Generals were able to pro-
vide the information requested, most of them either.referred the letter
of inquiry to local officials or advised the writer to correspond with
local officials. Consequently, some direct correspondence was carried
on with local prosecuting officials and defense counsel.
The information so obtained shows the following subsequent de-
velopments in these twenty-two cases reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court: The defendants in exactly half of the cases were again con-
victed of the same or a lesser included offense, while the defendants
in the other half were eventually released in one way or another.
After remand, the defendants in three cases were again tried and
convicted of the same offenses and given the same punishment. 1 The
proceedings in four cases resulted in convictions of the same offenses
1°Boskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 266 (1946).
'Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S.547 (1941). Original conviction was for murder
with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Vernon was again convicted and sen-
tenced to death. The conviction was affirmed in Vernon v. State, 245 Ala. 633, 18 So.
2d 388 (1944). Apparently no further petition for certiorari was filed. In accordance
with the judgment, Vernon was executed.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). Original conviction was for murder in the
first degree, with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Watts was again convicted
and sentenced to death. The conviction was affirmed in Watts v. Indiana, 229 Ind. So,
95 N.E.2d 570 (1950). Apparently no further petition for certiorari was filed. In
accordance with the judgment Watts was executed.
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Original conviction was of murder in the
first degree with a life sentence imposed. On retrial Haley was again convicted and
sentenced to life. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and a
motion to certify the record was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Ohio, 151
Ohio St. 8o, 84 N.E.2d 217 (1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 945 (1949).
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but with lesser punishments imposed.32 Four resulted in convictions of
lesser included offenses, and so with reduced punishments. 3
Ten cases eventually terminated in the judicial release of the de-
fendants while in one case, a rape proceeding, the defendant was
killed during the second trial by the husband of the prosecutrix.34 In
one case the state supreme court on remand directed entry of judg-
GCanty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940). Original conviction was of murder in
first degree with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Canty was again con-
victed of murder in first degree, but with the sentence reduced from death to life
imprisonment. This conviction was reversed because of prejudicial instructions.
Canty v. State, 242 Ala. 589, 7 So. 2d 292 (1942). On retrial Canty was again con-
victed of murder in first degree and sentence fixed at life imprisonment. The con-
viction was affirmed, 244 Ala. ioS, ii So. 2d 844 (943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 746
(1943)-
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 56o (1958). Original conviction was of murder in
first degree with the death sentence imposed. On retrial Payne was again convicted
of murder in first degree and sentenced to death. The conviction was reversed in
a four-to-three decision on the ground that a re-enactment of the crime "amounted
to but a part of his coerced confession, and was also coerced and unlawfully ob-
tained." Payne v. Arkansas, 231 Ark. 727, 332 SAW.2d 233, 235 (196o). Another
trial resulted in a conviction of first degree murder and a life sentence, which con-
viction was not appealed.
Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941). Original conviction was of rape with the
death sentence imposed. On retrial Lomax was again convicted of rape, but with
the sentence reduced to life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed, Lomax
v. Texas, 146 Tex. Crim. 531, 176 S.W.2d 752 (1944). [This was the third trial in the
Texas courts, the original conviction having been reversed because the trial judge
had not submitted to the jury the question of whether Lomax's confession was
voluntary. Lomax v. State, 136 Tex. Crim. 1o8, 124 S.W.2d 126 (1939)]-
3Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (196-). Original conviction of murder in
first degree and death sentence imposed. On remand Rogers pleaded guilty to
murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonmnt.
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (19i1). Original conviction of murder
in first degree and death sentence imposed. On remand Culombe pleaded guilty
to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). Original conviction of murder and
death sentence imposed. On remand, defendant pleaded nolo contendre to a
charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to 7 1/2 years imprisonment with credit
for the 2 1/2 years already served. Other defendants were sentenced to terms of
2 1/2 to 3 years, with similar credit for time served.
Spano v. New York, 36o U.S. 315 (1959). Original conviction of murder in
first degree and death sentence imposed. During the course of a retrial Spano
pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, and was sentenced to io-2o years
imprisonment.
"White v. Texas, 3og U.S. 631. on petition to rehear, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). The
original conviction of rape, in which the death sentence had been imposed, was
reversed by a state court. White v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 210, 117 S.W.2d 450 (i938).
On retrial there was another conviction of rape and the death sentence again im-
posed. This conviction was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court. While a jury
was being impaneled for a third trial, the defendant was killed in open court by
the husband of the prosecutrix. The husband was later acquitted.
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ment for the defendant. 35 The state nol-prossed further prosecutions
in four cases. 36 In one case one defendant was 1;3, 1 in a mental
institution during the course of the proceedings ano the trial judge
directed a verdict of acquittal as to the other defendants in what
was the fifth trial of the case.37 Two cases with the confessions ex-
cluded, resulted in jury acquittals. 38 Two cases resulted again in jury
convictions, but the holdings of the state appellate courts in setting
aside the convictions eventually required nol-prossing the convic-
tions.39
'Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949). See text infra after note 68
3Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). See text infra after note 43.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 US. 199 (1961). Original conviction was of
robbery, with sentence of 20 years imprisonment. Incident to the nol-prossing of
the case, the Veterans Administration took custody of Blackburn-and placed him
in a veterans hospital.
Reck v. Pate, 367 US. 433 (ig6i). Original conviction in 1936 was of murder
with a life sentence imposed. The other parties also convicted of the crime are
still in the penitentiary and refuse to testify against Reck. Without the confession
and without this testimony the state found it necessary to ask for the entry of a
nolle prosequi.
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)- Original conviction was of murder without
malice with a 3 year sentence imposed. Ward was first indicted at September Term
1939. The case was dismissed on October 22, 1942. The defendant very probably had
been confined all or a large part of three years.
T Chambers v. Florida, 309 US. 227 (ig4o). The four defendants had originally
been convicted of murder and the death sentence imposed in 1933. A multiplicity
of the state court proceedings followed, culminating in the reversal by the US. Su-
preme Court on February 12, 194o. Meanwhile, Chambers had been transferred to
the state hospital for the insane. The other three defendants were again tried, after
various legal proceedings in the Florida courts. On March 9, 1942, the trial judge
directed entry of judgments of acquittal.
wMalinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). Original conviction of murder in
first degree with death sentence imposed. On retrial in June 1946 the jury returned
a verdict of acquittal.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), 327 U.S. 274 (1946). Ashcraft was
twice convicted of murder and twice sentenced to life imprisonment. Both con-
victions were reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the ground that involuntary
confessions had been admitted into evidence. A third trial resulted in a jury verdict
of not guilty, both as to Ashcraft and his co-defendent, Ware.
ILeyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). An original conviction of murder in the
first degree with the death sentence imposed was reversed by the Court of Appeals
of New York, People v. Leyra, 3o2 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553 (1951)- On retrial Leyra
was again convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. The conviction
was affirmed by a four-to-two decision. People v. Leyra, 3o4 N.Y. 468, io8 N.E.2d
673 (1952), cert. denied (Black. J., and Douglas, J., dissenting), 345 U.S. 918 (1953).
This conviction was reversed in the federal habeas corpus proceedings that followed.
347 U.S. 556 (1954). On his third trial, Leyra was again found guilty and sentenced
to death, but this conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals in a four-to-two
decision. People v. Leyra, 1 N.Y.2d 199, 134 N.E.2d 475 (1956). As a result of this
decision the indictment was dismissed.
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949). See text infra after note 56.
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In the eleven cases in which convictions were again obtained in new
trials after Supreme Court reversal, the principal tangible benefit to
the defendants resulted from "delay." There was delay. in the execu-
tion of the death sentence on the two defendants again convicted of the
same crime and sentenced to death. Delay, operating somewhat dif-
ferently, was also of significance in the eight cases in which the de-
fendants were again convicted of the same offenses, with lesser pun-
ishments imposed, or convicted of lesser included offenses, carrying
lesser punishments. The results in these cases confirmed the guilt of
the defendants. Delay in bringing the cases to a final disposition was
probably the most important factor that operated to secure the reduc-
tions in punishment. The Supreme Court reversal was of no apparent
benefit to the one defendant who was again found guilty of the same
crime and again sentenced to life imprisonment.
In several of the cases in which the defendants were not again con-
victed the benefits to the defendants involved are somewhat tangential
or speculative. One defendant was killed before he could be tried
again. 40 Another defendant was transferred to a mental institution
and while he remains there cannot be tried again.41 A third defen-
dant's relatively short sentence militated against renewed prosecu-
tion.42 One defendant, for quite extraordinary reasons, has not been
able to obtain the benefits of the reversal; this is the defendant in
Fikes v. Alabama.
43
Fikes was charged with one rape and six burglaries. He confessed
commission of all the crimes. He was tried for rape, convicted, and
sentenced to 99 years imprisonment. He was then tried on another
charge, for burglary with intent to commit rape, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death. This latter conviction was reversed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court on the ground that his confession was involuntary. The
state did not prosecute again, since without the confession there was
not sufficient other evidence to sustain a conviction. The earlier con-
viction for rape was based, in part at least, on a similar "involuntary
confession," and so this conviction can presumably be set aside when-
ever the question is properly raised in court. However, there is evi-
dence other than the confession that might support another convic-
tion of rape, the evidence being the testimony of the victim who iden-
tified the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The dilemma
OWhite-v. Texas, nose 34 supra.
4tBlackbure v. Alabama, note 36 supra.
"Ward v. Texas, note 36 spura.
035t U.S. 191 (1957). Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court 5-46 (1961).
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posed for the defendant is that under Alabama law a retrial is on the
whole charge and a second conviction with the death sentence imposed
would not violate Alabama principles of double jeopardy. So far the
defendant has not chosen to run this risk and remains confined in the
penitentiary under an "unconstitutional" criminal judgment. Here
again, time and delay may eventually operate to the benefit of the
defendant. It is possible the victir will die so as to diminish the force
of the other evidence available for another trial. Another distinct
possibility is that the Supreme Court will extend the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment -to the states, which clause as interpreted
by the Court bars the imposition of greater punishment upon a second
conviction.
44
The subsequent developments in three cases reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court on June 27, 1949, are of particular interest because
they encompassed a large range of possibilities. These three convictions,
each of which carried the death penalty, came from different parts
of the country: Watts v. Indiana,45 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 46 and
Harris v. South Carolina.47
The reversals in all three were by a Court whose members were so
badly divided in their reasons that there were no majority opinions.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who delivered the judgments of the Court,
spoke only for himself and Justices Murphy and Rutledge.4 8 He said
the confessions were inadmissible, aside from any question of their
reliability or untruthfulness, because obtained by proceedings that
"offend the procedural standards of due process." 49 Mr. Justice Black
thought all three confessions had been obtained by "inherently coer-
cive" proceedings within the meaning of prior decisions.50 Mr. Justice
Douglas would have reversed because the confessions were obtained
while the defendants were held by the police in illegal detention.51
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton would have af-
firmed all three convictions on the record in the state courts.52 Mr.
Justice Jackson, who was concerned primarily with the reliability of
the confessions, thought the Watts conviction from Indiana should
be reversed on the basis of "the State's admissions as 'to treatment
"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)-
5338 U.S. 49 (1949).
"338 U.S. 62 (1949).
1338 U.S. 68 (1949).
"338 U.S. at 49, 63, 68.
19Id. at 54.
0Id. at 55, 66, 71.
'1 Id. at 56, 66, 71.
"Id. at 55, 66, 71.
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS
of Watts,"53 while the convictions from Pennsylvania and South
Carolina should be affirmed.
In light of subsequent developments in the three cases, these com-
ments can be made: While Watts obtained the largest number of votes
for reversal, six in all, he, of all three, was the defendant most cer-
tainly guilty. While Harris obtained fewer votes for a reversal, only
five, of the three he was the one most likely innocent of the crime for
which he had been convicted. On the basis of the record in the state
courts, there is little doubt but that Turner, whose conviction was
reversed by five votes, was actually guilty and escaped final conviction
because of the Supreme Court rule relating to confessions.
For those who criticize any Supreme Court supervision of state
criminal proceedings, the Turner case provides strong support. For
those who commend such Supreme Court supervision, the Harris
case provides support. For those who believe the rules established by
the Supreme Court interfere with state admistration of criminal
justice, the Watts case provides support. But when a comparison is
made of Watts and Turner, some doubts must be expressed as to
whether legal technicalities are not interfering with the equal ad-
ministration of state criminal justice. And when a comparison is
made of Watts and Harris, all should take pause. The comparison
suggests that the states are not sufficiently careful in protecting the
innocent from conviction, but it also suggests that the federal judicial
supervision of state criminal proceedings is more attuned to dealing
with unconstitutional convictions of the guilty than with barring
constitutional convictions of the innocent.
Watts v. Indiana involved murder in connection with an attempted
criminal assault. The judgment of conviction and sentence of death
were originally affirmed by a unanimous state supreme court.54 On
remand, in a trial with the confession excluded, Watts was again
convicted of the same crime and sentenced to death. This second con-
viction was affirmed by a unanimous court. 5 Watts was executed.5 6
Turner v. Pennsylvania involved a brutal double murder commit-
ted in 1945 during perpetration of a robbery. Turner, Johnson, and
Lofton were charged with the crime. Turner and Johnson pleaded not
guilty, but they were convicted and death sentences imposed. Lofton,
the look-out, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
53Id. at 57, 60.
r'Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N.E.2d 846 (1948).
nWatts v. State, 229 Ind. 8o, 95 N.E.2d 570 (195o).
O'Letter from Patrick D. Sullivan, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, August
31, 1961.
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,The original 1946 conviction of Turner was affirmed by a unan-
imous Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.57 After the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed this conviction,58 a series of four more trials followed, in
each of which Turner was convicted of murder in the fiLbt degree.
The jury imposed the death penalty in the first four of Turner's
five convictions and life imprisonment in the fifth. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in a unarimous decision reversed the second
convictionG9 and by a four-to-two vote reversed the third conviction.60
The fourth conviction was set aside by the trial court and the fifth
conviction reversed unanimously by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, 61 but with two judges dissenting from the majority's direction
that the charge should be nol-prossed unless additional evidence
could be presented at another trial. Lofton testified against Turner in
his second and third trials, but refused to do so in the fourth and fifth
trials. For refusing to testify, Lofton was found guilty of contempt by
the trial court, but this conviction was reversed on appeal.6 2 In ac-
cordance with the direction of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
the state entered a nolle prosequi on the charge against Turner and
he was released 3
Johnson was also convicted of murder in the first degree and sen-
tenced to death. This conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in a four-to-one decision, 64 but reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion on the authority of the
Turner decision. 6 In a second trial, with Lofton testifying against him,
Johnson was again convicted of murder in the first degree, but the
jury reduced the punishment to life imprisonment.66
So in end result, after this series of trials: Lofton, who pleaded
guilty remained in confinement. Johnson, who had been twice tried
and convicted, remained in confinement. Turner, who was able to
drag the proceedings through five trials, all of which resulted in con-
victions, four in the imposition of the death sentence,-won final
judicial release. Justice Musmanno found in this result a rewarding
5'Commonwealth v. Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A.2d 61 (1948).
'8338 U.S. 62 (1949).
WCommonwealth v. Turner, 367 Pa. 403, 8o A.2d 7o8 (1951).
WCommonwealth v. Turner, 371 Pa. 417, 88 A.2d 915 (1952).
"Commonwealth v. Turner, 389 Pa. 239, 13 A.2d 187 (1957).
"'Commonwealth v. Lofton, 389 Pa. 273, 133 A.2d 203 (1957).
"Letter from Arlen Specter, Assistant Attorney General, Philadelphia, Pa.,
October 27, 1961.
"Commonwealth v. Johnson,.365 Pa. 303, 74 A.2d 144 (g5o).
'Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 US. 881 (195o).
"Letter, supra note 41.
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end for "the search for the priceless jewel of truth,"67 Justice Bell
on the other hand, made this comment: "Lofton, io years after plead-
ing guilty to these murders and after all these years in jail, now swears
that he and Turner and Johnson never committed or had anything to
do with these murders. How gullible can we be?"68
Harris v. South Carolina involved the brutal murder of a country
storekeeper and his wife. The last words of the dying man were re-
portedly, "A big negro shot me and robbed me."6 9 Harris, although of
slight build, was convicted and sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina affirmed by a three-to-two vote.70 Both the
trial court and the South Carolina Supreme Court majority recog-
nized that the conviction could not be sustained without the use of
the defendant's confession. The two dissenting judges would have re-
versed because they thought the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the undisputed facts was that the confession had not been freely
and voluntarily made. On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina entered an order under date of Sep-
tember 2o, 1949, directing that judgment should be entered for the
defendant, who was then released.
7 1
Before himself confessing, Harris had accused another person of
the crime, but no prosecution was ever instituted against the person
so accused. Still another person later confessed to a series of crimes,
including the murders in the Harris case, and on his plea of guilty,
he was convicted of these murders. Since the person who ultimately
confessed did so to a number of crimes, the risk involved in confessing
to the murders in the Harris case was less than total. This and other
aspects of the case make it impossible to draw the certain conclusion
from subsequent developments that the Harris case involved the con-
viction of an innocent man for a crime committed by someone else.
It can be said with assurance, though, that the Harris case involved
a defendant whom the state had not proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that subsequent developments in this case, more than
those in any other, indicate that the accused was innocent.
These three cases, when compared and considered in relation to
others, reveal several defects in the present administration of criminal
justice: (1) Either guilty persons are being released by application
,'133 A.2d at 202.
1Id. n.,3 at 202.
"0338 U.S. at 69.
"State v. Harris, 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682 (1948).
'Letter from Hon. Daniel R. McLeod, Attorney General'of South Carolina,
September 12, 1961.
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of the present rules regarding confessions, or the administration of
criminal justice is so defective that innocent persons are being re-
peatedly convicted. (2) Long-delayed judicial reversals of convictions
are interfering with the orderly administration of the executive func-
tion of parole and pardon. (3) As a result of these two defects, the
criminal law is being applied unevenly to participants in the same
crime, with the result that the more guilty may go unpunished while
the less guilty suffer punishment. (4) The rights of innocent persons,
other than the person who is immediately accused, are perhaps not
being sufficiently considered and safeguarded.
Turner was convicted five times. Three different New York
juries found Leyra guilty of first degree murder and as a result he
was sentenced to death three times.7 2 Eventually, though, the New
York Court of Appeals in a four-to-two decision held -that the con-
viction, without the confession, was not supported by the evidence and
so the conviction was quashed and the defendant released.
In view of the repeated convictions by juries, initial affirmances
by respected state appellate courts, and ultimate quashing of the
convictions by divided courts, it seems impossible to treat the de-
fendants in the Turner and Leyra cases as having been judicially de-
clared to be "innocent" of the crimes with which they were charged.
But if the final dismissals can be so treated, then the present admin-
istration of criminal justice is extremely defective. If five juries in
Pennsylvania and three juries in New York can go so wrong as to
convict innocent men repeatedly; if the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania and the Court of Appeals of New York can go so wrong as to af-
firm convictions of innocent men; and if a large minority of the
members of the Supreme Court of the United States can go so wrong
as to vote to affirm the convictions of innocent men, the administra-
tion of criminal justice is indeed in a sad state.
The conscience rests easier on the assumption that Turner and
Leyra were guilty and escaped final conviction because of legal tech-
nicalities, rather than that these men were truly innocent and so the
victims of massive and continued injustice.
Turner v. Pennsylvania involved a crime in which three accom-
plices were convicted. All or none were guilty. From the legal stand-
point all participants in a crime, whether as perpetrator, aider and
abettor, or accessory before the fact, are equally guilty, but some
gradations in guilt are achieved through variations in the punish-
1Turner v. Pennsylvania, supra text after note 56; Leyra v. Denno, note 39
supra.
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ment imposed. Using such gradations in punishment as a basis for
determining relative guilt, the Turner case presents this situation:
Lofton, the look-out, was the least guilty by definition and because he
aided the state. He was never sentenced to death, but only to life im-
prisonment. Johnson was sentenced to death once, but on a second
trial the punishment was reduced to life imprisonment, and so he
must be considered the next most guilty. Turner was sentenced to
death four times and to life once, and so must be considered the most
guilty of the three. Yet in ultimate result it was Turner who obtained
final judicial release while Johnson and Lofton were left in confine-
ment.
Similarly, in Reck v. Pate73 one participant in the crime won final
release, since his accomplices refused to testify against him in another
trial,74 while the accomplices remain in prison.
The developments in another case, although not yet reviewed
by the Supreme Court, demonstrate the current vagaries that result
from long-delayed federal judicial review of state criminal proceed-
ings, particularly in the arbitrary discriminations that may result. In
1932, in New York three men confessed to murder committed during
armed robbery. All three were convicted of murder in the first de-
gee and sentenced to life imprisonment. There they remained for
twenty-three years. Then in 1955, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit ruled that Caminito's confession was involuntary.75 In 1956,
the Court of Appeals of New York, following this federal lead, made
a similar ruling as regarded Bonino's confession,76 and he too was
released. For technical reasons, however, it was not until 1962 that
the third person, Noia, was able to obtain a similar ruling on his con-
fession, again from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
77
He has not yet obtained release, however, since the U.S. Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in the case. 78 Was justice served when
Turner was released and Lofton and Johnson held in confinement?
Was justice served when Reck was released and his accomplices held
in confinement? Is it just to hold Noia in prison seven and more years
longer than Caminito?
"See note 36 supra.
7'Letter from Hon. Daniel P. Ward., State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois,
October 25, 1961.
nUnited States ex rel. Caminito v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing,
127 F. Supp. 689 (N.D.N.Y. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 896 (1955).
7 'People v. Bonino, i N.Y.2d 752, 135 N.E.2d 51 (1956).
TUnited States ex rel. Noia v. Fay, Soo F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962).
"Fay v. Noia, 369 U.S. 869 (1962).
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Legal rules, or technicalities, can be found that will serve to ex-
plain these results. 79 They do not serve to justify ,c results either to
the prisoners held in confinement or to a public ilite, .sted in the fair
and equal administration of criminal justice. This iz not to argue that
criminals should not be treated on an individual basis, or that it is
not proper to keep one of several participants in a crime in confine-
ment while others are released. However, it is to argue that the state
parole authorities are the agencies of government charged by law
with the responsibility for making such distinctions, and that ap-
pellate judges are not so charged. Where innocent men are held in
confinement, every effort should be made to secure thir immediate re-
lease. But where guilty men are held in confinement, it is the executive
branch of government that is charged by law and is in the best po-
sition to determine which prisoners have been rehabilitated and should
be released and which ones should be held in confinement until their
sentences are served.
Another aspect of the long-delayed judicial reversal is that it
encourages a tongue-in-cheek approach to the serious matter of crim-
inal law. The U.S. Supreme Court in ig6i in Reck v. Pate reversed a
1936 murder conviction and remanded the case to allow "the State
a reasonable time in which to retry the petitioner."8 0 Is such a remand
to be taken seriously? What factors should the prosecuting officials
consider in determining whether to retry the petitioner?
It is doubtful if a state can fairly prosecute for a crime committed
a quarter of a century ago. But even if it can, is there any sense to a
system that involves prosecutions of defendants twenty-five years after
they have been placed in confinement, and who have been amenable
to prosecution all that time? While the sixth amendment does not ap-
ply to the states, the principle of a "speedy" trial does have merit in
any sound system of criminal law administration. Such remands
after twenty-five years are hardly consistent with the principle.
If the prisoner is truly innocent in such a case, there has been a
grave miscarriage of justice that is hardly remedied by simple release
following twenty-five years of confinement. If the prosecuting authori-
ties consider the prisoner to be guilty, in deciding whether to prose-
cute again, the state must consider all the factors that would be rele-
vant to a determination of whether the prisoner should be released on
parole. Twenty-five years of confinement cannot be ignored. The judi-
ciary itself, when it orders such long-delayed releases, acts more in
9E.g., see note on the Second Circuit decision in 48 Va. L. Rev. 761 (1962).
"567 U.S. 433, 444 (190).
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the executive capacity of a thinly disguised super-board of paroles
and pardons than in a judicial capacity.
In three of the cases reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the de-
fendants finally won acquittals. In Chambers v. Florida,sl the defen-
dant had originally been convicted in 1933. After a multiplicity of
legal proceedings, directed verdicts of acquittal in favor of the defen-
dants were entered in 1942, after the defendant whose name the case
bears had been transferred to a mental institution. Nine years is a long
time. Ashcraft was twice convicted of murder, which convictions were
twice affirmed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and twice reversed
by the United States Supreme Court;8 2 only thereafter did Ashcraft
win a jury acquittal. Malinski's original conviction had been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals of New York in a four-to-three decision, which
conviction was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in a five-to-four
decision.s3 Again it can only be said, that if these defendants were
innocent, the judicial system came perilously close to working grave
injustices. One can be happier with the present judicial system if one
assumes that these defendants were guilty.
This leaves the Harris case, in which another man was eventually
convicted of the crime for which Harris had been convicted and
sentenced to death. Did the Supreme Court in this case save an in-
nocent man from death? If it did, it is arguable that this one case
alone would justify Supreme Court review of state criminal proceed-
ings. However, the matter is not so simple. Suppose that Harris was
in fact guilty, then the very reversal of his confession resulted in the
conviction of an innocent man, whose conviction remains unreversed.
How can it be known with certainty that the guilty person was the
second man, who pleaded guilty to a series of crimes, and not Harris,
who confessed, albeit involuntarily, to the crime?
The truth of the matter is that the more certain the guilt of the
person convicted by use of an involuntary confession, the less harm
can result from overturning the conviction. The release of the guilty
though becomes a luxury that can be ill-afforded if it should result in
the conviction of the innocent. If the law enforcement officials should
" See note 37 supra. ,
BThe case in the state courts is not reported. The first Supreme Court re-
versal was by a six-to-three vote, with Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Roberts
dissenting. 322 U.S. 143 (1944). The second reversal was by a unanimous court, but
with Frankfurter joining on the basis of the decision in the first case and Jackson
not participating. 327 US. 274 (1946).
83Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), reversing 292 N.Y. 36o, 55 N.E.2d
353 (1944).
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assume that the judicial overturning of a conviction establishes the in-
nocence of the person involved, they would be duty-bound to seek for
another person as the perpetrator. It is possible, with the prime suspect
judicially removed from furthei consideration, that the person so found
will be innocent.
Suppose the second person accused in the Harris case had denied
guilt, would the Harris "involuntary confession" have been admissible
in evidence to prove Harris's guilt and so by necessary implication
the innocence of the second defendant? Surely in this situation the
Rogers v. Richmond rule that the admissibility into evidence of the
confession must be determined "with complete disregard of whether
or not [Harris] in fact spoke the truth"8 4 does not apply.
Here a question may be asked that bears on larger considerations
of ethics and morality: "May coercion be used' to extort a confession
from a guilty person in order to save an innocent person from con-
viction?" This could be the situation if the confession led to other
evidence that demonstrated. the truth of the confession. The question,
even left unanswered, may serve to highlight a fundamental principle
involved in the administration of the criminal law: The most certain
way to protect the innocent is to find and convict the guilty.
II. A SuRvEy oF CURRENT STATE CONFESSIoN'CAsES
Evidence is not available to show the frequency with which the
question of the voluntariness of a confession is raised in trial courts,
or the number of confessions ruled involuntary as a matter of law by
the trial judges. The frequency with which the question is raised in
the state appellate courts shows that the matter is being considered
in a large number of criminal trials.
In 1946, Professor McCormick reported the results of a survey he
had made of the cases reported in the digest during the twenty-year
period that had then elapsed since 1926.85 He reported:
"The digests for the twenty-year period 1926-1945 reveal 94
appeals in which the appellant claimed force or threats in se-
curing a confession. The number of cases by years varies from i
to 8. There was i in 1927, and there were 8 in each of the years
193o and 1939, and surprisingly there were likewise 8 in the first
half year of 1945. The number of these cases in which a reversal
"s65 U-S. at 544-
"McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Con-
fessions, 24 Texas L. Rev. 239 (1946).
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is granted varies from 1 to 4 annually and recent years have
seen no lessening of reversals."8
In 1959, Professor Maguire reviewed the status of state law relating
to involuntary confessions, particularly as it was being affected by
the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.8 7 More recently, Donald
G. Targan has made a survey of the appellate court cases during the
nine-year period from 1952 to 196o.88 By Shepardizing the twenty-
nine confession cases reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Targan
found ninety-two state cases in which the defendants alleged that their
confessions had been obtained by physical or psychological coercion.8 9
The present writer has scanned the advance sheets of all series of
the National Reporter System for somewhat more than a year looking
for confession cases relevant to this inquiry and has found more than
eighty such cases.90
It is evident from the present survey that the number of cases in
the state appellate court has greatly increased since Professor Mc-
Cormick reported on the subject in 1946. It also seems clear that Mr.
Targan's figure of ninety-two cases for a nine-year period considerably
understates the actual number of cases, since his survey did not include
any cases in which the state court did not cite a U.S. Supreme Court
decision, there being a a considerable number of such cases. However,
it is probable that Mr. Targan's figure does include most of the
cases in which a truly serious question was presented as to whether
the confession was involuntary. The increase in number of confes-
sion cases has not been paralleled by any similar increase in the
number of reversals of convictions on the ground that involuntary
confessions were used. Instead, the number of reversals each year dur-
ing the past quarter century appears to have been fairly constant.
In the large majority of confession cases presented to state appel-
late courts in 1961-62, the courts appear to have had little doubt but
"Id. at 244. In his survey, Professor McCormick used "Criminal Law, Key no.
522 (Confessions, Voluntary Character, Threats and Fear)."
Ot Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 107-66 (1959), an earlier version of which had
been published as Maguire, 'Involuntary Confessions,' 31 Tul. L. Rev. 125 (1956).
OComment, Justice Black-Inherent Coercion: An Analytical Study of the
Standard for Determining the Voluntariness of a Confession, io Am. U.L. Rev.
53 (1961).
Oid. at 54.
"While no particular claim to complete coverage is made, it is believed that
substantially all reported cases for 1961 and early 1962 were found, so that the
cases covered give a reasonably complete picture of current litigation involving
confessions.
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that the confessions were voluntary. 91 In a substantial number of cases
the defendant's contention of involuntariness of F confession is
based on a claim that it was obtained after an illegal ,irest, ur during
a period of illegal detention as by denial of counsel or failtue to take
before an examining magistrate.9 2 Occasionally, of course, the mem-
1 fHargett v. State, 357 S.W.2d 533 (Ark. 1962); People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288,
14 Cal. Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865 (1961); People v. Carter, 56 Cal. 2d 549, 15 Cal. Rptr.
645, 364 P.2d 477 (1961); People.v. Fitzgerald, 56 Cal. 2d 855, 17 Cal. Rptr. 129,
366 P.2d 481 (ig6i); People v. Kaminsky, 22 Cal. Rptr. 191 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. '96'); Shuler v. State, 132 So. 2d 7
(Fla. ig6i); Ebert v. State, 140 So. 2d 63 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1962); People v.
Sims, 21 Ill. 2d 425, 173 N.E.2d 494 (1961); People v. Seno, 23 Ill. 2d 2o6, 177
N.E.2d 843 (1961);
People v. Mosley, 23 Ill. 2d 211, 177 N.E.2d 851 ('96i); People v. Jackson, 23
Ill. 2d 274, 178 N.E.2d 299 ('96i); People v. Carter, 182 N.E.2d, 197 (Ill. 1962);
People v. Freeman, 182 N.E.2d 677 (IIl. 1962); State v. Jones, 1.13 N.W.2d 303
(Iowa 1962);
Andrews v. Hand, 372 P.2d 559 (Kans. 1962); State v. Collins, 242 La. 704,
138 So. 2d 546 (1962); State v. Scott, 141 So. 2d 389 (La. 1962); State v. Bueche, 142
So. 2d 381 (La. 1962); Doyon v. State, 181 A.2d 586 (Me. 1962);
Parker v. State, 225 Md. 288, 17o A.2d 21o (i96i); Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480,
174 A.2d 163 (1961), cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting), 369 U.S. 813 (1962);
Hyde v. State, 228 Md. 209, 179 A.2d 421 (1962); Jones v. State, 182 A.2d 784 (Md.
1962); Commonwealth v. Pina, 174 N.E.2d 370 (Mash. 1961);
State v. Arradondo, 26o Minn. 512, 11o N.W.2d 469 (1g6i); Richardson v.
State, 133 So. 2d 266 (Miss. 1961); State v. Ray, 354 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. 1962); Dryman
v. State, 361 P.2d 959 (Mont. 1961); State v. Nelson, 362 P.2d 224 (Mont. i96i);
Bloeth v. New York, 9 N.Y.2d 211, 213 N.Y.S.2d 51, 173 N.E.2d 782 (1961), on
motion to amend remittur, 9 N.Y.2d 823, 215 N.Y.S.2d 769, 175 N.E.2d 347 (1961),
cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 868 (1961); State v. Outing, 255
N.C. 468, 121 S.E.2d 847 (1961); Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, i6g A.2d
78o (1961); State v. Young, 238 S.C. 115, 119 S.E.2d 504 (1961), cert. denied (Doug-
las, J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 868 (1961); State v. Worthy, 123 S.E.2d 835 (S.C. 1962);
Link v. State, 355 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); Porter v. State, 357 S.W.2d
401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); State v. Holman, 58 Wash. 2d 754, 364 P.2d 921 (1961).
Stories of police brutality are sometimes told, which, if true, leave little doubt
of the involuntary character of the confession, but usually such stories are found
to be untrue.
People v. Nischt, 23 Ill. 2d 284, 178 N.E.2d 378 (1961).; Johnson v. State,
336 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Crim. App. i96o), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 927 (196o); Smith
v. State, 35o Tex. Crim. App. 344 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
In Johnson v. Ellis, 194 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Tex. 1961), the federal district judge
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding had this to say of the petitioner's story,
"His tale of beatings, abuse, etc. struck this court as pure fabrication. Arranged
against petitioner's incredible, unsupported story of coercion is a coherent, plaus-
ible narration of the events...." Id. at 263. The district judge's denial of the
petition for habeas corpus was affirmed in 296 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. i96i), cert. denied
(Douglas, J., dissenting), 369 U.S. 842 (1962).
"2People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal. 2d 71, 14 Cal. Rptr. 13, 363 P.2d 13 (1961); People
v. Garner, 15 Cal. Rptr. 620, 364 P.2d 452 (x961); Leach v. State, 132 So. 2d
329 (Fla. ig6i), cert. denied (Douglas, J., dissenting), 368 U.S. 1005 (1962); Daw-
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bers of the courts have been divided as to whether a particular con-
fession was voluntary or involuntary.93
Most of the reversals of convictions in the state courts are made on
the basis that some state rule relating to the admissibility of confessions
has been violated.94 Less frequently, in reversing, the state courts place
the decision on the ground that the confession was obtained in viola-
tion of standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.95
son v. State, 139 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1962); Young v. State, 140 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1962);
State v. Evans, 372 P.2d 365 (Hawaii 1962); Parker v. Mississippi, 141 So. 2d
546 (Miss. 1962); People v. Lane, io N.Y.2d 347, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 179 N.E.2d
347 (1961); People v. Everett, io N.Y.2d 500, 225 N.Y.S.2d 193, 18o N.E.2d 556
(1962); People v. Doyle, 13 App. Div. 2d 6o 5 , 212 N.Y.S.2d 182 (3 d Dep't 1961);
State v. Scarberry, 114 Ohio App. 85, i8o N.E.2d 631 (Ct. App., Scioto County,
Ohio 1961); In re Dare, 370 P.2d 846 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962); Lopez v. State, 352
S.W.2d io6 (Tex. Crim App. 1961); Collins v. State, 352 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1962); Fernandez v. State, 353 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962);
Marrufo v. State, 357 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962); State v. Self, 366 P.2d
193 (Wash. 1961).
'People v. Roth, ii N.Y.2d 8o, 226 N.Y.S.2d 421, 181 N.E.2d 440 (1960) (con-
viction reversed because of admission of psychiatrist's report into evidence, but
three of seven judges would also have reversed on ground that defendant's
confession was involuntary); State v. Haynes, 58 Wash. 2d 716, 364 P.2d 935 (1961)
(conviction affirmed by a 5-to-4 decision, four judges dissenting on the ground that
the confession was involuntary); People v. Roberts, 364 Mich. 6o, 1o N.W.2d 718
(1961) (the trial court's denial of a motion to quash was affirmed by an equally
divided court, four judges taking the view that the proceedings should be quashed
because of a failure to take the defendant, a juvenile, before a juvenile court as
required by statute); Commonwealth v. Graham, 182 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1962) (convic-
tion affirmed, one judge dissenting).
"People v. Trout, 54 Cal. 2d 576, 6 Cal. Rptr. 759, 354 P.2d 231 (1960) (im-
plied threat that release from custody of wife of accused was dependent upon
accused confessing); People v. Brommel, 56 Cal. 2d 629, 15 Cal. Rept. 909, 364
P. 2d 845 (s96i) (officers told defendant that unless they got what they wanted,
they would write "liar" on his statement and then he could expect no leniency from
the court); People v. Rand, 21 Cal. Rptr. 89 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (threat to
take wife to jail if accused did not confess); People v. Jackson, 23 111- 2d 263, 178
N.E.2d 3to (1961) (confession obtained during preliminary hearing); State v. Cross,
357 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1962) (trial court failed to instruct that jury must find con-
fession to be true before they could consider it as evidence of guilt); State v.
Tassiello, 75 N.J. Super. 1, 182 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1962) (trial judge who admitted
confession of one defendant and excluded that of another obtained under similar
circumstances must have been mistaken as to the applicable law); People v. Howard,
15 App. Div. 2d 863, 224 N.Y.S.2d 886 (4th Dep't 1962) (police questioned defendant
after his arraignment); Odis v. State, 345 S.V.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (trial
judge refused on request by the jury to define duress required to make a confes-
sion involuntary).
vIllinois has held that a confession obtained after the defendant had been
detained in confinement for eight days is involuntary as a matter of law. People v.
Price, 24 Ill. 2d 46, 179 N.E.2d 685 (1962). Arkansas has ruled that fifty-two hours
of continuous questioning violates the "inherently coercive" Ashcraft rule. Binns v.
State, 344 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1961).
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Under the rules developed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court
makes ultimate findings of fact that a confession was or was not in-
voluntary, with the result that if ruled involuntary, the confession is
excluded from further proceedings in the state court. Professor Ma-
guire has commented that "the very minimum effect" of this pro-
cedure is "to remove this issue from state hands for decision in Wash-
ington. 96 State courts, on the other hand, are reversing and ordering
new trials at which time further consideration may be given by the
trial court to the character of the confession. The Supreme Court of
Arkansas in Binns v. State97 said that fifty-two hours of continuous
questioning was inherently coercive as a matter of law, but neverthe-
less, while reversing the conviction, left the way open for the trial court
to determine whether such extended questioning had in fact taken
place.9 8 The same procedure is being followed in Illinois99 and New
Jersey.10°
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's rule of automatic reversal, the
well-advised prosecutor with substantial evidence of guilt, aside from
the confession, will not introduce the confession into evidence. This
may lead the accused himself to try to get the "coerced confession"
into evidence or take advantage of it in some other way so as to secure
the benefits of an automatic reversal. In the North Carolina case of
State v. Gaskill'0 ' the defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced
to life imprisonment. In his cross-examination of a police officer,
the attorney for the defendant undertook to bring out that the state
had obtained a confession, a tape recording of which was available
and that it had been obtained by duress. The Supreme Court of North
"Maguire, supra note 87, at 124.
1344 S.W.2d 841 (Ark. 1961).
lAwne point had not been argued by counsel for the defendant, which led one
concurring judge to doubt whether the continuous questioning had in fact occurred,
and so he thought the defendant was getting a "windfall reversal." One judge dis-
sented, taking the view that the record did not show that this continuous question-
ing had taken place.
The procedure of the Binns case was followed in Kasinger v. State, 354 S.W.2d
718 (Ark. 1962).
"ePeople v. Nemke, 23 IIl. 2d 591, 179 N.E.2d 825 (1962).
nOState v. Fauntleroy, 36 N.J. 762, 177 A.sd 762 (x962).
10256 N.C. 652, 124 S.E.2d 873 (1962). In Doyon v. State, x8i A.sd 586 (Me.
1962), a confession was admitted into evidence, but a tape recording of the inter-
rogation was excluded on motion of the defendant. In a petition for writ of error
coram nobis the defendant based his claim almost entirely on the contents of
the tape recording. In denying the petition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
said that coram nobis was not a device by which the petitioner could "reconsider
his earlier decisions as to what evidence to offer on his own behalf and what
evidence to seek to exclude from consideration by the jury." Id. at 587.
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Carolina ruled against any argument based on the confession, saying,
"A defendant cannot invalidate a trial by voluntarily introducing
evidence which he might have excluded if that evidence had been
offered by the State."' 02 Similarly, Missouri has refused to permit a
collateral attack, by way of habeas corpus, on a judgment of con-
viction following a plea of guilty, where the indictment by the grand
jury was based on a "coerced confession."' 03 A trial court in New York
has ruled that even if a confession was coerced, its legal vitality dis-
appears as an effective issue after the defendant, on the advice of
counsel, pleads guilty. 10
4
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in United
States ex rel. Reid v. Richmond'0 5 that a state prisoner cannot claim a
denial of due process in his conviction, when his counsel as a matter
of strategy permitted introduction of an "involuntary" confession into
evidence without objection. Speaking for the majority, Chief Judge
Lumbard said, "We see no reason to require a state to try a criminal
case on the theory that the state may not rely on concessions of
counsel and the testimony of the defendant himself."' 06 Circuit Judge
Waterman, dissenting from a denial of a petition for rehearing, indi-
cated that he was puzzled as to why defense counsel, a Public De-
fender, did not object to the introduction of the confessions "if only
to save for appellate review the obvious constitutional questions."' 07
The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine was recently extended by
the Supreme Court of California to involuntary confessions. The court
did so in People v. Ditson'0 8 without upsetting death-$entence con-
victions of a particularly brutal gangland murder. The trial court had
excluded a confession as being involuntary, while at the same time
declaring, "The mere exclusion of the confession to my mind does
not exclude the evidence secured by the People as a result of it."109
Testimony and photographs relating to the finding of the dismembered
remains of the murder victim were claimed to be the fruits of the
confession.
10124 S.E.2d at 877.
0a State v. Young, 351 S.W.2d 732 (Mo. 1961). The court assumed for purposes
of decision that the confession had been "coerced", but expressed doubts as to
whether this was a fact.
"'People v. Williams, 225 N.Y.S.2d 333 (Ct. Gen. Sess., N.Y. County 1962).
I 695 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 US. 948 (1961).
"OId. at go. But see People v. Rand, 21 Cal. Rptr. 89 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962),
Files, J., dissented on ground that evidence presented to court was based on a
stipulation entered into by defense counsel.
2"95 Fad at 91.
2o Cal. Rptr. 05, 369 P.2d 714 962).m09 P.%d at 716.
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The evidence in the record, the Supreme Court of California
thought, showed the confession to have been voluntary, and not invol-
untary as ruled by the trial court. The court found it surprising, there-
fore, that the State did not challenge the ruling below, strongly indi-
cating that the State should do so in the future, since on a reversal
and retrial a confession ruled voluntary by the Supreme Court would
be admissible in evidence. The court also took note of legal and
psychiatric authorities who have recognized a compulsion on the part
of a perpetrator of a crime to confess, a phenomenon strikingly dem-
onstrated in the Ditson case when, following conviction, the defendant
who had confessed made a statement in writing to the trial judge in
which he said that he had admitted what he had done "because I
couldn't live with myself any more" and further, "The way I feel about
getting caught, is like a Blessing from heaven."110 In recognition of
this aspect of human nature, the court reaffirmed a previous statement,
"So long as the methods used comply with due process standards,
it is in the public interest for the police to encourage confessions and
admissions during interrogation."'
Nevertheless, the court continued to assume that the confession
was involuntary and properly excluded from evidence, in order to
examine the applicability of a fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
After reviewing the United States Supreme Court decisions in the
involuntary confession area, the court concluded that the doctrine of
"the admissibility of the product or 'fruits' of an involuntary confes-
sion has been rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States and
must be regarded as untenable." 1" 2 Although no U.S. Supreme Court
decision so holding was cited,13 the court announced the following
rule to be followed henceforth in California:
"[Tjhe reason for the common law rule permitting the in-
troduction of real evidence discovered by means of an invol-
untary confession-that such evidence tends to prove the 'trust-




raThe U.S. Supreme Court has never considered the question. Speaking with
reference to the admission into evidence of a coerced confession, whose truthfulness
has been established by corroborating evidence, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent in Stein v. New York said, "But if law officers learn that from now on they
can coerce confessions without risk, since trial judges may admit such confessions
provided only that, perhaps through the very process of extorting them, other
evidence has been procured on which a conviction can be sustained, police in the
future even more so than in the past will take the easy but ugly path of the third
degree." 346 U.S. 156, 203 (1953).
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tionally indefensible, and hence that the rule itself must be aban-
doned. The inquiry should instead be directed to the issue of
whether the introduction of the challenged evidence-the con-
fession itself or its asserted product-in a criminal 15rosecution
which culminated in a conviction denied the defendant, in the
particular circumstances of that case, any essential element
of a fair trial or due process of law."
114
In the Ditson case, the California Supreme Court recognized
"dangers inherent in the application" of a fruit of the poisonous tree
rule, and admonished the trial courts to exercise great care to deter-
mine: (i) that the confession is in fact involuntary; and (2) "that the
asserted 'fruits' of the confession thus found .to be involuntary were
in fact a product of that confession and would not have been otherwise
discovered by the police from information already in their possession
or independently acquired." 1 5 Two independently adequate bases
were found to render the rule inapplicable to the facts of the Ditson
case: (i) the defendant had not made timely object at the trial to the
admission of the "fruits" and (2) there were no "fruits." The first basis
is largely a makeweight of dubious value. 116 The second basis illustrates
the difficulties inherent in the rule.
The California rule does not require .the exclusion of all evidence
obtained on the basis of checking out an involuntary confession. Only
evidence that would not otherwise have been discovered by the police,
either from information already in their possession or from indepen-
dent sources, is to be excluded. In Ditson, as a result of the confession
the dismembered body of the victim was discovered, but this evidence
was held not to be the fruit of the confession, since every essential detail
of the crime and the identity of its perpetrators were already known to
the police, and the state was prepared to prosecute even though the
body of the victim was never found.1 17 Apparently also the implication
of another person in the crime is not a fruit of the confession if the
police already suspect his implication. 118
11 369 P.2d at 727.
11d. at 730.
216Cf. State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (1962), examining into legality
of a search and seizure, even though no objection bad been made to the admission
of the evidence, "since the defense should not be charged with failing to anticipate
Mapp." 181 A.2d at 765. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applied the rule of
exclusion in the case in which the rule was announced.
n 7California has upheld a conviction of murder on wholly circumstantial
evidence, no body having been found. People v. Scott, 176 Cal. App. 2d 458, s Cal.
Rptr. 6oo, appeal dismissed (Douglas, J., dissenting), 364 U.S. 471 (196o).
raThe confession implicated Gerald and Wynston Longbrake, but the court
said this was not evidence but merely a "lead" in a process of investigation, since
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The New York Court of Appeals, without any particular discussion
of the point, impliedly rejected the fruit of the c, :3onous tree doc-
trine in People v. Roth.119 In this murder case th,.. efen.._. orally
confessed and then pointed out the place where he had hidden a
bloodstained rug and where the victim's coat could be found. The
New York Court of Appeals indicated that even though the confession
was held to be involuntary, "This does not mean that upon the re-
trial the People would be prevented from proving his identification
of objects claimed to have constituted circumstantial evidence of his
commission of the homicide."'
120
Professor Maguire' 2l has pointed out that there is a close relation-
ship between pretrial suppression of illegally-obtained evidence, and
the exclusion of other evidence obtained by use of the illegal evi-
dence. 22 While a majority of. the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in the case of In re Fried23 authorized pretrial suppression of in-
voluntary confessions obtained in violation of an accused person's
constitutional rights, 2 4 the decision has met with a "general lack of
enthusiasm" in other federal courts, 125 and appears to have been re-
jected by all the state courts that have considered the matter.126
"the police already knew of the various members of the Longbrake family (some
of whom had recently served time in prison) and of their possible connection with
the crime." 369 P.2d at 730-31
'"it N.Y.2d 8o, 226 N.YS..d 421, 181 N.E.2d 44o (1962).
M°18i N..2d at 444. The court was divided on the question of whether the
confession was involuntary. Only three of seven judges thought it was involuntary.
The statement quoted is from the opinion of the court, prepared by one of the
three judges who would have ruled the confession to be involuntary. All members
of the court agreed on reversing the conviction on another point.
mMaguire, supra note 87.
"mId. at 147-48.
"'x6i F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. granted, 331 U.S. 804 (1947), writ dismissed
on motion, 332 US. 807 (i947).
2"Judge Frank wrote the opinion of the court and would have sanctioned pre-
trial suppression of any confession obtained illegally, whether in violation of con-
stitutional rights or not; Judge Learned Hand agreed only to the extent of author-
izing pretrial suppression of involuntary confessions obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights. Judge Augustus Hand would not have authorized
pretrial suppression in either situation.
mCentracchio v. Garrity, 198 F.2d 382, 387-88 (ist Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 866 (1952); Chieftain Pontiac Corp. v. Julian, 209 F.2d 657, 659 (Ist Cir.
1954). One of the few cases, even in the federal courts, in which pretrial suppression
of a confession has been ordered is United States v. Skeeters, 122 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.
Cal. 1954.)
"'Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524, 526 (1938); McGee v. State,
230 Ind. 423, 104 N.E.2d 726, 728 (1952); State v. Cincenia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568,
571 (1951); People v. Nentarz, 142 Misc. 477, 254 N.Y.S. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1931);
Application of Miller, 22 Misc. 2d 488, 193 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1959); State
v. Olivieri, 86 R.I. 211, 133 A.2d 767, 768 (1957); Dominguez v. State, 275 S.W.2d
1962] INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS 229
It is too early to know the full effect that Mapp v. Ohio127 will
have on the present approach. It is significant, though, that the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Rodriguez128 has held that a pre-
trial motion to suppress may be used to exclude from consideration
a confession obtained as a product of an illegal search and seizure.
In this case the accused contended that he had been induced to con-
fess to certain killings by confrontation with a gun and other articles
illegally obtained 'rom his room. The court said:
"In short, the exclusion rule covers not only the evidence il-
legally obtained but the product of the unlawful search as
well .... And, obviously, it matters not that these 'fruits' happen
to be confessions rather than some other tjpe of evidence."'' 29
The logic of Judge Learned Hand's comment in the case of In
re Fried on the relationship between pretrial suppression of il-
legally-obtained evidence and illegally-obtained confessions seems
unanswerable. Referring to the procedures followed where viola-
tions of the fourth amendment were involved, Judge Hand said:
"Although, so far as I know, the same rule has not as yet been
extended to confessions procured in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, I feel too much the force of consistency not to take
this added step.... Since I cannot see any rational basis here
for distinguishing between the two Amendments when the situa-
tion is so nearly the same, I am content to accept this in-
novation." 130
There appears to be no more rational basis for distinguishing between
the fourth and fourteenth amendments than between the fourth and
fifth.
Presumably, any person who coerces an accused into an involun-
-tary confession in violation of his federal constitutional rights may
be punished in an action brought under the Civil Rights Act,131 but
the effectiveness of such a proceeding is dubious. The rationale of
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in both the confession cases and
in Mapp v. Ohio indicate that both a fruits of the poisonous tree
doctrine and pretrial suppression of involuntary confessions are in
the offing.
677, 678-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955); Walker v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 408, 286 S.W.2d
144, 149 (1955); cert. denied, 35 US. 931 (1956).
"13 6 7 US-. 643 (1961).
Imii N.Y.*xd 279, 183 NXE.2d 651 (t962).
3"183 N.E2d at 654.
m16i F.2d at 465."
IaSee supra, notes 8 and 9.
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In the confession cases, some version of the McNabb-Mallory rule,
under which even voluntary confession'. obtaine'" ;ring periods of
illegal detention are excluded from evidence,3' -  .,.quctliy urged
upon the state courts. 133 The rule, however, has been reject4d by the
state judiciaries almost without exception,134 although it finds some
support among state judges. 35 The opinions of the United States
Supreme Court in Culombe v. Connecticut'36 would indicate that the
matter is the subject of frequent debate within the Court. At least
two of the Justices are urging a broad right to counsel rule-"the right
to consult a lawyer before talking with the police"--that would ex-
clude many voluntary confessions obtained during periods of illegal
detention. 37 If this viewpoint is once accepted, it would be but a
short step to applying the full McNabb-Mallory rule 38 to the states.
III. CENTRALIZATION OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION
One important aspect of U.S. Supreme Court review of state
criminal proceedings has apparently never been noted in the confes-
sion cases. This is the fact that the administration of state criminal
justice, particularly when it is compared with the federal set-up, is
highly decentralized. The federal-state judicial systems constitute a
hierarchy, in which pronouncements at the top are made effective
throughout the system. Similarly federal executive enforcement of
criminal justice is centralized in the U.S. Department of Justice. This
centralization has been carried so far that certain federal crimes can-
not even be prosecuted without the "formal approval in writing by
the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, which function of approving prosecutions may not be dele-
gated."139
"'Maguire, supra note 87, at 155-66; Hogan and Snee, The McNabb-Mallory
Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo. L. J. (1958).
mSee cases cited in note 92 supra.
'"In Culombe v. Connecticut, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that Michigan was
the only state to follow the McNabb rule, citing People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410,
1o2 N.W.2d 738 (196o). 367 U.S. n.51 at 6oi. People v. Roberts, supra note 93, may
cast some doubt on whether Michigan is following McNabb to the full extent.
"'Besides the Michigan cases cited supra note 134 see Dawson v. State, 139 So.
2d 408 (Fla. 1962); People v. Lane, io N.Y.2d 347, 223 N.Y.S.2d 197, 179 N.E.2d
197 (1961); State v. Hayes, 58 Wash. 2d 716, 364 P.2d 935 (1961).
" 367 U.S. 568 (1962).
"'Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black agrees, concurring. Id
at 637.
I'McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S g 449 (1957) AL'Ougitive Felon Act, 75 Stat. 795, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073 (1961 SuPp.).
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The decentralization of criminal justice at the state level is par-
ticularly apparent when one seeks information on state law enforce-
ment activities, such as subsequent developments in state confession
cases reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. To some
extent not precisely defined, the States' Attorneys General have rep-
resented the states in these cases before the Supreme Court. The
United States Reports indicate that in the twenty-two cases in which the
convictions were reversed, the states were represented by the State
Attorney General alone in nine cases, by the State Attorney General
and other attorneys in seven cases, and by attorneys not identified as
being associated with the State Attorney General in six cases. The
survey made in this article shows that many State Attorney General
Offices do not maintain records on what happens subsequent to re-
mands from the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General for New York,
for example, writes, "Criminal prosecutions in this State are handled
by the County District Attorneys and not by the Attorney General.
Consequently, this office has no record whatsoever of further proceed-
ings in these cases."'
140
The Attorney General of the United States can adopt rules, which
will carry out the directives of the federal judiciary as laid down in con-
fession cases, and he may require federal law enforcement officials to
obey such rules. State Attorney Generals do not have such great
powers in relation to state and local enforcement officials.
The image of a soverign state being called to the bar of the U.S.
Supreme Court to answer for its administration of criminal justice is
largely an illusion. Formally, so far as the style of the case is concerned,
it is the state that prosecutes for crime. In proceedings before appellate
courts, state officials, in the name of the state, defend the criminal
convictions so obtained. The state as such may be castigated for its
techniques of law enforcement.
But law enforcement activities are carried out at a different level
and by different persons. While of course the situation varies through-
out the nation, generally there are no organized procedures by which
federal constitutional rules, as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
are made binding on local law enforcement officials. In fact, it is
doubtful if there is very much in the way of organized procedures for
even making the rules known to these officials.
A truly effective enforcement of federal constitutional rules re-
quires a great deal more than supervision by the federal judiciary of
1 1Letter from Hon. Paxton Blair, Solicitor General of New York, August 25,
sg6i.
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state criminal proceedings. There must be centralization of law en-
forcement activities, as well as judicial activities. This means there
must be a transfer of authority from the localities to the states, so that
the law enforcement activities of the states may be more easily sub-
jected to directions from the federal government. To state the remedy
also is to state the dangers inherent in the remedy. A centralized po-
lice system has great potentialities' for good, but it also has great po-
tentialities for evil.
A review of the state confession cases that have reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in the last quarter century, particularly an analysis of
the cases in which the Court reversed convictions, does not demon-
strate that the present situation is one of which the states need to be
ashamed. It would be a gross overstatement to say on the basis of this
review, that the number of innocent persons who have been convicted
by coerced confessions during the past quarter century equals the
number of fingers on one hand. Considering human fallibility, this is
hardly a bad record. Some lingering doubts must remain though as
to whether this truly states the picture, and whether the cases that
reach the U.S. Supreme Court have much to do with guilt or in-
nocence.1
41
So far as protecting the innocent is concerned, a good case could be
made, as a preferable alternative to the present techniques, for the
complete abandonment of federal review of state confession cases and
the adoption by the states of a rule that a criminal conviction will be
reversed in an appellate court, unless two-thirds, or some such figure,
of the reviewing judges vote to affirm. So far as a review of these
confession cases shows, such a rule at the state level would more surely
have protected the innocent, than the present system of reversals only
by a majority even though the conviction is reviewed by a larger num-
ber of courts.
Herein must lie the basis for the major criticism that can be made
of federal judicial review of state criminal cases involving convictions.
The states, and particularly, the people in the local communities, are
not interested solely in constitutional guarantees. They are also in-
terested in protecting the innocent from unjust convictions. Federal
judicial review emphasizes the prevention of the unconstitutional
conviction of the guilty. An ideal system of criminal law administra-
tion gives first consideration to protecting the innocent.
""See Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court 298-3oo (1961).




RENO S. HARP, IIIj-
The initial step after the indictment has been returned by the
grand jury is an inquiry by the court as to whether each defendant
is represented by counsel. Section 19.1-241 of the Code of Virginia
requires that counsel be appointed to defend all indigents who are
charged with a felony. During the past twelve months, I have appeared
in thirty different courts in this State. Judges before whom I have
argued cases have expressed their concern over the increasing num-
ber of defendants who assert that they are unable to employ counsel,
and ask the court to provide them with a lawyer. In most of the cir-
cuits that I have visited over 50 per cent of the criminal cases are now
handled by lawyers appointed by the court. This has caused a great
deal of concern among the members of the judiciary. Some judges
have made it a practice in every case where the defendant requests
court-appointed counsel to inquire as to the defendant's financial
condition. If it then appears to the court that the defendant is finan-
cially able to employ a lawyer, he is urged to do so by the court and,
if the defendant is on bond, the case is continued to the next term
of court.
The selection of the attorney to represent an indigent defendant
is the next, and a very important, step. Many of the courts have adopt-
ed the policy of appointing two lawyers of considerable experience
in all capital cases. This divides between two experienced heads the
heavy burden of deciding on what course of action to take. In some
circuits the court appoints two lawyers, an older and a younger
lawyer, to handle a number of cases. The young lawyer does the leg
work and the older lawyer is available to give advice and counsel.
The fees allowed by the court are then divided between the attorneys.
Very few courts still follow the practice of indicting, appointing
counsel, and trying a defendant all on the same day. This is a very
dangerous practice. Although perfectly correct, this procedure, looks
*This paper is based on an address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
Judicial Conference of Virginia, May 11, 1962.
tAssistant Attorney General of Virginia.
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somewhat unusual at a later date. Some of the courts have adopted a
hard and fast rule that at least a week must elapse between the time
counsel is appointed and the trial of the case, even if the plea to be
entered is guilty.
At the time the defendant is arraigned, a question-may arise as to
whether or not he understands the nature of his plea. In the case of
a youthful offender inquiry should always be made as to his age and
previous education. Some of the courts have expressed the view that
in all questionable cases, the defendant should be examined and a
determination made as to his mental condition. Moreover, the court
should explain to him his constitutional rights, that is to say, his right
to plead not guilty and to be tried by a jury; his right to plead not
guilty and to be tried by the court, with the. consent of the court and
the Commonwealth's Attorney; and if he pleads guilty that he will be
tried by the court. This procedure should be followed in every case,
and is most important when the defendant pleads guilty. Of course,
inquiry should be made to ascertain that any guilty plea is made vol-
untarily and without any promises having been made to the defendant.
The next question that arises is the necessity of transcribing the evi-
dence. Some of the courts have adopted a uniform practice of requiring
a court reporter in all capital cases. This is by far the better practice.
The availability of a transcript of the record protects the right of the
Commonwealth and of the accused. Section 17-3o.1 does not pre-
scribe the particular means to be used in recording the evidence in a
particular case. In the Third Judicial Circuit almost all criminal
cases are recorded by means of a dictaphone dictating machine. The
machines have been purchased by the respective boards of supervisors,
and the cost of operation is small. This procedure is less expensive
than employment of court reporters and works nearly as well. The
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council made a study of the entire
problem of court reporters in 1949, and it was determined at that
time not to establish a court-reporter system. However, some sort of
record of every criminal trial of any magnitude is needed, because
more and more long-term prisoners are filing petitions for writs of
habeas corpus.
If the defendant pleads guilty, or not guilty, and is tried by the
court without a jury, the use of the pre-sentence report, as provided
for in Section 53-278.1, is of great assistance to the court in ascertain-
ing the quantum of punishment to be imposed. Moreover, this report
is part of the record of the court and usually contains a full summary
of the crime or crimes committed by the defendant. More and more
ALUMNI COMMENT
courts in this State are using this very fine tool in determining the
sentence to be imposed upon the defendant.
After the trial has been concluded, the next question which arises is
the amount of the fee to be paid the attorney in court-appointed cases.
Section 14-181 of the Code of Virginia (1950) provides that the court
may allow a fee not to exceed $15o in cases where the crime may be
punishable by death, or by confinement in the penitentiary for a
period of more than ten years. If the crime is other than those men-
tioned before, the court may allow a fee not to exceed $50. The mem-
bers of the bar and of the judiciary are aware of the fact that the
amounts allowed by this statute are not sufficient to provide adequate
compensation for the efforts of court-appointed attorneys in many
cases.
The setting of the fee in any specific case is a difficult matter at
best. There is a great difference in the fees allowed under identical
situations in different courts. In one circuit a fee of $15 is allowed
an attorney when he represents an- indigent defendant who pleads
guilty, while only one hundred miles away, the minimum fee allowed
in another circuit under the same situation is $25. In 196o, $107,447
was paid court-appointed attorneys. In 1961, $156,965 was paid court-
appointed attorneys. The total amounts involved are not small and
are increasing each year.
In the order of appointing counsel the words "able and experienced
attorney at law" could well be used. In the order allowing an at-
torney's fee the words "a fee of - dollars is allowed John Doe,
attorney at law, who effectively and competently represented Richard
Roe on a charge of murder" are useful.
The members of the judiciary receive many letters from inmates
at the Virginia State Penitentiary. On some occasions these letters
request that an attorney be appointed to aid the indigent in his appeal
from his criminal conviction. Section 17-30.1 provides for the record-
ing of the evidence and incidents of trial. It also provides that, in
any felony case where the defendant is represented by an attorney
appointed by the court, the court shall on motion of counsel for the
defendant order that a copy of the transcript of the evidence be pre-
pared in order that the indigent defendant may appeal. There is no
specific provision of law which provides for the appointment of coun-
sel to assist an indigent in his appeal of his criminal convicton. The
Supreme Court of the United States has not ruled specifically on this
point in regard to State cases. In the Federal system indigents are
entitled to court-appointed counsel on appeal. The highest courts
1962]
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of the states of Washington, Indiana, New York and Kansas have held
that under the fourteenth amendment an indigent is entitled to court-
appointed counsel on appeal. They have held that the refusal of a
court to assign counsel upon request was a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights as guaranteed to him by the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.
The test to be applied in these cases was expressed in the case of
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the denial of a transcript which was necessary
to appeal a decision in a criminal case was a denial of a constitutional
right.
The Supreme Court of the United States has laid great stress upon
the point that indigents must be raised to the same level as those
defendants who have the financial means to employ counsel. In 1895
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Barnes v. Commonwealth,
92 Va. 794, 23 S.E. 784 (1895) recognized the fundamental right of an
accused to have the assistance of counsel. Subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and the statutes enacted by
the General Assembly require the appointment of counsel in all
felony cases. In the absence of a definitive decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, it would seem that the better practice
would be for a trial court, upon request of an indigent defendant, to
appoint counsel to assist the indigent in appealing his criminal con-
viction. Such action will have a far-reaching effect on the trial courts
in this Commonwealth, but it is likely that in the not too distant
future, the Supreme Court of the United States will require such ap-
pointments. This is a problem of considerable interest, for a convict
is usually unable to appeal his own conviction.
In some cases, the attorneys appointed to represent an indigent
defendant will, on their own motion, appeal a criminal conviction,
thus insuring the equal protection of rights of accused persons re-
gardless of their financial situation.
It is the duty of the legal profession to make sure that all persons
charged with crimes are treated equally before the bars of justice in
this State.
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A CHANGE IN THE LAW OF LIBEL
Historically, the publication of a libel was actionable without
pleading and proving any special damages.'Injury to the plaintiff's
reputation was presumed, and so he could recover general damages.
Three types of damages may be involved in a libel action: general,
special, and punitive. The major elements of general damages are
injury to reputation,2 loss of business,3 bodily injury and wounded
feelings.4 Special damages, on the other hand, can only be recovered
when the injury is a direct pecuniary or material one.5 Proof'of special
damage is extremely difficult, and American decisions sustaining such
claims are few.6 Finally, if the evidence shows that the defendant was
wanton or malicious, punitive damages are recoverable in addition
to damages given for compensation.7 The theory of awarding punitive
damages is that they are imposed on the defendant as a penalty. At
common law, publication of a retraction would defeat a claim for
punitive damages but served only to decrease the amount of general
damages recoverable by the defamed party.8
The common law of libel has been often criticized,9 particularly
in the area of unintentional defamation where seemingly excessive
damages have sometimes been recovered from responsible publishers.
This dissatisfaction resulted in the sporadic enactment of statutes
'Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812). Mansfield
stated in this case he that could see no valid reason for distinguishing slander
from written defamation but was bound by a long established precedent.
'Craney v. Donovan, 92 Conn. 236, 102 At. 640 (1917).
8Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders, 113 Va. 156, 73 S.E. 472 (1912).
'Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. io7, x29 N.E. 369 (1921).
5McCormick, Damages § 114 (1935).
6The courts generally require the defamed party to plead and prove the char-
acter of the acts which have-caused the damage with a greater degree of definiteness
than is normally required in pleading damages. McCormick, Damages § 115 (1935).
The same conditions are required in England as well. "As much certainty and
particularity must be insisted on, both in pleading and proof of damage, as
is reasonable, having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts
themselves by which the damage is done." Ratcliff v. Evans, [18921 2 Q.B. 524,
532 (C.A.).
WMcCormick, Damages § i18 (1935).
Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 45 N.D. 568, 178 N.W. 792 (1920).
"See Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 891 (1956).
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limiting the recovery of general damages where the publisher of the
libel has published or offered to publish a retraction.10 Legislatures
enacting such statutes consider retraction to be the same as excul-
pation and, therefore, this alleviates the need for general damages.
Proponents of the retraction statutes contend that "exculpation in
the eyes of the world is not accomplished by quiet entry of judgment
on musty court rolls."" The strong desire to disseminate news rapidly
in a world of nearly instantaneous communication will necessarily
result in some unavoidable mistakes. Though there is no exact statisti-
cal information available, it is believed that responsible news media
readily retract any false statements which are published. By providing
for retraction in lieu of general damages, publishers are relieved of the
danger of excessive verdicts and extortion by unscrupulous plaintiffs.
However, numerous writers are somewhat critical of the various re-
traction statutes.' 2 They believe that retraction is never an entirely
adequate remedy, for rarely does a retraction reach all who heard
the defamation. Even though retraction often may be a sufficient
remedy in the case of an inadvertent libel, there seems to be no justi-
fication for allowing publication of a retraction to relieve a malicious
defendant. 13
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Holden v. Pioneer Broadcasting
Co.14 applied a retraction statute 5 that radically changes the common
law of libel. Under the Oregon statute the plaintiff may recover such
special damages as he can prove to have suffered as a result of the
defamatory statement, but general damages are not recoverable unless
a correction or retraction was demanded and refused, or the plaintiff
proves that the defendant actually intended to defame him.
"For a comprehensive compilation of American retraction statutes see Leflar,
Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 423, 436-40 (1952).
"Morris, Torts 294 (1953).
'See for instance Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 6o
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 17 (1946); Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction,
32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1936); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 944 (1956).
'3 See 38 Calif. L. Rev. 951 (195o).
"356 P.2d 845 (Ore. 1961). The defendant's primary ground of attack was
on the constitutionality of the Oregon statute. In Holden the Statute was upheld
by a 4-3 decision. This constitutional attack has long been a serious deterrent to
the adoption of strong retraction statutes. A statute eliminating the recovery of
general damages by a defamed party runs the risk of depriving him of property
without due process of law. This subject is developed at great length in Morris,
Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1937). In addition
see 23 So. Cal. L. Rev. 89 ('949); 36 Ore. L. Rev. 70 (956); 38 Calif. L. Rev. 951,
954 (195o).
"Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 30.155-30.175 (1955).
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In Holden the plaintiff sued to recover special, general and puni-
tive damages for a libelous statement made by the defendants dur-
ing a television broadcast. On motion of the defendants, the court
struck the claims for general and punitive damages on the ground that
the complaint did not allege that the defendants either intended to
defame the plaintiff or refused to publish a retraction. In affirming,
the Supreme Court said the Oregon statite requires "the plaintiff
to plead and prove, as a condition precedent to recovery, defendants
intent to defame or in the absence of such intent, the failure to re-
tract upon demand."'16
Though this decision represents a great change in the law of libel,
it does not come without warning. As previously indicated, some state
legislatures have sought to protect news media that retract defamatory
releases from excessive verdicts. However, these efforts have been
met with great hostility from the courts, for most of these retraction
statutes have been held unconstitutional17 or have been judicially
construed so as to leave the common law virtually unchanged.18 Re-
traction statutes may be divided into two categories: One group uses
vague language that is susceptible of varying construction, while the
other group expressly precludes the recovery of general damages.
A statute in the first group may read that the plaintiff shall re-
cover only "actual damage" in the event of a retraction or an offer
of the same. Most courts reviewing such a statute have construed
"actual damage" to -include both general and special damages.' 9 Such
a judicial construction leaves the common law unchanged, with the
result, as Professor Morris says, that "the sum total of significant
changes in the measure of damages when inadvertent libel has been
retracted is zero."
20
At least three states2' have enacted statutes in the second group,
u365 P.2d at 847.
"E.g., Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 67o, 75 Pac. 1041 (19o4); Park v. Detroit
Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888).
"Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. ioi8 (19o8); Osborn v.
Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 81, (1904).
12Comer v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 151 Ala. 613, 44 So. 673 (1907) (actual equals
general damage); Ross v. Gbre, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950) (actual damages equal
general damages);Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538, 84 N.E. io18 (19o8) (ac-
tual damages equal general damages); Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 45 N.D. 568,
178 N.W. 792 (192o). In Neafie v. Hoboken Printing and Pub. Co., 75 N.J.L. 564,
68 At. 146 (1907), the statute was construed to exclude the recovery of punitive
damages only.
"Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 Il1. L. Rev. 36, 42
(1932).
2The three states with more stringent retraction statutes which have been
upheld in the face of constitutional attack are California, Minnesota, and Oregon.
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expressly excluding general damages in the event of a retraction or
an offer of retraction. These statutes do not admit of a judicial con-
struction that permits the recovery of general damages. Although this
latter group of statutes does preclude the recovery of general damages
in the event of a retraction, there is a wide divergence of opinion as
to how far this protection should carry.
Under the Minnesota statute general damages are not recoverable
where there is a showing of good faith coupled with a full retraction
by the defendant.22 However, in Allen v. Pioneer Press Co.23 this good
faith requirement was construed to include freedom from negligence as
well as freedom from an improper motive. Thus the scope of this
statute has been limited by the judiciary so that there is little change
from the common law.
The California statute24 is at the other extreme from the Minne-
sota act. This statute, which was applied in Werner v. Southern Cali-
fornia Associated Newspapers,25 allows a retraction as a defense to
recovery of general damages even in the case of a deliberate and ma-
licious libel. By limiting the plaintiff's recovery to special damages
for a malicious publication, the legislature seems to have granted a
license to defame, tacitly encouraging sensationalism in the press.
The Oregon statute occupies the median position between the
milder Minnesota statute and the more severe California legislation.
The Oregon statute has many of the good features of the other two
acts and yet omits the more objectionable aspects of each. It goes
further in changing the common law of libel than does the Minnesota
act, but it does not offer the more drastic protection to malicious pub-
lishers provided in the California statute.
Even at common law, proof of retraction generally precluded the
recovery of punitive damages.2 6 Consistent with this rule, most of the
retraction statutes are interpreted as precluding the recovery of puni-
tive damages. The Oregon retraction statute does not mention puni-
tive damages and the court in Holden specifically declined to make a
determination on that issue.2 7 It only held that the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint were not sufficient to charge the defendants
with an intent to defame.
Though the various retraction statutes have not met with great
UMinn. Stat. Ann. § 548.o6 (1947).
."4o Minn. 117, 41 N.W. 936 (1889).
mCal. Civ. Code § 48(a).
'35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d 825 (1950).
26Prosser, Torts § 96 (955).
2365 P.2d at 851.
[Vol. XIX
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judicial favor in the past, it is to be noted that the two most recent
decisions involving retractions have sustained the more drastic type
statutes. Perhaps this represents a new trend in the law of libel. If
so, it is possible that the Oregon statute construed in Holden will be-
come a model for other states. One of the better features of the Oregon
act is that it allows a retraction to preclude recovery of general dam-
ages only for inadvertent libels. Although the Oregon statute re-
quires the plaintiff to plead and prove malice or failure to retract upon
demand, it would perhaps be desirable to establish a presumption
against malice and to require the plaintiff to prove malice in fact. This
would have the effect of taking the issue of good faith from a jury
which might be oversolicitous of the plaintiff.
ANDREW W McTHENIA, JR.
COHABITATION DURING PENDENCY
OF A DIVORCE ACTION
When a court hearing an action for divorce learns that the parties
have cohabited during pendency of such suit, the court is presented
with an interesting question involving conflicting policies. Ordinarily
the courts hold that voluntary cohabitation during the pendency
of the suit bars the suit" and dismiss the action.2 Some courts, though,
have held that while the facts of such cohabitation should be brought
to their attention, their jurisdiction to grant the divorce is not af-
fected.3 In accordance with the latter view it has been held that the
original cause of action may be revived in the same action, after sub-
sequent acts of aggression have taken place, by the filing of a sup-
plemental petition.4
Recently, a Florida District Court of Appeals in Sezferth v. Seiferth5
reached a different result concerning the effect of cohabitation of
the parties during the pendency of a divorce action. A husband sued
'Givens v. Givens, 304 S..W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
-Byrne v. Byrne, 93 N.J. Eq. 5, 114 At. 754 (Ch. 1921); Givens v. Givens, 304
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
'Cabral v. Cabral, 323 Mass. 441, 82 N.E.2d 616 (1948); Tackaberry v. Tacka-
berry, loi Mich. 102, 59 N.W. 400 (1894); Payne v. Payne, 157 Ore. 428, 72 P.2d 536
(1937).
'Huffine v. Huffine, 74 N.E.2d 764 (Ohio C.P 1947).
'132 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Ct. App. ig6i).
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for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty.6 The chancellor granted
the divorce and the wife appealed contending that the court below
should have dismissed the suit because the resumption of cohabita-
tion during its pendency established condonation of the marital of-
fense as a matter of law.7 In affirming the decision below, the District
Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion,8 agreed with the finding of the
chancellor that the defendant wife had not shown the element of
forgiveness implicit in the defense of condonation.9 One judge dis-
sented, being of the opinion that the cohabitation in the marital
home, which admittedly included several acts of sexual intercourse
subsequent to the institution of the divorce proceedings, constituted
condonation as a matter of law.10
The court in the Seiferth case, in its preoccupation with the legal
sufficiency of the defense of condonation," seemingly failed to con-
8It has been held that either a husband or a wife may maintain an action
for divorce based on cruelty. Levy v. Levy, 388 Il. 179, 57 N.E.2d 366 (1944);
Nail v. Nail, 287 Ky. 355, 153 S.W.2d 909 (1941); Persinger v. Persinger, 133 W Va.
312, 56 S.E.2d 110 (1949). The chief distinction made here is that a wife is ordinarily
granted a divorce for cruelty on less provocation than a husband. Woolley v.
Woolley, 113 Utah 391, a95 P.2d 743, 744 (1948).
7The appeal was actually taken from a refusal to dismiss upon the facts as
set forth in the wife's amended answer. These are the facts as found by the special
master upon re-referral of the cause to him by the chancellor: The defendant wife
went to the plaintiff husband's place, the marital abode, for dinner. A violent
argument developed, during the course of which the wife received a broken wrist.
The plaintiff took his wife to the hospital and paid for her bill there. After the
wife's release from the hospital she returned to the marital home, with her per-
sonal effects, and she shared the same bed with plaintiff. It was admitted by both
parties that they had indulged in sexual intercourse. Seiferth v. Seiferth, 132 So.
2d 471, 473 (Fla. Ct. App. ig6i).
'The decision was three to one.
9All courts require forgiveness, either implied or express, by the aggrieved
spouse to constitute a valid defense of condonation. York v. York, 280 S.W.2d 553
(Ky. 1955); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 69 Nev. 176, 244 P.2d 381 (1952); Duff v. Duff,
126 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
"1i32 So. 2d 471, 474 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).
"Another problem which might have been behind this court's reluctance
to accept condonation as a defense in this case is the distinction frequently applied
by courts concerning condonation as a defense to a divorce based on the ground
of cruelty as opposed to one based on the ground of adultery because of the dif-
ferent character of the offenses. 'Wolverton v. 'Wolverton, 163 Ind. 26, 71 N.E. 123
(i9o4); Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan. 249, 232 P.2d 6o3 (i95i); Weber v. Weber, 195
Mo. App. 126, 189 S.W 577 (1916); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 69 Nev. 176, 244 P.2d
381 (1952); Fisher v. Fisher, 223 App. Div. 19, 227 N.Y. Supp. 345 (1st Dep't 1928);
Wilson v. 'Wilson, 16 R.I. 122, 13 ALI. 1o2 (1888); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 39
Tenn. App. 99, 281 S.W.2d 270 (1954); Cudahy v. Cudahy, 217 Wis. 355, 258 N.W.
168 (1935)-
There have been many cases holding that the resumption of marital relations
constitutes condonation of cruelty. Obennoskey v. Obennoskey, 2i4 Ark. 358, 220
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sider the "overwhelming weight of authority,"' 2 which denies relief
to the parties who cohabit during pendency of a suit for divorce.'
3
This view is typically reflected by the words of a New York court:
14
"We think it is contrary to the policy of the law and incongruous to
separate parties judicially who have not separated themselves."'1 The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Tarr v. Tarr,16 added its sup-
port to this view with these graphic words: "It would be shocking to
the moral sense for a court of equity to grant a divorce to parties,
who, during the pendency of the suit, litigated by day and copulated
by night."'7
While the authorities denying relief to parties who cohabit during
the pendency of a divorce action are unanimous in their conclusion,
they are also unanimous in refraining from enunciating the exact
reasons behind their conclusion.' 8 One can speculate as to the reasons.
Possibly a kind of the "clean hands" doctrine' 9 is involved. This
would not be an application of the doctrine in its usual sense, t.e.,
denial of relief to a wrongdoer,20 but rather a denial of relief to parties
S.W.2d 61o (1949); Buck v. Buck, 205 Ark. 918, 171 S.W.2d 939 (1943); Johnson v.
Johnson, 21o Ga. 795, 82 S.E.2d 831 (1954); Moore v. Moore, 362 Ill. 177, 199 N.E.
98 (1935); Babcock v. Babcock, 317 Mass. 772, 59 N.E.2d 471 (1944); Sewell, v.
Sewell, i6o Neb. 173, 69 N.W.2d 549 (1955); Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 832, 29
N.W.2d 629 (1947); Lazarczyk v. Lazarczyk, 122 Misc. 536, 203 N.Y. Supp. 291
(Sup. Ct. 1924); Greer v. Greer, 178 Pa. Super. 643, 115 A.2d 794 (1955); Brooks v.
Brooks, 2oo Va. 530, io6 S.E.2d Gi1 (1959). But see Cox v. Cox, 343 S.W.2d 395
(Ky. 1961); Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 198 At. 154 (1938); Hollister v. Hollister,
6 Pa. 449 (1847).
'The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that when the parties
to a suit for divorce have... resumed their marital relations, such action operates
to end the litigation." Givens v. Givens, 304 S.V.2d 577, 58o (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"Holt v. Holt, 77 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Baumgartner v. Baumgartner,
16 Ill. App. 2d 286, 148 N.E.2d 327 (1958); Vnght v. Wright, 153 Neb. 18, 43 N.W.2d
424 (195o); Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc. 2d 3992 149 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Sommer
v. Sommer, 285 App. Div. 8og, 137 N.Y.S.2d i (ist Dep't 1955); McCarthy v. Mc-
Carthy, 199 Misc. 680, 103 N.Y.S.2d 8o8 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951); Berman v. Berman,
277 App. Div. 56o, 1o N.Y.S.2d 2o6 (ast Dep't 195o); Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443,
35 S.E.2d 4o (1945).
UBerman v. Berman, 277 App. Div. 560, 1o1 N.Y.S.2d 2o6 (ist Dep't 195o).
25d., ioi N.Y.S.2d at 207.
1184 Va. 443, 35 S.E.2d 401 (1945).
17184 Va. at 449, 35 S.E.2d at 4o4.
u8Typical of the language of the courts in this respect is the language of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska: "It is elementary that while a divorce is pending
the parties must live separate and apart." Ellis v. Ellis, 115 Neb. 685, 214 N.W 300,
301 (1927).
1nhe doctrine that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands
has been held applicable to divorce cases. Fritz v. Fritz, 179 Ore. 512, 174 P.2d 169,
174 (1946); Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 1.o3 (1945).
2°Generally the clean hands principle is applied when the party seeking re-
1!962]
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who, through their actions out of court, show a lack of good faith
in participating in the suit.21 Professor Chafee in an exhaustive article
criticizing the application of the clean hands doctrine to matrimonial
litigation wrote: "It was an evil day when the first American judge to
speak of clean hands had the bright idea of injecting the maxim
into the very place where it would work its greatest mischief." 22 Per-
haps he would not object to this application of the doctrine. The
chief objection of Chafee and others to the use of a clean hands doc-
trine in divorce actions lies in the intolerable position in which the
parties are left after its invocation.23 This objection hardly applies
where the parties show by their actions during the pendency of the
suit that their position after denial of'relief will not be intolerable.
2 4
Another possible reason behind the conclusion of the majority view
may be some idea of estoppel. Estoppel has been applied to divorce
actions where lack of good faith has been shown.25 It would not be
an unwarranted extension to invoke an estoppel on the ground that
the party is asking for judicial relief wholly inconsistent with his extra-
judicial conduct.
The foregoing considerations point to the denial of relief where
the parties have cohabited during the pendency of their suit for
divorce. But a contrary result can be reached if the strong policy
favoring reconciliation of the spouses26 is considered controlling. It
is arguable that this policy favoring reconciliation will best be served
by allowing the parties to cohabit during the pendency, of their di-
vorce suit. They are then permitted to remain in the best possible
lief is himself guilty of some wrongdoing in connection with the lawsuit. Rhine
v. Terry, iii Colo. 506, 143 P.2d 684, 685 (1943); Christensen v. Christensen, x44
Neb-763, 14 N.W.2d 613, 616 (1944); Hartiman v. Cohn, 35o Pa. 41, 38 A.9d 22,
25 (1944).
2'Lack of good faith has been described as one of the bases underlying the
clean hands maxim. Vulcan Detirning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J.Eq. 387,
67 Ad. 339, 341 (1907); Canfield v. Jack, 78 Okla. 127, 188 Pac. 1o4o (192o).
21Chafee, Coming into Equity with Unclean Hands, 47 Mich L. Rev. 877, io83
(1949).2Id. at io88.
mThe parties in the Seiferth case have shown by their actions that living to-
gether is not an intolerable situation.
mStafford v. Stafford, 163 Kan. 162, 181 P.2d 491 (1947); Bohmert v. Bohmert,
213 App. Div. io3, 21o N.Y. Supp. i (ist Dep't 1925); Deutsch v. Deutsch, 141 Pa.
Super. 339, 14 A.2d 586 (i94o).
26Many courts have enunciated this policy favoring reconciliation. DeBurgh
v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952); Pilliner v. Pilliner, 64 Idaho 425,
133 P.gd 735 (1943); Diamond v. Diamond, 182 Md. 103, 32 A.2d 376 (1943);
Iovino v. lovino, 58 N.J. Super, 138, 155 A.2d 578 (App. Div. 1959); Brown v.
Brown, 2o8 N.Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
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relationship to effect a reconciliation before they are legally separat-
ed.2 7 While this view has been given scant consideration by the
courts, it does seem to have some merit.
Cohabitation during the pendency of a divorce suit and the defense
of condonation obviously raise different questions; and, therefore,
they should be distinguished. The court in the Seiferth case failed to
do so, and was led to a result contrary to the weight of authority.
The court would have been on stronger ground if it had based the
result on the policy favoring reconciliation of the spouses.
JAMNS L. HOWE III
FINDERS' RIGHTS IN MISLAID PROPERTY
Legal controversies over the rights of contesting claimants to
personalty discovered on premises not owned by the finder present
particularly difficult problems. An excellent example is offered by
the federal case of Rofrano v. Duffy,' which involved a tenant's
action against his landlord for the recovery of $1o,5oo cash the tenant
found upon the leased premises. The tenant discovered the money in
a lunch box hidden behind paint cans on a shelf in the basement.
He turned the money over to the landlord who represented that he
was the owner. At the trial the landlord admitted that he was not
the owner, but claimed that the money belonged to his deceased
brother-in-law.
The trial court gave judgment for the tenant, and the landlord
appealed. The federal court, applying New York law, affirmed the
lower court's decision stating that either as a finder or as the occu-
pant of the premises, the tenant was entitled to the money.2 Alter-
native rationales were invoked. As one basis, the court said that
under common law principles the tenant as the person in possession
of the premises was entitled to custody of "mislaid" property as
against anyone but the true owner. Futhermore, as a second basis of
decision, the court pointed out that New York has by statute abolished
the distinction between mislaid and lost property and awards both
to the finder.
There is conflict over whether the custody of goods found on the
-7But see Szulc v. Szulc, 96 N.H. 190, 72 A.2d 500 (1950).
1291 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1961).
2Id. at 85o.
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premises of another should be given to the finder or to the owner of
the premises.3 A distinction is often drawn between mislaid and lost
goods.4 Mislaid goods are goods that are intentionally put aside and
later forgotten.5 Lost goods are those which casually and involuntarily
pass out of the possession of the owner. 6 The element of intentional
deposit, present with mislaid goods, is lacking in the case of lost
goods.7 The owner of the chattel is said to retain constructive posses-
sion of the property though custody may be in another on whose
premises it has been left.
8
The general view in the United States is that the finder of lost
property should prevail as against the whole world except the true
owner,9 but the owner of the locus in quo should prevail over the
finder of mislaid property. 10
Since the circumstances under which the owner parts with pos-
session are usually unknown, it is often difficult to decide whether the
aCompare Pyle v. Spnngflield Marine Bank, 33o Ill. App. 1, 70 N.E.2d 257
(1946); Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 162 Mo. App. 165, 145 S.W. 139 (1912);
Cohen v. Mfrs. Safe Deposit Co., 271 App. Div. 428, 65 N.Y.S.2d 791 (ist Dep't
1946); with In re Savanno, i F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Vickery v. Hardin,
77 Ind. App. 558, 133 N.E. 922 (1922); Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Ad. 858
(19o8); Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Ore. 1o8, 74 Pac. 913 (19o4). For a full discussion
of this matter see Aigler, Rights of Finders, 21 Mich. L. Rev. 664 (1923); Moreland,
Does the Place Where a Lost Article Is Found Determine the Rights of the Finder?,
15 Ky. L.J. 225 (1927). See also Walsh, Law of Property, 115 (2d ed. 1937).
'Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234, 265 S.W 612 (1924); Foster v.
Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376 (1915); Hill v. Schrunk, 207
Ore. 71, 292 P.2d 141 (1956).
5 lbid.
6
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Kirby, 25 Ala. App. 245, 144 So. 123 (1932); McDonald
v. Ry. Express Agency, 89 Ga. App. 884, 81 S.E.2d 525 (1954); Foulke v. New York
Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (192o); Toledo Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52
Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.9d 661 (1935).
7
Cohen v. Mfrs. Safe Deposit Co., 271 App. Div. 428, 65 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Ist
Dep't 1946); Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Ore. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948); Schley v. Couch,
155 Tex. 195, 284 S.W.2d 333 (1955); Zech v. Accola, 253 Wis. 8o, 33 N.W.2d 232
(1948).
8Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co., 05 Ky. 234, 265 S.W. 612 (1924); J. G. Mc-
Grory Co. v. Hanley, 37 Ohio App. 461, 175 N.E. 232 (1930).
91n re Savanno, 1 F. Supp. 331 (S.DN..Y. 1932); McDonald v. Ry. Express
Agency, 89 Ga. App. 884, 81 S.E.2d 525 (1954); State v. Mitchell, 15o Me. 396, 113
A.2d 618 (1955); Erickson v. Sinykn, 223 Minn. 232, 26 N.W.2d 172 (1947); Toledo
Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.9d 661 (1935); Jackson v. Stein-
berg, 186 Ore. 129, 200 F.2d 376 (1948).
10Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit CO., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.V. 376 (1915); Foulke v.
New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (192o); Jackson v. Steinberg,
186 Ore. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39
S.E.2d 308 (1946). See 34 Am. Jur. Lost Property § 3 (1941); 36A C.J.S. Finding
Lost Goods § i (i96i).
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goods are lost or merely misplaced."3 Courts are often forced to base
the classification upon the nature of the place where the goods are
found.12 If the place of finding is private, it is said that the owner
of the premises has -the intent to possess the place and whatever may be
located there, but if the place where the goods are found is public,
no such intent can be said to exist.'3
Difficulties arise in determining whether the place of finding was
private or public and distinctions are often attempted between quasi-
private and quasi-public places of finding.'
4
In the Rofrano case, the Court of Appeals found that the money
was mislaid rather than lost. "A lunch box containing $10,500 is 'mis-
laid' rather than 'lost' within the above definitions if found behind
paint cans on a shelf six feet above the ground."'15 It is doubtful if
there could be any serious question on this matter.
The classification of the property as "mislaid" adds little to
the solution of disputes between landlords and tenants. If one starts
with the premise that mislaid property should be placed in custody
of the owner of the land, as against a finder, 16 the question arises as
to whether landlord or tenant should be considered the owner. Right-
ful occupancy of the premises on which mislaid property is discovered
could satisfy the "ownership" requirement and give the tenant the
right to custody of the mislaid property. This appears to be the reason-
ing of the court in the principal case.
Cases involving landlords and tenants are rare.' 7 However, analo-
uHow is one to tell whether a lady's handbag discovered on a streetcar seat
has been casually dropped, or placed there and forgotten? Cf. Foulke v. New York
Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (1920). It seems undoubtedly true that the
owner of goods may, by placing them on a table or bench in a bank, public con-
veyance, or shop, constitute the owner of such place bailee thereof, but this isn't
always true.
"In the following cases the custody of the property was awarded to the owner
of the premises on the ground that the place of finding was private. Pyle v.
Springfield Marine Bank, 330 Ill. App. 1, 70 N.E.2d 257 (1946); Silcott v. Louisville
Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234, 265 S.V. 612 (1924); Hill v. Schrunk, 207 Ore. 71, 292 P.2d
141 (1956). However, in Toledo Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.2d
661 (1935) (found articles were awarded to the finder on the ground that the
place was semi-public).
"Ibid.
"Compare Toledo Trust Co. v. Simmons, 52 Ohio App. 373, 3 N.E.2d 661 (1935)
with Pyle v. Springfield Marine Bank, 330 Ill. App. i, 70 N.E.2d 257 (1946); Flax
v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39 S.E.2d 3o8 (1946). See 3 6A C.J.S. Finding
Lost Goods § i (ig6i).
"291 F.2d at 85o.
"8 See note io supra.
17This writer has been unable to find a case presenting a fact situation similar
to that involved in Rofrano v. Duffy. One explanation suggested for this is a lack
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gous cases point to a result contra to Rofrano v. Duffy.1 8 The English
case of Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.19 was the first reported case to present
a landlord-tenant dispute over discovered personalty. It held that the
landlord was entitled to a two-thousand year old prehistoric boat
uncovered by the tenant in making excavations. This principle was
considered ten years later in South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Shar-
man.20 The court approved the following statement of the applicable
law:
" 'The possession of land carries with it in general, by our
law, possession of everything which is attached to or under that
land, and, in the absence of a better title elsewhere, the right
to possess it also. And it makes no difference that the [owner]
is not aware of the things' existence It is free to anyone who
requires a specific intention as part of a de facto possession to
treat this as a positive rule of law. But it seems preferable to
say that the legal possession rests on a real de facto posses-
sion.... '"21
Up to the present time, this line of reasoning has generally been
followed by American courts2 2 These courts often go so far as to hold
that any personalty found in a private place is to be considered mislaid
property rather than legally lost 23 As such it is awarded to the owner
of the premises as against a finder either on the basis of a quasi-
bailment relationship2 4 or by virtue of the doctrine of construc-
of diligence on the part of tenant-finders in reporting discoveries of lost or mislaid
property on the leased premises.
13Pyle i,. Springfield Marine Bank, 33o Ill. App. 1, 7o N.E.2d 257 (1946); Silcott
v. Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234, 265 S.W. 612 (1924); Dolitsky v. Dollar Say.
Bank, 2o 3 Misc. 262, 118 N.YS.2d 65 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1952) (money discovered lying
on shelf adjacent to safe-deposit vault was held to be mislaid and custody was
awarded to the owner of the premises).
"33 Ch. D. 562 (1886).
1(1896] 2 Q.B. 44.
21Id. at 46-47. The quotation is from Pollock and Wright, Essay on Possession
in the Common Law 41. The word "possessor" instead of "owner" is used in the
original, but in context the word "possessor" is used to mean " owner," as distin-
guished from the "finder."
=Pyle v. Springfield Marine Bank, 330 Ill. App. i, 70 N.E.2d 257 (1946); Silcott
v. Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234, 265 S.W. 612 (1924); Dolitsky v. Dollar Sav.
Bank, 203 Misc. 262, 118 N.Y.S.ad 65 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1952); Hill v. Schrunk, 207
Ore. 71, 292 P.2d 141 (1956); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39 S.E.2d
3o8 (1946). See 34 Am. Jur. Lost Property § 3 (1941). This view is not accepted
by all courts. For authority contra to the general rule see In re Savarino, i F.
Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1932); Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546, iog A.2d 623 (i954)-
-'*Hill v. Schrunk, 207 Ore. 71, 292 P.2d 141 (1956).
-1flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39 S.E.2d 3o8 (1946) (innkeeper held
to be custodian as to mislaid and forgotten property).
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tive possession. 2. If the position of the article indicates that it was
voluntarily placed where discovered, the principle seems to be that the
owner of the chattel has designated the owner of the place as bailee.20
If the position of the chattel when discovered indicates that the
owner parted with it involuntarily, the doctrine of constructive
possession is used.
27
New York has by statute abolished the distinction between lost and
mislaid property.28 Both lost and mislaid property are treated as lost
property and awarded to the finder.29 A finder is defined as the person
who first takes possession of lost property.3°
The New York statute contains elaborate procedural provisions for
the protection of the original owner's rights. 31 The finder is required
to notify the local authorities promptly, or turn the property over
to the owner of the premises on which the personalty is found, who
in turn has the responsibility of notifying local officials.32 The chat-
tel must be retained a stipulated length of time by the authorities
and an effort made to locate the owner.3 3 However, the statute also
creates and protects the rights of honest finders.34 The most distinctive
feature is that title vests in the finder which is good as against the
owner himself if the property is not claimed within the time period.
This is in marked contrast to statutes in several other states which
only require that the finder must be reimbursed for the expenses
he necessarily incurs in caring for the chattel.3 6 Under this type of
statute, if the owner cannot be found, the chattel is sold and the
proceeds retained by the municipality, except for whatever amount
may be deducted for reimbursement of the finder.3 7
The New York statute contains at least one possible source of
-Silcott v. Louisville Trust Co., 205 Ky. 234, 265 S.W. 612 (1924) (where liberty
bond was discovered by renter of safety vault box on the floor of a private room
of safety vault department of a trust company, the company's right to custody was
held superior to that of the finder on the basis of prior constructive possession).
2See note 24 supra.
-See note 25 supra.
21N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 251-58.
2Id. at § 251.
0Ibid.
4N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 251-58.
2Ibid.
3N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 251.
Uid. at § 254.
"N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 254, 257.
36Ala. Code tit. 47 §§ 155-60 (Recomp. 1958); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 50-1-50-14
(t958 Rev.); Vt. Stat. §§ 7632-7641 (1947); Wis. Stat. §§ 170.07-170.11 ('959).
3Ibid.
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uncertainty and confusion in that a finder is defined merely as the
one "who first takes possession." This leaves the old familiar prob-
lem of interpreting the term possession. The- Court of Appeals in
the Rofrano case impliedly construed possession as requiring a
reduction to physical control 38 and so rejected the constructive posses-
sion doctrine.
One of the main purposes of the New York statute seems to be
to promote the return of lost property by encouraging possible action
by finders.3 9 Indeed, protection of the owner's interest has always
been the purported purpose of the courts in dealing with cases in this
area.40 Bearing this in mind, it is suggested that this would be defeated
if the term "possession" was construed to require only a constructive
control.
It is doubtful if the Second Circuit in the principal case correctly
evaluated the precedents in saying that case law dictated a de-
cision for the tenant. However, its decision is consistent with the
purpose of the New York personal property statute. An award of the
disputed property to the landlord on the basis of technical prior
possession would result in a severe and undue limitation upon the
statute's effectiveness. Certainly the temptation not to report a finding
would be very great if the finder was aware that by doing so, he
might lose his rights in the property found. The Rofrano decision
should have the effect of encouraging honesty among finders.
JOHN W. JOHNSON
EFFECT OF HOLD OVER PROVISIONS
ON VACANCIES IN OFFICE
In many jurisdictions, the incumbent in an elective public office
is authorized to hold over after the expiration of the term, until his
successor is duly qualified. When the successor fails to qualify, the
question arises as to whether there is a vacancy in the office.
The question arose in State ex rel. Foughty v. Frzederzch.1 At the
"291 F.2d 848, 85o (2d Cir. 1961).
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 251-58.
"OFoster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W, 376 (1915); Foulke v.
New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (192o); Jackson v. Steinberg,
186 Ore. 129, 2oo P.2d 376 (1948); Flax v. Monticello Realty Co., 185 Va. 474, 39
S.E.2d 3o8 (1946). See Comment, 52 Harv. L. Rev. sio 5 (1939).
11o8 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1961).
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i96o election, Heringer was elected a trial judge for a term to com-
mence on the first Monday in January, 1961. The incumbent, Judge
Benson, resigned before his term officially expired on January 2, 1961.
Afterwards, on December 23, 196o, Heringer died. The governor
appointed Friederich to fill the vacancy created by Judge Benson's
resignation. The succeeding governor declared that a vacancy existed
in the office because Judge-elect Heringer had failed to qualify, and
he appointed Foughty to fill the vacancy. When Friederich refused
to vacate the office upon request, Foughty filed an information in
quo warranto challenging Friederich's claim to said office.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the trial court's
denial of the writ, holding that the subsequent appointment of Fough-
ty was invalid. The court reasoned that a vacancy in office does not
result from the death of an elected official before the. beginning of
the new term where the term of the incumbent extends until a
successor has qualified.2 One judge dissented, taking the view that
the hold over provision was designed in the public interest to prevent
a vacancy in office and not to extend the tenure of an incumbent for
his own benefit.3
The prevailing rule, as illustrated by the majority opinion is
that the death of one elected to an office. before he has qualified does
not create a vacancy if the incumbent is authorized to hold over until
his successor shall have qualified. 4 Therefore, the office is not to be
deemed vacant so long as such office is filled by an incumbent who is
legally qualified to perform the duties which appertain to it.5
The majority approach draws a distinction between vacancy
created during the regular term and the expiration of a term of
office. In the latter case, the incumbent is under an obligation to con-
tinue in office to discharge the duties until his successor has quali-
fied, and this added period is a part of the rightful term of office6 And
accordingly, it is an established principle that a qualified successor
is one who has been chosen by the same mode as the regular incum-
'Id. at 682.
81d. at 694.
'Pittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 190 S.E. 794 (1937); Clark v. Wonnacott, 3o
Idaho 98, 162 Pac. 1o74 (1917); State ex rel. Freeman v. Carvey, 175 Iowa 344, 154
N.W 931 (1915); Smith v. Snell, 154 Kan. 197, 117 P.2d 567 (1941); Gnnnell v.
Bunker, 115 Me. io8, 98 AtI. 69 (1916); State ex rel. Boone County Atty. v. Willott,
1o3 Neb. 798, 174 N.W. 429 (1919); State ex rel. Hoyt v. Metcalfe, 8o Ohio St. 244,
88 N.E. 738 (19o9); State ex rel. Hellier v. Vincent, 2o S.D. 9o, 104 N.W 914 (9o95).
For cases of other jurisdictions see generally Annot., 74 A.L.R. 486 (1931).
tPittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 19o S.E. 794 (1937).
"Shackelford v. West, 138 Ga. 159, 74 S.E. 1079 (1912).
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bent, absent a statute to the contrary3 Thus, if there is no vacancy to
warrant an appointment, and there is no provision for a special elec-
tion, the incumbent is entitled to hold over for another term.
Some jurisdictions follow a minority rule, as illustrated in the
dissenting opinion of the principal case, under which the expiration
of a term of office is synonymous with vacancy, even though the in-
cumbent may hold over until his successor has qualified.8 Therefore,
the appointing power may fill the vacancy created by the expiration
of a term of office, if no one has been elected to the office or if the
official elected died prior to the beginning of his term.
The jurisdictions adhering to this approach generally emphasize
that the hold over provision is not "designed or intended to extend
the tenure of office by an incumbent for his own benefit beyond the
specified term.."9 In declaring that a vacancy exists upon the expira-
tion of a term of office, it is reasoned that a holdover provision is not
a limitation upon the appointing power to fill vacancies in the of-
fices. 10
Under this approach a vacancy in office does not hinge upon the
fact that there is an absence of a qualified person to administer the
office. :" The hold over provision is primarily aimed at preventing a
hiatus in the office rather than prolonging the tenure of the incum-
bent.'2
Another principle stressed by the jurisdictions following this mi-
nority approach is the construction of the state constitutions or the
applicable statutes. 1 3 The Kentucky constitution provides that Justices
of the Peace shall hold for three-year terms and "until their successors
are elected and qualified." 14 Nevertheless, Olmstead v. Augustus15
'Pittman v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 19o S.E. 794 (1937).
'State ex tel. Covington v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98, 38 So. 679 (i9o5); Adams
v. Doyle, 139 Cal. 678, 73 Pac. 582 (193o); Gibbs v. People ex Tel. Watts, 66 Colo.
414, 182 Pac. 894 ('919); People v. Pillman, 284 Ill. App. 287, 1 NXE.2d 788 (1936);
People ex tel. Mitchell v. Sohmer, 209 N.Y. 151, 102 N.E. 593 (1913); State ex tel.
Kenner v. Spears, 53 S.W. 247 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1899); Dobkins v. Reece, 17
S.W.2d 8i (rex. Civ. App. 1929); State ex rel. Finch v. Washburn, 17 Wis. 678
(1864). For cases of other jurisdictions see generally Annot., 74 A.L.R. 486, 494
(193-1)
'State ex tel. Sathre v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W 558 (1935). This case
is distinguished in principal case but is not overruled.
1In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 65 Fla. 434, 62 So. 363 (913).
"Alcorn ex tel. Hendrick v. Keating, 120 Conn. 427, 181 At. 340 (1935).
22Campbell v. Dotson, iii Ky. 125, 63 S.W. 48o (igoi).
"State ex tel. Sikes v. Williams, 222 Mo. 268, 121 S.W 64 (19o9); People ex Tel.
Mitchell v. Sohmer, 29o N.Y. 151, 1o2 N.E. 593 (1913).
"Olmstead v. Augustus, 112 Ky. 365, 65 S.W 817, 818 (19o).
512 Ky. 365, 65 S.W 817 (190).
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held there was a vacancy upon the expiration of the incumbent's
term. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky felt construction of the
constitution should be based "not only on an isolated expressi . n, but
on the whole instrument, and the plain purpose of the framers of
the instrument must be effectuated."' 6 The court said the framers
of the constitution could not have intended for a person who was
elected for one term of office to hold for a second term simply because
his successor had died prior to qualifying. The prerequisite, as fol-
lowed by the majority jurisdictions, that the successor is to be se-
lected by the same mode as the incumbent has also been held not to be
entirely conclusive as requiring actual qualification of a successor.
Thus in State ex rel. Robert v. Murphy, 7 the Florida Supreme Court
said this is only one factor "to be considered with such others as
the law may present in forming a correct judgment as to the mean-
ing of that law, whether organic or statutory."' 8
In a comparison of the majority and minority approaches, several
distinguishing aspects are evident. The rationale in a majority of
jurisdictions is that the people should be entitled to select the suc-
cessors for elective offices.' 9 If it is determined that a vacancy exists
upon the expiration of the term of office, whenever the successor
has not qualified, these jurisdictions feel there would be numerous
occasions where the governor would be supplying such offices with
incumbents and depriving the electorate of their right as provided
under the state constitutions.20 Such jurisdictions reason then, that
allowing an incumbent to hold over for another term provides an
adequate solution. However, the minority approach provides a more
adequate protection for the electorate. It prevents an officer from
holding over for a term to which he has neither been elected nor
appointed.2i The electorate has a manifest right to select successors, 22
and if under the circumstances they are unable to do so, then all juris-
dictions provide some authority with the power of appointment. Allow-
ing an incumbent to hold over for another term seems an undesirable
result, which cannot be concealed by simply labeling the period of
holding over as part of the fixed term. An incumbent may manipulate
the election so as to secure the selection of a successor who would refuse
"Id. at 818.
1132 Fla. 138, 13 So. 705 (1893).
"State ex rel. Robert v. Murphy, 32 Fla. 138, 13 So. 705, 711 (1893).
19See State ex rel. Hoyt v. Metcalfe, 8o Ohio St. 244, 88 N.E. 738 (1909).
0Ibid.
'=Campbell v. Dotson, iii Ky. 125, 63 S.W 480 (19o).
"Ibid.
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to qualify, or he might induce his successor to renounce the office be-
fore qualification.
The second distinguishable aspect between-the two approaches is
that of constitutional and legislative construction. The majority
approach interprets literally the hold over provision of a state con-
stitution or statute. It is interpreted as preventing the development
of a vacancy, and of requiring the successor to be chosen by the same
mode as the incumbent.23 This prevents a governor whose appoint-
ments are subject to legislative confirmation from delaying appoint-
ments until the legislature has adjourned. 24 On the other hand the
minority approach follows the intention of the framers of applicable
constitutions and statutes.25 The primary aim of a hold over pro-
vision is to insure the presence of a person qualified to perform the
duties of the office during the short interval betwveen the expiration
of a term and the assumption of duties by the successor.26 If the
draftsmen had intended for an incumbent to hold over for another
term upon the failure of his successor to qualify, a special provision
would have been made.
Although the majority approach has several beneficial aspects,
the minority view gives more protection to the integrity of elective
offices and is more in accord with the spirit and purpose of the state
constitutions or statutes on the subject.
JAY FREDERICK WILKS
LIABILITY OF LAND POSSESSOR TO SOCIAL GUEST
The division of negligence into degrees-slight, ordinary, gross-
which was introduced into Anglo-American law in a 17o4 bailment
case,1 has never received general judicial approval.2 The concept,
'See Pitmann v. Ingram, 184 Ga. 255, 190 S.E. 794 (1937).
'E.g., Shackelford v. West, 138 Ga. 164, 74 S.E. 1079 (1912).
"See Olmstead v. Augustus, 112 Ky. 365, 65 S.W. 817 (190).
"Hood v. Miller, 144 Okla. 88, 291 Pac. 504 (1930).
'The doctrine was borrowed from the Roman law by Chief Justice Holt in
Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 9o9, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1704). See generally Green,
The Three Degrees of Negligence, 8 Am. L. Rev. 649 (1874); Elliot, Degrees of
Negligence, 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1933).
'Steamboat New World v. King, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 260 (1853); Denver & R.G.R.R.
v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77, 69 Pac. 578 (1902); City of Lanark v. Dougherty, 153
I1. 163, 38 N.E. 892 (1894); Denny v. Chicago, R.I. & P Ry., 15o Iowa 460, 130
N.W. 363 (1911); Raymond v. Portland R.R., 100 Me. 529, 62 At. 6o2 (19o5);
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however, has survived by statute in special situations.3 Some twenty-
nine states, by statute or court decision, apply the doctrit-, limit
the liability of a motor vehicle operator to a guest.4 In these states
the guest generally may not recover unless the driver was guilty of
acts amounting to gross negligence or wilful misconduct.
Smith v. Alien,6 a recent decision from the Court of Appeals'for
the Fourth Circuit in a diversity action involving Virginia law ex-
panded this doctrine to cover the host's liability to a social guest.
Mrs. Smith was visiting her nephew, Mr. Allen, when she received
leg injuries as a result of a fall caused by the collapse of a board in
a pier which was maintained and controlled by Allen. There was
evidence tending to show the board was rotten and that this fact
was known or should have been known by Allen. Allen was told by his
employee immediately prior to the accident of the defective condi-
tion of that part of the pier on which Mrs. Smith was injured. The
trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, who had rested
without introducing any evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded, holding that while the plaintiff could recover only upon
a showing of gross negligence, there was sufficient evidence to go to
the jury on this issue.
Since this was a case of novel impression under Virginia law,7 the
Prosser, Torts § 33 (2d ed. 1955). Most writers also have rejected the theory of
degrees of negligence. Harper, Law of Torts § 74 (x9g3); Salmond, Law of Torts §
121 (loth ed. 1945); Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Cal. L. Rev. 91 (1933);
Harper, Licensor-Licensee, Tweedledum-Tweedledee, 24 Conn. B. J. 123 (1951);
'These statutes generally apply the doctrine in situations involving bailment,
criminal negligence and contributory negligence. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1846 (ig3);
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1151 (1956); N.D. Comp. Laws §§ 7280-7283 (1913); S.D.
Comp. Laws § 991 (1929); Wis. Stat. § 340.26 (1953). See note 4 infra.
'These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina,
South Dakato, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. For
a comprehensive and detailed analysis as to what is required to impose liability in
each of the above states see 27 Ins. Counsel J. 223 (196o).
"All of the states enumerated in note 4 supra require proof of gross negligence
or willful misconduct or both to enable the guest to recover. 27 Ins. Counsel J.
223 (196o).
0297 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. ig6i).
7Though Virginia has no cases dealing with the liability of a possessor of
land to a social guest there are several Virginia cases dealing with the general
class of licensees in the form of "tolerated intruders." Pettyjohn & Sons v. Basham,
126 Va. 72, ioa S.E. 813 (igig); Norfolk & W.R.R. v. DeBoard's Adm'r, 91 Va.
700, 22 S.E. 514 (1895); Nichols' Adm'r v. Washington, 0. & W.R.R., 83 Va. 99, 5
S.E. 171 (1887). There are dicta in cases dealing with business invitees which
suggests that the social guest might be given the status of an invitee. Richmond &
M. Ry. v. Moore's Adm'r, 94 Va. 493, 27 S.E. 70 (1897); Rayless Chain Stores,
Inc. v. DeJarnette, 163 Va. 938, 178 S.E. 34 (1935); see note 9 infra.
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court looked elsewhere for authority. The court followed the Re-
statement nomenclature of classifying the social guest, Mrs. Smith,
as a gratuitous licensee s rather than an invitee. 9 However, the court
rejected the Restatement rule of the liability of possessors of land to
gratuitous licensees which imposes liability on the host where he
knows of a dangerous condition and fails to warn the guest or to use
reasonable care to make the condition safe. 10 This rule, based pri-
marily on ordinary negligence, was discarded in favor of the gross
negligence rule. In reaching this result the court said:
"[W]e cannot overlook the analogy between this situation and
that of a guest passenger in the automobile of another.""
The Virginia guest statute, which codifies earlier Virginia deci-
sions,' 2 limits the liability to a guest of the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle to situations involving gross negligence or wanton and
wilful conduct.'3 Inherent in the Virginia statute and other "guest"
statutes and judicial decisions which have adopted this rule is the
premise that the recipient of gratuitous hospitality should be allowed
to recover from his host only if the host was guilty of something more
than ordinary negligence. 14 Thus, since the benefit runs only to the
6A gratuitous licensee enters the land with the possessor's consent but not
necessarily by his invitation. Only the consent distinguishes him from a trespasser.
Restatement, Torts § 341 (1934); Prosser, Torts § 77 (2d ed. 1955).
9In order to qualify as an invitee the visitor must offer some potential pe-
cuniary benefit to the host, or, at least, enter the premises under an invitation which
expressly or impliedly represents that reasonable care has been exercised to make
the premises safe. Restatement, Torts §§ 332, 343, comment a (1934); Prosser,
Torts § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
"The rule provides that "a possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily
harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial condition thereon if,
but only if he
(a) knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk
to them and has reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or
realize the risk, and
(b) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land, without exer-
csing reasonable care (i) to make the condition safe, or (ii) to warn them of
the condition and the risk involved therein." Restatement, Torts § 342 (1934).
11297 F.2d at 24o.
"Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63 (1932); Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30,
i6o S.E. 77 (1931). In 1938 Virginia passed a statute codifying the rule laid down
in these decisions. Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (195o). See note 13 infra.
"The statute stipulates that a guest may recover from the host driver only if
injury was caused "from the gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard
of the safety of the person or property of the person being so transported on
the part of such owner or operator." Va. Code Ann. § 8-646.1 (1950).
1Aragona v. Parrella, 325 Mass. 583, 91 N.E.2d 778 (195o); Scheibel v. Lipton,
156 Ohio St. 3o8, 1o2 N.E.2d 453 (i95i); Solterer v. Kiss, 193 Va. 695, 70 S.E.2d 329
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guest, the host's duty toward him should be correspondingly less
than it would be in the ordinary situation.15 Also some cour" -it the
problem as one involving assumption of the risk, pointing ,at that
the guest should occupy a position equal to that of the host 6 family.16
It appears that the basic philosophy is simply that one should not be
quick to sue a friend for damages.
At first blush, the rationale appears equitable and just; but, is the
host's hospitality worth absolving him from liability in all cases where
he merely negligently injures the guest? Moreover, favors are re-
turned so that the host may be in the process of returning a favor
when the guest is injured. Is it fair, in any event, to classify the social
guest invited partly for business purposes with the social guest in-
vited for friendship only? It is hard to conceive of a situation in which
the host does not receive or expect to receive some benefit from the
presence of the guest, be it only his desire to accommodate a friend.
In any event if the hospitality received by the injured guest is com-
pletely gratuitous such hospitality is unlikely to be of such magni-
tude as to justify excusing the host from all wrongdoing short of gross
negligence. It is to some extent true that the social companion should
not be quick to sue a good friend. But, in most cases in which suit
is brought, the host will have insurance in which case the proceeding
loses much of its adversary character and the basic reason for the gross
negligence rule fails.'
7
This problem is further compounded by the difficulty experienced
by the courts in applying and defining the standard of gross negli-
gence.13 At the root of this problem is the difficulty of formulating an
objective standard by which the jury can determine, as a matter of
fact, whether or not a defendant has been grossly negligent. Many
courts,19 including Virgima,2 0 maintain that there is a difference in
(1952); Roanoke Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Whitner, 173 Va. 253, 3 S.E.2d 169 (1939);
Ferguson v. Virginia Tractor Co., 17o Va. 486, 197 S.E. 438 (1938).15Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917); Jones v. Massie, 158
Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63 (1932); Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 3o, 16o S.E. 77 (1931). See
note 14 supra.
6Comeau v. Comeau, 285 Mass. 578, 189 N.E. 588 (1934); Cosgrave v. Molstrom,
127 N.J.L. 505, 23 A.2d 288 (i941).
'-See note 27 infra.
"Chicago, R.I. & P Ry. v. Hamler, 215 IL. 525, 74 N.E. 705 (19o5); John v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 42 Mont. 18, ii1 Pac. 632 (191o); McAdoo v. Richmond & D.R.R.,
io 5 N.C. 140, 11 S.E. 316, (189o); Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Oho
St. 567, 2oo N.E. 483 (1936); Ketchmark v. Lindauer, 198 Va. 42, 92 S.E.gd 286
(1956); Prosser, Torts § 33 (2d ed. 1955); Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Cal.
L. Rev. 91 (1933).
"Wilhite v. Webb, 253 Ala. 6o6, 46 So. 2d 414 (195o); Bedwell v. De Bolt,
221 Ind. 6oo, 5o N.E.2d 875 (1943); Titus v. Lonergan, 322 Mich. 112, 33 N.W.ad
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kind between acts which are grossly negligent and those which are
wilful and wanton. But the nature of this difference is not easily as-
certainable and at least one writer has concluded that Virginia courts
in particular have failed to grasp this distinction.21 The only agree-
ment the courts have reached in the area is that gross negligence is
something greater than ordinary negligence,22 which does little to
dispel the aura of confusion surrounding the term. Nonetheless, the
fact that the definition and application of the term "gross negligence"
have been extremely difficult both for the courts and the juries is hard-
ly to be doubted. 23 This is not to imply that standards of ordinary
negligence are entirely certain and definite. But the additional division
of an already indefinite standard can only result in increased con-
fusion among courts and juries.
On the other hand, the Restatement rule,24 has the merit of being
relatively clear and precise. This rule, by virtue of its clarity and pre-
cision, is not likely to result in confusion in the minds of the jury,
while an instruction on gross negligence, accompanied by a nebu-
lous and uncertain standard, is likely to have the opposite result.
For example, in the instant case, the jury could readily find that
Allen knew or should have known of the condition and failed to
warn Mrs. Smith. Under the Restatement rule this would settle
the liability. However, under a gross negligence instruction, the
jury would then have to decide if knowledge of the condition and
failure to warn the guest amounted to gross negligence as defined by
the court..
The Restatement theory of liability is substantially the standard
of reasonable care in specific terms, though in all cases it exonerates
the host from the duty of inspection. Since state courts are not
bound by federal precedent dealing with state law, it would seem
that it would be preferable for the Virginia court, when confronted
685 (1948); Ressmeyer v. Jones, 210 Minn. 423, 298 N.V 709 (1941); Sorrell v.
White, 1o3 Vt. 277, 153 At. 359 (1931).
"°Ketchemark v. Lindauer, 198 Va. 42, 92 S.E.2d 286 (956).
2 1Light, Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 42 Va. L. Rev. 1197 (1956).
2Steambolt New World v. King, 570 U.S. (16 How.) 260 (1853); Dickerson v.
Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 1 z8 AtI. 518 (1922); Thompson v. Ashba, 122 Ind. App.
58, 1o2 N.E.2d 519 (1951); Nadeau v. Fogg, 145 Me. 1o, 7o A.2d 73o (1950);
McLean v. Triboro Coach Co., 3o2 N.Y. 49, 96 N.E.2d 83 (195o). See also Prosser,
Torts § 33 (2d ed. 1955).
2wThis fact has led the legal writers to condemn almost unanimously the doc-
trine of degrees of care. Eldridge, Modern Tort Problems § 1o (1941); Harper &
James, Law of Torts § 16.13 (1956); Pollock, Torts 353 (14th ed. 1939); Prosser, Torts
§ 33 (2d ed. '955); Salmond, Torts § 121 (ioth ed. 1945)..
24See note io supra.
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with a case similar to Smith v. Allen, to adopt the Restatement rule
on both practical and theoretical grounds. Though the gross negli-
gence rule is firmly cntrenched in Virginia law concerning guests in
automobiles, the similarity between social guests in automobiles and
those on land is not so striking as to demand a uniform rule. Many
statutes, in fact, have different theories of liability to cover the two
situations.2 5 Moreover, consistency is not all important where the
extension of a rule of law would tend to be unjust and impractical.
Though Virginia has never passed on a case involving the problem
presented in Smith v. Allen, such cases are appearing in the United
States courts with increased frequency,26 perhaps due to the spread
of liability insurance to cover such situations.27 If the present trend
holds true the likelihood is that in the future Virginia courts also
will be called upon to deal with this problem with frequency.
There has been an undercurrent of dissatisfaction with the rigid
and arbitrary classifications concerning the social guest.28 A recent New
Jersey case set up reasonable care as the duty owed by the host to his
guest.2 9 Yet, essentially the social guest is still the invitee who is not
an invtee,30 even though such "business visitors" may offer no shade
of pecuniary benefit to the host.31 Perhaps the only way to do justice
2For example Delaware, Florida, Ohio and Washington have "guest" statutes
requiring the automobile guest to prove gross negligence or willful and wanton
misconduct in order to impose liability on the host. Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 61oi
(1953); Fla. Stat. § 320.59 (1956); Ohio Rev. Code § 4515.02 (Baldwin 196i); Wash.
Rev. Code § 46.o8.o80 (1957). These same states have held that a possessor of
land must use reasonable care to warn against or remove defects which he knows
are likely to cause harm to his social guests. Maher v. Voss, 46 Del. 418, 84 A.2d
527 (1951); Goldberg v. Strauss, 55 Fla. 254, 45 So. 2d 883 (195o); Scheibel v. Lipton,
156 Ohio St. 3o8, 1O2 N.E.2d 453 (1951); McNamara v. Hall, 38 Wash. 2d 864, 233
P.2d 852 (1951).
mCompare the great number of recent cases in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952),
with the earlier lack of authority in annotations 12 A.L.R. 987 (1921), 92 A.L.R.
1oo5 (1934).
-Professor Harper suggests that their increased frequency is due to the spread
of liability insurance. Harper & James, Law of Torts § 27.1 (1956). The great
number of cases in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598 (1952) between members of the same
family suggests that these suits are not truly adversary.
' Laube v. Stevenson, a Discussion, 25 Conn. B.J. 123 (1951); McCleary, The
Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land,
i Mo. L. Rev. 45 (i936).2'Cohen v. Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (ig6i).
nOThe term "invitee" seems to indicate that a social guest would fall squarely into
this category. For a discussion of this anomaly see Prosser, Business Visitors and In-
vitees, 26 Minn. L. Rev. 573 (1942).
"Those classified by the courts as invitees include many groups of visitors
who do not confer discernible benefits upon the host. Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128
Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917 (1942); Bunnell v. Waterbury Hospital, io3 Conn. 520,
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to social guests as a group is to hold them entitled to reasonable
care. This is not to emphasize particularly the desirability of decisions
in favor of plaintiffs in" tort cases, but rather- to provide a more ef-
fective and practical means of enabling the courts to consider all
relevant circumstances in each case. Hence it is urged that when
confronted with this problem the Virginia courts adopt either the
Restatement rule or the due care standard rather than extend the gross
negligence theory of liability.
TIMOTHY G. IRELAND
BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO PERPETRATORS OF CRIMES
In criminal law, a difficult problem sometimes arises in those
cases involving two persons when it is not clear whether one or both
of them committed the crime. If the evidence shows that only one
person could have committed the crime, the prosecution certainly
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt which person is guilty.' If,
however, it appears that the two persons co-operated in the crime, it
would seem that the prosecution should not be required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the exact part played by each.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was recently confronted
with this problem in State v. Hargett.2 According to the state's evi-
dence, Weingardner, Parrish and two other soldiers left Fort Bragg
in Weingardner's car and drove to a nearby town. On reaching their
destination, Weingardner remained at the home of a friend, while
Parrish and others, later joined by Hargett, visited several food
and liquor establishments. When Weingardner rejoined the group he
was drunk and quarrelled with Parrish. Later, Parrish, Hargett and
Weingardner left in Weingardner's automobile for the ostensible
.purpose of putting Weingardner on a bus for Fort Bragg. After
twenty minutes, Parrish and Hargett returned, asserting that they
had done so.3 Three days afterward the body of Weingardner was
131 Atl. 501 (1925); Schmidt v. George H. Hurd Realty Co., i7o Minn. 322, 212 N.W
903 (1927); Roper v. Commercial Fibre Co., 1O5 N.J.L. 10, 143 At. 741 (1928);
Le Roux v. State, 307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E.2d 386 (1954); Caldwell v. Village of Island
Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Hise v. City of North Bend,. 138 Ore.
15o, 6 P.2d 3o (1931). See also Prosser, Torts § 78 (2d ed. 1955).
'Aylward v. State, 216 Ala. 218, 113 So. 22 (1927).
2255 N.C. 412, 121 S.E.2d 589 (196i).
3Later in the evening Hargett said that Weingardner was in his (Hargett's)
car. In referring to this acknowledgement, the Supreme Court said that if Parrish
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found in a ditch at the city dump. An autopsy showed the cause of
death to have been drowning.
Hargett was indicted for murder. At his trial, Parrish testified
that Hargett drove the car to the dump, and, after a brief altercation,
shoved Weingardner into the ditch. This testimony was in direct
conflict, however, with the statement made to the police by Hargett in
which he said that Parrish was the one who hit the deceased and
pushed him into the ditch. The jury returned a verdict that Hargett
was guilty of manslaughter.
Hargett appealed, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed on the ground that there was error in the instructions given to
the jury. The lower court had given instructions embodying the pro-
secution's contention that even if Hargett was not guilty as a principal
in the first degree, he might be guilty of aiding and abetting. 4 The
instructions on the law of aiding and abetting were correct, but the
Supreme Court thought there was no basis for a conviction as an aider
and abettor,a stating that Hargett could be guilty only as a perpe-
trator. A new trial was ordered.
Although there was no affirmative testimony at the trial that the
defendant was an aider and abettor, it can hardly be said that he
was a disinterested bystander.6 At the trial, Parrish accused Hargett
of committing the crime, whereas, in an earlier statement Hargett had
was the perpetrator the statement might be evidence of Hargett's guilt as an ac-
cessory after the fact, but was not sufficient to make him an alder and abettor.
'A principal in the first degree actually commits the crime with his own hands.
State v. Allison, 2oo N.C. i9o , 156 S.E. 547 (i93i). A principal in the second degree
is not the perpetrator, but one who is present at the commission of the crime and
either aids and abets, counsels, commands or encourages its commission. Spradlin
v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 523, 79 S.E. 2d 443 (1954). The distinction between the
two is usually of little importance other than for descriptive purposes, since the
degree of guilt for each is usually the same, State v. Holland, 211 N.C. 284, 189
S.E. 761 (1937). Only in those cases where some factor of mitigation or aggravation
applies to one and not the other will the punishment vary as between the two. Red
v. State, 39 Tex. Crnn. App. 667, 47 S.W 1003 (1898).
5The Supreme Court felt that the evidence only showed that Hargett was at
the dump with Parrish, and that he did not attempt to prevent the crime. Mere
presence at the scene of the crime of a person who does not in any way participate
in or encourage its comnision does not make an alder and abettor. The court
also stated that Hargett could not be considered an aider and abettor on the
theory that he was bound to impede the commission of the felony or to recover
the deceased from the ditch.
OGenerally, a bystander is one who is present at the scene of the felony, but
who does not act in concert with those who commit it. Hilmes v. Strobel, 59 Wis.
74, 17 N.W 539 (883). To be guilty as an alder and abettor, the evidence must
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he participated in the crime before or at
the time of its occurrence. Drury v. Terntory, 9 Okla. 398, 6o Pac. soi (igoo).
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said that Parrish perpetrated the crime. Neither admitted that one
perpetrated the crime with the other present aiding and abetting.
However, it would not be inconsistent with either man's statement to
find that one did aid and abet the other in the commission of the
crime.
Furthermore, it was disclosed at the trial that both Parrish and
Hargett were together for the greater part of the evening; that they
told their friends they were going to the bus station to put Wein-
gardner on a bus, when in fact they took him to the city dump; that
Hargett drove Weingardner's car to the dump; that they were pres-
ent at the scene of the crime; that neither interfered to prevent
the crime, nor to recover Weingardner from the ditch; and that Har-
gett attempted to conceal the crime.7 From these facts it would seem
a jury might reasonably conclude that Hargett either perpetrated
the crime or aided and abetted in its commission.3
Even though there was no concrete evidence of Hargett's aiding
and abetting, it does not necessarily follow that an instruction relat-
ing to this degree of crime was wrong. In many jurisdictions,9 the
jury may convict the defendant of a lesser included offense even
though the evidence shows the greater offense.' 0 Once convicted, the
defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that the court
erred in instructing on the less serious crime as to which there was
no evidence." The theory is that the accused is not prejudiced by an
instruction that he can be convicted of a crime of a less serious nature
than the one for which he should be convicted.i
2
Therefore, in State v. Hargett, if the punishment for aiding and
7Although not disclosed at the trial, it may also be assumed that both were at
the dump on their own accord, since neither testified otherwise.
'Notwithstanding that these facts, when considered separately, do not have
much legal significance, yet when they are considered by the jury in connection
with other circumstances, they indicate that one was the perpetrator of the
crime and the other an aider and abettor.
"Some of these jurisdictions are: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
For cases upholding this rule in the above jurisdictions see: Annot., 21 A.L.R.
6o3, 622 (1922); Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1097, i1o (1923); Annot. 102 A.L.R. 1019, 1026
(1936).
"North Carolina holds that if the evidence warrants a conviction of a higher
degree of homicide and does not warrant an acquittal, the jury can find the accused
guilty of a lower degree. State v. Matthews, 142 N.C. 621, 55 S.E. 342 (19o6); State
v. Branch, i93 N.C. 621, 137 S.E. 8o (1927).
"State v. Bidwell, i5o Wash. 656, 274 Pac. 716 (1929).
"People v. Wolcott, 137 Cal. App. 355, 30 P.2d 6oi (1934).
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abetting was less than that for perpetrating the crime, the former
would be a lesser included offense. Accordingly, an instruction, on
aiding and abetting, even though the evidence did not show such,
would not be prejudicial error. There is no reason why this rule should
not also apply if the penalty imposed on a perpetrator of a crime
and one who aids and abets is of equal degree. Consequently, even if
the giving of the aiding and abetting instruction was error, it hardly
seems to have been prejudicial error.
A somewhat different approach could also be taken. In all crim-
inal trials, the burden as to those facts which are material to the
crime rests on the prosecution.13 Evidence must be produced to over-
come the presumption that the accused is innocent 14 and to establish
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Thus, where the perpetrator
of a single crime must be one of two persons, the evidence afford-
ing no reasonable inference that they acted in co-operation, the
burden is upon the prosecution to prove one or the other of them
guilty.16 If there is a reasonable doubt as to which of the two perpe-
trated the crime, the doubt will operate so as to require an acquittal of
both.17
State v. Hargett, however, can be distinguished from the above
situation since the state had evidence tending to show that both par-
ticipants were guilty. The difficulty was that the state did not have
enough evidence to show the part that each played in the crime. But,
when it can be inferred that both parties are guilty, is it necessary
for the state to prove their respective roles in the crime?
The doctrine of the "non-shifting" burden of proof in criminal
trials has become a firmly implanted principle of law due to the ab-
sence of affirmative pleadings by the defendant, and the general policy
nState v. Helms, 181 N.C. 566, 107 S.E. 228 (1921); State v. Kline, i9o N.C.
177, 129 S.E. 417 (1925); State v. Walker, 193 N.C. 489, 137 S.E. 429 (1927). See 1
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 16 (12th ed. 1955).
"The presumption of innocence cautions the jury to consider only the evi-
dence, and that they should not make any surmises based on the present situation
of the accused. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2511 (3 d ed. 194o).
5If a juror has a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused he cannot vote
for a conviction. State v. Ellis, 2io N.C. 166, 185 S.E. 663 (1936). In defining
"reasonable doubt" Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts said: "It is not mere
possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on
moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of
tile case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they can not say they feel
ani abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." Common-
wealth v. Webster, 59 Mass (5 Cush.) 295 (185o).
16Aylward v. State, 216 Ala. 218, 113 So. 22 (1927).
" People v. Woody, 45 Cal. 289 (1873).
266 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIX
of caution in favor of accused persons.' 8 Nevertheless, this rule has
been relaxed in some jurisdictions which hold that the burden of
producing evidence, in certain instances, may be upon the accused19
Thus, if the prosecution has established proof which would con-
vince the jury of the defendant's guilt, the accused has been placed
in a position where he should go forward with countervailing evi-
dence.20 Although the defendant is not required to do so, 2 1 his failure
to present rebutting proof may be regarded as confirming the con-
clusion indicated by the evidence shown by the prosecution.22 Hence,
many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, place on the accused
the burden to show certain facts in the nature of excuse or mitiga-
tion;23 to prove that he acted in self-defense; 24 to rebut the presump-
tion of malice arising from the use of a deadly weapon; 25 to establish
intoxication at the time of the crime; 2
6 and to establish insanity.2 7
The defendant's duty to produce contervailing evidence has been
interpreted to mean that the accused must support his cause by those
facts peculiarly within his knowledge.28 This rule might be extended
"i Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence § 81(b) (t899).
"Although the burden of producing evidence as to certain facts may be upon
the defendant, the burden of ultimately convincing the jury, beyond a reasonable
doubt remains upon the prosecution. See Cardozo's reasoning in Morrison v.
California, 291 US. 82, 88 (1934).
'Lee v. State, 259 Ala. 455, 66 So. 2d 881 (1953).
"Hurston v. State, 235 Ala. 213, 178 So. 223 (1938); State v. Davis, 214 N.C.
787, 1 S.E.d io4 (z939).
2rhe -viewpoint is that once the prosecution has presented evidence which
the accused could explain or deny, the accused's failure to testify raises a strong
inference that he cannot truthfully explain or deny them. Vanderheiden v. State,
156 Neb. 735, 57 N.W.gd 761 (1953); State v. Anderson, 137 N.J.L. 6, 57 A.9d 665
(1948); State v. Levine, 117 Vt. 320, 91 A.ad 678 (1952).
"1State v. Whitson, iii N.C. 695, x6 S.E. 332 (1892); State v. Jones, 98 N.C. 651,
3 S.E. 507 (1887).
EState v. Barringer, 114 N.C. 84o, 19 S.E. 275 (1894).
-Mealy v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 585, 115 S. E. 528 (1923).
"State v. Corrivau, 93 Minn. 38, ioo N.W 638 (19o4).
"People v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81, 48 Pac. 1014 (1897); Commonwealth v. Ber-
chine, 168 Pa. 603, 32 AtI. log (1895).
'For example, in a case in which the defendant's whereabouts at the time
of a crime is in question, the burden is on him to show where he was, as this
knowledge is peculiarly within his power. White v. State, 31 Ind. 262 (1869). Many
states have passed statutes making the proof of certain facts a prima facie showing
of unascertained facts peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. People v.
Osaki, 209 Cal. 169, 286 Pac. 1025 (193o). Therefore, if the crime charged involves
proof of a negative (i.e., that defendant did not have a license to carry a pistol)
which is difficult to prove and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant,
proof of the doing of the prohibited act (i.e., carrying a pistol) makes out a prima
facie case for the state and the burden is cast upon the accused to disprove the
negative. McHenry v. State, 58 Ga. App. 410, 198 S.E. 818 (1938). In support of
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to State v. Hargett in which the prosecution's evidence tends to
show that Hargett co-operated in the crime. In most states, one involv-
ed in the joint commission of a crime is as guilty as the perpetrator
of the act.29 Since Hargett knew the identity of the actual perpetrator,
the burden would shift to him to show that he was not the perpe-
trator. If he could not do this, it can be inferred that he was the one
who pushed Weingardner into the ditch. This rule would not alter the
state's burden of proof as to the accused's guilt, but would merely place
upon Hargett the burden of producing evidence as to his part in the
event.
In essence, once the prosecution produces evidence showing that
the two persons co-operated in the crime, thereby making one as
guilty as the other, it should not be required to convince the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt of their respective functions in the act.
RICHARD K. WHITE, JR.
ATTACHMENT FOR A FOREIGN TORT
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is authorized by statute' to
prescribe forms of action, writs and other rules of civil procedure for
the courts of Pennsylvania. In order to carry out this function, the
statute authorizes the court to suspend Acts of Assembly, provided
neither the substantive laws nor the jurisdiction of the court is
abridged, enlarged or modified. Under this authority, the Supreme
this rule, Justice Holmes said: "It is consistent with all the constitutional pro-
tections of accused men to throw on them the burden of proving facts peculiarly
within their knowledge and hidden from discovery by the government." Casey
v. United States, 276 U-S. 413, 418 (1928).
'The reasoning behind such a rule is expressed in Benge v. Commonwealth, 92
Ky. i, 27 S.W 146 (1891): "This is for the reason that each is the agent and
instrument of the other, and his act is the act of the other, and the act of each
constitutes but one crime, and each is guilty of the act actually committed by the
other. Such act is, in law, the act of each. Hence each is principal as to each act,
although he did not actually perpetrate each act; but the act that the other perpe-
trated was his act, and he is principal as to it."
'Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 61 (Supp. 196o) provides in part that: "the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania shall have the power to prescribe by general rule the forms
of actions, process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in
civil actions at law and in equity Provided, That such rules shall be consistent
with the Constitution of this Commonwealth and shall neither abridge, enlarge
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant nor the juisdiction of any of the
said courts nor affect any statute of limitations."
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Court adopted Rule 1252 which provides in part that a writ of foreign
attachment may issue to attach property of a defendant upon any
cause of action at law or in equity in which the relief sought in-
cludes a judgment or decree for the payment of money.
2
Prior to the promulgation of Rule 1252, a 1937 Pennsylvania Act
of Assembly3 limited writs of foreign attachment to torts committed
within the Commonwealth.4 So the question arises as to whether the
court has the power to suspend the Act of 1937 and thereby extend
the availability of the writ to any ex delicto action irrespective of
where the tort occurred. The problem turns upon whether or not
such a change affects either the substantive rights of the parties or
the jurisdiction of the court.
The question was squarely presented in the recent case of Alpers
v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.5 The plaintiff, a resident of Penn-
sylvania, was injured in an auto collision involving a vehicle owned
by the defendant, a New Jersey corporation. The plaintiff attached
property of the defendant in the possession of the Pennsylvania Bell
Telephone Co.6 The lower court dismissed the action and this was
affiirmed by the state supreme court. The majority held that foreign
actions ex delicto were not within the scope of Rule 1252. The ma-
jority concluded that in view of the clear restriction of the writ of
foreign attachment in actions ex delicto to torts committed within the
Commonwealth, both by statutory and case law prior to the promul-
gation of Rule 1252, it was certainly not intended that Rule 1252
should change or alter in any manner a role so firmly established and
so salutary in its effect. A dissenting judge took the view that Rule
1252 should be interpreted so as to permit the attachment subject to
the application of the doctrine of forum non convenzens.7
Rule 1252 does not affect any fundamental change in the basic
requirements for a proceeding by attachment.8 Prior to obtaining a
2Pa. Rules of Court 1252 (ig6o).
TPa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 P.S. § 2891 (1951).
4 Originally the writ was limited to ex contractu actions; however, the writ
was gradually extended to ex delicto actions. Numerous amendments were passed
which eventually extended the writ of attachment to property within the Com-
monwealth owned by nonresidents for torts committed within the Commonwealth.
A complete statutory history is provided in the opinion and footnotes of Alpers
v. Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 403 Pa. 626, 17o A.2d 36o (ig6i).
64o3 Pa. 626, 17o A.2d 360 (i96i).
6In doing so the plaintiff relied upon Pa. Rules of Court 1252 (1960).
'See note 24 infra.
9"The foreign attachment proceeding is firmly established in Pennsylvania.
Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp. v. Bellanca Corp., 391 Pa. 177, 137 A.2d 248
(1958); Falk & Co. v, South Texas Cotton Oil Co., 368 Pa. 199, 82 A.2d 27, 31
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writ of foreign attachment, the plaintiff must show: (i) that the de-
fendant is a nonresident (or foreign corporation) on whom personal
service cannot be obtained, and (2) that tangible or intangible prop-
erty belonging to the defendant is within the forum when the attach-
ment is served upon the garnishee. 9 Upon meeting these requirements,
the writ of foreign attachment will issue and a suit quasz-zn-rem' 0 will
be formally instituted whereby the plaintiff may proceed against
the property of the defendant, rather than against the defendant's
person.
The question arises as to why the firmly established quast-zn-rem
action, as commenced by writ of foreign attachment, should serve to
change the substantive rights of parties" who seek recovery for a
transitory cause of action.12 Permitting the writ to issue for a transitory
tort, irrespective of its origin, does not affect a change of substance,
for the substantive law of the state wherein the cause of action arose
will still control the liability imposed.' 3
It is equally difficult to understand what jurisdictional change
would be made by Rule 1252. The word jurisdiction is undoubtedly
difficult to define, since the term is used in two different general con-
texts: (i) jurisdiction over the person, and (2) jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is involved here
since the action is one quasn-in-rem. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter refers to the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought.
(1951); David E. Kennedy Co. v. Schleindl, 29o Pa. 38, 137 At. 815 (1227); Ray-
mond v. Leishman, 243 Pa. 64, 89 At. 791, 793 (1914).
OPa. Rules of Court 1252 (196o).
10A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property.
A judgment quasi-in-rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated
property and is of two types: (i) where the plaintiff seeks to secure a pre-existing
claim in the subject property and exclude all other claims by third persons, and
(2) where the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the
defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
225, 246 (1958); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877); Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp. v. Bellanca Corp., 391 Pa. 177, 137 A.2d 248, 250 (1958). Restate-
ment, Judgments §§ 73, 74, 75, 76 (1942).
"For a similar case relating to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
effect of a federal rule on the substantive rights of parties see Sibbach v. Wilson
& CO., 312 U.S. 1 (1940).
"Transitory actions are such personal actions as seek only the recovery of
money or chattels whether the action is in tort or contract. The underlying
theory is founded on the supposed violation of rights which in contemplation
of law have no locality. Livingston v.'Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 66o (No. 8411) (C.C.D.
Va. 18ii); Solomon v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 187 Va. 240, 46 S.E.2d 369 (1948).
"3Western Union v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1914); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
304 Pa. 294, 156 At. 89 (1931); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 12o N.E.
198 (1918); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 378 (1934)-
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This is conferred by sovereign authority which organizes the court,
and is found in the general nature of the court's powers.14 Certainly,
it is within the nature of the court's power to render a judgment on
a transitory cause of action for a personal injury.'5 As to the property
itself, the tribunals of a state may subject property within its juris-
diction, although owned by nonresidents, to the payment of the de-
mands of its own citizens without infringing upon the sovereignty of
the state wherein the defendant resides. 1
If permitted, the extension would not constitute a novel change.
Other jurisdictions provide for writs of foreign attachment in actions
ex delicto irrespective of where the cause of action arose;' 7 however,
the writ varies in its application depending upon the jurisdiction. New
York courts are reluctant to entertain suits commenced by writ of
foreign attachment when both parties are nonresidents of the state, but
if the plaintiff is a resident s of New York then the suit will be enter-
tained.' 9 Illinois is more liberal in that a nonresident plaintiff may
attach property of a nonresident defendant when such property is
within the state.20 Indiana also provides for a writ of foreign attach-
ment for actions ex delicto irrespective of the parties' residence.
21
Even though the court concluded that the rule authorized foreign
attachments, the writ would not necessarily issue as a matter of right.
In the recent case of Plum v. Tampax Co., 22 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted the discretionary doctrine of forum non convenzens.
23
Simply stated, the doctrine is that a court may refuse to accept a case
even when the jurisdictional requirements are met, provided there
is a more convenient forum. By applying this doctrine,2 4 the courts
"Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. 3o8, 316 (87o).
21See note 12 supra.
1OPennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877); Weiner v. American Ins. Co., 224
Pa. 292, 73 At. 443 (9o9); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § io6 (1934).
'-N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 902 (i96o); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. ii § 11 (1951); Ind. Ann.
Stat. § 3-5o (1946).
"Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "'Residence," 6 Vand. L. Rev. 561 (953).
"Palmer v. The Gillette Co., 285 App. Div. 1156, 14o N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't
1955); Hoolahan v. United States Lines Co., 189 Misc. 168, 70 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); see also Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 405 (1948).
-"Missoun Pac. R.R. v. Flannigan, 47 Ill. App. 322 (1893).
nShedd v. Calumet Constr. Co., 27o Fed. 942 (7th Cir. 1921).
'339 Pa. 533, 16o A.2d 549 (1960).
2The applicability of the doctrine within the states was formally recognized
by the Supreme Court in Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935). The doc-
trine was later recognized in the federal courts in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947).
2"Pennsylvania has expressly approved the doctrine as stated in the Restatement,
Conflict of Laws § 117(e) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957). See Plum v. Tampax Corp.,
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can effectively control the use of the writ in actions to recover for
foreign torts. At the same time, the plaintiff who asserts a good cause
of action and seeks recovery by attachment would not be denied all
access to the courts of Pennsylvania. It would seem that under the
Alpers decision, a resident must either seek recovery in personam25
within or without the Commonwealth since there is little chance the
plaintiff can obtain personal service26 upon the foreign defendant.
The desirability of reducing burdensome litigation does not appear
to warrant the harsh restriction that denies the fundamental quasi-in-
rei action, especially when the same results may be more equitably
achieved by a discretionary use of the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens.
The efficacy and desirability of the writ of foreign attachment as
extended to foreign actions ex delicto has been well recognized and
accepted in other jurisdictions.27 It is submitted that a decision inter-
preting Rule 1252 so as to extend to foreign actions ex delicto would
have been preferable. The application of the rule could then have




AND MINIMUM JURISDICTIONAL CONTACTS
Doing an act within a state or causing consequences therein are at
the outer limits of a state's jurisdiction in personaml over nonresi-
339 Pa. 533, 16o A.2d 549 (196o). For the application of the doctrine in other juris-
dictions see Barnett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L. Rev.
380 (1947); Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217 (1930);
Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo American Law, 29 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (929).
'The distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam is
that in an action in rem a valid judgment may be obtained so far as it affects the
res without personal service of process, while in an action to recover a judgment
in personam process must be personally served or there must be a personal or
authorized appearance in the action." In re Blue's Estate, 67 Ohio App. 37, 32
N.E.2d 499, 507 (1939).
2Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be acquired before a
valid judgment in personam can be obtained. Such jurisdiction is obtained by
personally or constructively serving the defendant with notice of the pending suit.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
"'For the general provisions for writs of foreign attachment in several states,
see note 17 supra.
'An action in personam is one in which "the technical object of the suit is
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dents. In section 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 2 the Illinois
legislature has undertaken to go to the limits of the due process
clause of the Constitution.3 The constitutionality of the Illinois
statute, specifically of section 17(i)(b) relating to the commission of a
single tortious act as constituting the basis for in personam jurisdic-
tion, was recently questioned in Gray v. American Radiator & Sani-
tary Corp.
4
The specific problems presented by the Gray case were twofold:
(i) statutory interpretation, more specifically, the meaning of the
words "tortious act," and (2) the power of a state under federal con-
stitutional law to subject to its courts, by process other than personal
service within the state,5 a nonresident 6 for a tortious act committed
by the nonresident outside the territorial limits of the state, where the
injury occurs within the state.
Titan Valve Manufacturing Company manufactured a safety
valve outside Illinois.7 American Radiator & Sanitary Corporation
bought and installed the valve in a water heater which was sold to
the plaintiff.8 When the water heater was used in Illinois it exploded
and caused injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued both Titan and
American Radiator for damages. The Illinois trial court dismissed the
action against Titan, but the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed.
to establish a claim against some particular person, with a judgment which gen-
erally in theory at least, binds his body...." Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registra-
tion, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (igoo). See Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 72
(2d ed. 1949).
2111. Rev. Stat. c. iio, § 17 (1959). The pertinent parts of paragraph 17 are
as follows: "(i) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who
in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the juris-
diction of the courts of this State to any cause of action arising from the doing
of any of said acts: .... (b) The commission of a tortious act within this State."
3See Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 Ili. 99, 124 N.E. 355,
359 (igi9), dealing with the power of Illinois to give its courts jurisdiction in per-
sonam over a foreign corporation, in which the court stated that "the decisions in
this State as to due process of law under the Fourteenth federal amendment must
be controlled by the decisions of the federal courts rather than by the decisions
of our own or other state courts."
'22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (i96i).
GAn action in tort is transitory and, if personal service can be obtained on
the nonresident defendant anywhere in the state, the plaintiff can secure a personal
judgment against him. See Roper v. Brooks, ao La. 135, 9 So. 2d 485 (1942).
6The term "nonresident" as used in this comment in reference to the defendant,
Titan, means that it was, at the time of the commencement of the action, a
resident of another state.
7The court's syllabus to the case in the unofficial reporter states that the valve
was manufactured in Ohio.
8 -he court's syllabus to the case in the unofficial reporter states that the
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The defendant, Titan, contended that the words "commission of a
tortious act" did not mean the same thing as "commission of a tort,"
and section 17 would not apply to one who commits a tort by an
act done outside the state with consequences in the state.9 The Supreme
Court of Illinois held otherwise. Although a "tortious act" may mean
something different from a tort,' 0 the court interpreted the language
of section 17 to include those cases where -the negligent action alleged
in the complaint does not occur in Illinois but only the injury occurs in
Illinois.
In reaching its decision the Supreme Court of Illinois relied on
Nelson v. Miller." In the Nelson case, the defendant, a resident of
Wisconsin, sent an employee into Illinois to deliver a stove. At the
employee's request plaintiff assisted in unloading the stove. The
employee negligently pushed the stove and injured the plaintiff.
It was held that:
"[T]he jurisdictional requirements ... are met when the
defendant.., is the author of acts or omissions within the State,
and when the complaint states a cause of action in tort arising
from such conduct."' 2
The Nelson case holds that "tortious act" means an act alleged to be
tortious. In the Gray case the Illinois court is extending this concept
to include an injury in Illinois caused by an allegedly tortious act
committed outside the jurisdiction.
This Illinois rule, in the light of developing precedents in this
area, is believed to be constitutional under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
The International Shoe Co. v. Washington'3 case announced a
liberal rule that greatly expanded the traditional concepts of state
jurisdiction over nonresidents. Justice Stone declared:
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment
in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the de-
fendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a
valve was installed in the water heater in Pennsylvania and was sold to the con-
sumer in Illinois.
9176 N.E.2d at 763.
'Olt can be argued that the words "tortious act" are not synonymous with the
word "tort." "The former term, more restrictive than the latter, refers only to
the act or conduct and does not include the consequence thereof." McMahon v.
Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 9o8, 9og (N.D. Ill. ig6i).
nit Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
"Id. at 681.
'3326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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judgment personally binding him.... But now that the capias
ad respondendum has given way to personal service of sum-
mons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "14
Significantly, the only positive limitation placed on the assumption
of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant by the International
Shoe Co. case is that due process "does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or
corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations."15
The defendant, Titan, ir the Gray case argued that this minimum
contact requirement had not been satisfied. The court, in rejecting
Titan's contention, relied in part on the United States Supreme
Court decision in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.'6 In the
McGee case the Court for the first time held that a single isolated
act was sufficient to comply with the minimum contact test laid down
in International Shoe. In McGee an insurance company, which so-
licited through the mails the purchase of an insurance policy and
thereafter mailed the insured premium notices, was held subject to the
jurisdiction of the state over causes of action arising from the policy.
A case which goes even leyond McGee is Zacharakis v. Bunker Hill
Mut. Ins. Co.,17 in which New York was held to have judicial juris-
diction over a Pennsylvania insurance company which, so far as it ap-
pears, had done no more than to mail a resident of New York a policy
insuring hotel property in New Hampshire and had received in re-
turn a premium mailed from New York. This case was cited, appar-
ently with approval, by the United States Supreme Court in the
McGee case.' 8
The current attitude of the Supreme Court towards problems of
allocating judicial jurisdiction among the states was clearly indi-
cated in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp.'9 The defen-
dant issued a liability insurance policy to the manufacturer of a hair-
waving product, an Illinois subsidiary of a Delaware corporation hay-
RId. at 316.
S'lId. at 319. (Emphasis added.)
"'355 U.S. 220 (1957).
1281 App. Div. 487, 12o N.Y.S.2d 418 (1st Dep't 1953).
18355 U.S. at 223.
"348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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ing its headquarters in Massachusetts. The pblicy issued in Massachu-
setts or Illinois indemnified the insured against damages that might be
suffered by users of the product. The plaintiff, a resident of Louisiana,
was injured in using the product and instituted suit against the in-
surance company under the Louisiana direct action statute.20 As the
defendant insurance company was admitted to do business in Louisi-
ana, it could be served with personal service and there was no issue
as to jurisdiction over the person. However, the defendant denied
liability because the policy contained a "no action" clause, which
was valid under Massachusetts and Illinois law, prohibiting direct
actions against the insurer until final determination of the insured's
liability. The Supreme Court of the United States declared that
Louisiana could apply its own law rather than the law of Massachu-
setts or Illinois and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.21 The
Court reasoned that the interests of the states where the contract was
negotiated and delivered cannot outweigh the contracts and inter-
ests of Louisiana in taking care of persons injured in Louisiana. It
should be noted that the Court analyzed the contacts for the purpose of
solving a conflicts of laws problem (which state law to apply) rather
than to determine whether or not the Louisiana court had personal jur-
isdiction over the defendant. Yet the two problems are similar in that
they both concern the scope of the power of a court to render judg-
ment. If the Supreme Court is willing to follow the weight of con-
tacts in the one case it would seem to indicate that it should do so
in the other.
It is commonly recognized that the law of the place where the
injury occurs governs the right of action for a tort, no matter where
the act or omission causing the injury takes place.22 In the Gray case
the place of injury was Illinois where the explosion occurred. The
fact that Titan's conduct occurred outside of Illinois does not eliminate
the law of Illinois as a matter of choice of law. It knew the valve might
be sent into Illinois where the harm was done. This case is somewhat
similar to that of shooting a firearm across the state line,2 3 starting a
21La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:655 (1950), allows a direct action against the liability
insurer without regard to a "no direct action" clause and without regard to the fact
that the contract of insurance may have been made in another state, where it is
binding.
2'"What has been said is enough to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in
,safeguarding the rights of persons injured there. In view of that interest, the
direct action provisions here challenged do not violate due process." 348 U.S. at 73.
2sThe lex loci deliciti governs in actions of tort. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Bab-
cock, 154 U.S. 190, 197 (1894); Jarrett v. Wabash Ry., 57 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1932);
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 412 (1934).
2Dallas v. Whitney, ni8 W. Va. io6, 188 S.E. 766 (1936).
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fire which crosses the state line,24 owning a a vicious dog which strays
over the state line,25 or shipping a negligently manufactured coffee
urn across the state line.2 6 By the rule of conflicts of laws, the defen-
dant Titan's liability is measured by the domestic laws of Illinois27
to the same extent as if it had acted within the state.
Since Illinois law would be applied in the Gray case as a matter
of choice of law it seems plausible that Illinois courts should have
jurisdiction to make this application. The fact that Illinois law is the
law applicable in the Gray case in and of itself provides the neces-
sary minimum contact to permit Illinois to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
MALCOLM LASSMAN
MINERAL LESSEE'S RIGHT TO STRIP MINE
There are two general methods of mining: underground or deep
mining' and surface or strip mining.2 The use of strip mining has
always been limited by the thickness and character of the overlying
strata. However, the development of modern earth-moving equipment
and new mining techniques permit the application of strip mining
to mineral deposits which could previously be mined only by the
more conventional undergound method. While strip mining may
severely damage the surface, it does not necessarily render it entirely
useless. Deep mining may or may not cause damage to the overlying
surface, depending upon whether a sufficient amount of the mineral
deposit is left in place to maintain adequate support.
The different effects that deep mining and strip mining have upon
the surface are of great importance in determining the rights of the
parties to a mineral lease that severs the surface ownership and mineral
rights. These effects become even more significant if the lease agree-
2Otey v. Midland Valley Ry., io8 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921).
- Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. iog (1875).
mReed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (ist Cir. 1934).
"See note 23 supra.
'Deep mining involves the sinking of shafts or the driving of slopes or drifts
from the surface into the mineral deposit and the underground development of
entries or galleries from which the mineral is removed for transportation to the
surface.
2"Strip mining is done from the surface of the earth. In general, it is per-
formed by stripping off the earth, known as overburden, which lies over the [min-
eral] and then removing the [mineral] so uncovered." Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215,
216 (1959).
[V7ol. XlX
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ment was executed at a time when one of the mining methods either
was unknown or was not generally accepted in the locality. The prob-
lem most often arises when the mineral lessee finds that, due to
economic conditions or technological improvements, it will be more
profitable to strip mine the mineral than to employ deetp mining. The
surface owner is then faced with the possibility that he will be de-
prived of the use and enjoyment of his land.
In a recent Pennsylvania case, Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal Co.,3
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the mineral lessee from strip mining
fire clay. The defendant coal company acquired mining rights under a
1915 mineral lease to its predecessor in title who had deep mined the
fire clay between 1915 and 1926. The plaintiff obtained title to the sur-
face through various devises and conveyances, each of which expressly
excepted and reserved 4 the minerals and mining rights by reference5 to
the 1915 lease. When the plaintiff filed the complaint in ig6o, he was
using the surface for agricultural purposes6 and had posted the land
with "No Trespass" signs. The defendant entered upon the land and
began its strip mining operation. The trial court entered judgment
for the defendant and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
Although strip mining of fire clay may have been unknown7 at the
time the mineral lease was executed and although there may have
been implications in the lease that deep mining was contemplated, a
clause in the lease which provided the "right to mine to include all
practical methods now in use, or which may hereafter be used ... and
34o6 Pa. 188, 176 A.2d 400 (1962).
'For the distinction between "exception" and "reservation," see Lauderbach-
Zerby Co. v. Lewis, 283 Pa. 250, 129 AtI. 83 (1925).
5A description of the property transferred may be incorporated by reference to
a prior conveyance. Bland v. Kentucky Coal Corp., 306 Ky. 1, 206 S.W.2d 62 (1947).
OAlthough the plaintiff complained that strip mining would prevent him from
using the land for agricultural purposes, the surface in question was, "in the
relatively near future," to be inundated by the construction of a federal dam.
However, the court said that this fact was "in no sense controlling." 176 A.2d
at 404.
-"Stripping with power shovels really began in 1877 near Pittsburg, Kansas."
Sherwood, Development of Strip Mining, Mining Congress Journal 31 (Nov. 1945).
"The present era of stripping can be said to have begun in about gio with
the successful introduction ... of large, full-revolving shovels in the midwestern
United States." Koenig, Economics and Technique of Strip Coal Mining, Colorado
School of Mines Quarterly 29 (April 195o).
Even though it is probable that mechanized stripping was not used to mine
fire clay until after the lease was executed in 1915, "there is no rule of law which
would preclude defendant, having the right to mine the [mineral], from using
methods for that purpose made possible by modern machinery and inventions."
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568, 570 (1950).
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the right to strip the surface..." was sufficient to grant the mineral
lessee the right to strip mine for fire clay.
The plaintiff argued that, with the exception of this one provision,
virtually all the language in the lease implied that the parties intend-
ed the fire clay to be removed only by deep mining. However, the
court said that the implications of deep mining were not strong
enough to prevent the lessee from strip mining under the express
covenants of the lease, and that to deny the lessee the right to strip
mine would be to make a new contract.8 The Heidt decision illus-
trates the most obvious basis for determining the mineral lessee's right
to strip mine; i.e., by an express agreement in the lease.
Another basis for establishing the mineral lessee's right to strip
mine is by construing the entire lease to determine the intention9 of
the parties at the time the instrument was executed. When the lan-
guage of a lease is contradictory, obscure or ambiguous, the most
reasonable construction will be adopted.10 Fairness, custom and
usage are considered to determine what is reasonable." Even though
the original parties to the lease are not available, parol evidence
may be introduced to explain ambiguous terms and to give meaning
to expressions by showing the custom and usage at the time the instru-
ment was executed.12 If the instrument is susceptible of two or more
equally reasonable constructions, it will be construed most strongly
against the lessor.'
3
One provision, commornly found in mineral leases, deserves special
consideration. This provision relates to the surface owner's absolute
right to subjacent support.14 Unless the surface owner has either ex-
"The law will not imply a different contract from that which the parties them-
selves made." Mount Carmel R.R. v. M. A. Hanna Co., 371 Pa. 232, 89 A.2d 5o8,
513 (1952).
"'Mhis intention must be deduced, not from specific provisions or fragmen-
tary parts of the instrument, but from its entire context...." Uinta Tunnel, Min-
ing & Transp. Co. v. Ajax Gold Mining Co., 141 Fed. 563, 566 (8th Cir. 19o5).
'Hempfield Township School Dist. v. Cavalier, 3o9 Pa. 46o, 164 Ad. 6o2
(1932); Navarro Corp. v. School Dist. of Pittsburgh, 344 Pa. 429, 25 A.2d 8o8 (1942);
Elliott-Lewis Corp. v. York-Shipley, Inc., 372 Pa. 346, 94 A.2d 47 (1953).
uPercy A. Brown & Co. v. Raub, 357 Pa. 271, 54 A.2d 35 (1947).
',"Evidence to explain ambiguity, establish a custom, or show the meaning of
technical terms, and the like, is not regarded as an exception to the [parol evidence]
rule, because it does not contradict or vary the written instrument...." Thomas
v. Scutt, 127 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E. 961, 963 (i8gi).
"Hunt v. Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 82 S.W. 998 (19o4); Eastham v. Church, 31o Ky.
93; 219 S.W.9d 4o6 (1949).
"'Clinchfield Coal Corp. v. Compton, 148 Va. 437, 139 S.E. 308 (1927); Couch v.
Clinchfield Coal Corp., 148 Va. 455, 139 S.E. 314 (1927).
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pressly or impliedly waived his right to subjacent support, 15 the min-
eral lessee must carry on his underground mining so as not to disturb
the overlying surface. However, a conveyance that expressly releases
the mineral lessee from liability for damage to the surface is a waiver
of the lessor's right to have his land supported.'; It is also generally
accepted that a grant of the right to mine all the mineral amounts to
an implied waiver of the lessee's duty to maintain subjacent
support.1 7 All the mineral cannot be removed without causing damage
to the surface. Some form of temporary support may be left in place
of the mineral, or the nature of the overlying strata may be such that
subsidence will not take place immediately, but ultimately the min-
ing of all the mineral will necessarily result in some disturbance of
the surface. By this rationale, the lessor who conveys the right to mine
all the mineral will be deemed to have waived his right to subjacent
support, and the mineral lessee is released from liability for damage
to the surface resulting from underground mining.
The courts have not extended this reasoning to the point of hold-
ing that either an express or an implied waiver, standing alone, is
enough to establish the mineral lessee's right to strip mine.'8 It seems
that they have restrained from doing so by adopting a theory that
the right to damage the surface is not the right to destroy the surface.
Strip mining does not necessarily render the surface useless for its
intended purpose.19 Many states have reclamation statutes2 0 which re-
""The modern decisions of both England and America recognize that the right
of subjacent support may be waived either expressly or by necessary implication."
Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 113 W. Va. 309, 311, 167 S.E. 737 (933)-
'0Stelmack v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 339 Pa. 410, 14 A.2d 127 (1940); Continental
Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Product Co., 1o4 W. Va. 44, 138 S.E. 737 (1927).
'-Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 179 Fed. 191 (4 th Cir. 1910); Simmers v. Star Coal
& Coke Co., ii 3 W. Va. 309, 167 S.E. 737 (1933)
"8One exception is Commonwealth v. F. & W. Coal Co., 65 Dauph. 157 (Pa.
C.P. 1953). The court held that an implied waiver of the right to subjacent sup-
port carried with it the right to conduct strip mining.
10"[]t has been proven to the hilt that the [mineral] can be [strip] mined and
that the land then can be put back into shape for satisfactory hay and pasture ....
In fact, with proper handling, some land is even better after being turned over
and plowed up." Brohard, Strip Revegetation, Coal Age 64, 65 (March 1962).
The usual reclamation statute requires the strip mine operator to post bond
at a specified rate per acre. If he fails to regrade and replant the stripped area with-
in the designated period after completion of the mining, the bond is forfeited.
In Pennsylvania, the proceeds from forfeited bonds go into the "Bituminous
Coal Open Pit Mining Reclamation Fund" for the purpose of reclaiming stripped
lands in the same county where the liability was charged. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §
1396.18 (1954).
In West Virginia, the forfeitures are deposited in the "Surface Mining Reclama-
tion Fund" and are expended upon the particular land upon which the permit
was issued. W. Va. Code Ann. § 2312(3 5 d) (961).
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quire the mineral lessee to regrade and replant the stripped area, thus
minimizing the damage. If the land is restored so that it serves a use-
ful purpose, it can hardly be said that the surface has been destroyed.
Furthermore, it is possible that deep mining of all the mineral will
render the surface just as useless as strip mining does.21 If both methods
equally deprive the surface owner of the use and enjoyment of his
land, it does not seem reasonable to deny the mineral lessee the right
to choose the more practical method. It is therefore submitted that,
when the land can be restored and used for its intended purpose or
when either method would result in an equal amount of surface
damage, either an express or an implied waiver of the mineral lessee's
duty to maintain subjacent support should be sufficient to establish
his right to strip mine.
Another provision in mineral leases which merits consideration is
a grant of the right to use and occupy the surface. Here again, the
courts have not interpreted such a provision to include the right to
strip mine, by reasoning that the right to use and occupy the sur-
face does not mean the right to destroy the surface.22 This reasoning
was upheld in West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong.23 A ma-
jority of the court denied the mineral lessee the right to strip mine
even though the lease expressly granted the right to mine all the
mineral and strip mining was the only method by which all the min-
eral could be removed.2 4 The one dissenting Judge25 felt that the court
was disregarding an express provision of the lease and thereby depriv-
ing the lessee of a valuable contract right. Although it is conceded that
a grant of the right to use and occupy the surface may not, in itself,
be sufficient to establish the mineral lessee's right to strip mine, it
should add considerable weight to this position. This is especially true
if the surface is rugged mountainous country or barren wasteland.2 6
Every effort must be made to protect the surface owner's right to
use and enjoy his land, but if he has conveyed away this right, he
should not be protected at the expense of the mineral lessee. The
"Where deep mining is conducted without leaving proper subjacent support,
subsidence of the surface may damage the land even more severely than strip min-
ing.
"Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 Pac. 534 (1923).
3129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
"WVhere the overburden is relatively thin and consists of loose, unconsolidated
material, strip mining may be the only method by which the mineral can be re-
covered.
"Fox, J., West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
"Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (ig5o); Commonwealth
v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 39 o , 102 A.2d 893 (1954).
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courts have endeavored to decide each case upon its own merits.
Nevertheless, in the absence of ar- express provision in the lease
granting the right to strip mine, the mineral lessee has been faced
with a most difficult task of providing his right to destroy the surface.
By placing this burden upon the mineral lessee, he is denied a valu-
able contract right and is penalized for having failed to foresee the
mining industry's unprecedented mechanization.
LEONARD SARIGEANT III
DIREGTOR'S RIGHT TO INSPECT CORPORATE RECORDS
Normally a director in office has the right to examine the books and
records of the corporation.' Whether this right may be denied or
limited because the director's purposes are hostile to the corporation
or because he acts in bad faith is a question that courts have not
always answered consistently.
The recent Delaware case of State ex rel. Farber v. Seiberling Rub-
ber Co.2 deals with this problem. One of the directors of Seiberling
Rubber Co., Eugene Farber, sought mandamus3 to compel the officers
of the corporation to provide him with a list of the stockholders or
give him access to the corporate stock ledger. Seiberling answered
that Farber's motive was improper; and if his petition was granted,
such an inspection would be detrimental to the corporation. Farber
moved to strike the answer4 in its entirety, and the court was presented
with the problem of whether or not a showing of improper motive
on the part of a director is sufficient in law to deny him the right to
inspect the corporate stock ledger.
The Superior Court of Delaware concluded that a director has a
'People ex rel. Bartels v. Borgstede, 169 App. Div. 421, 155 N.Y.S. 322 (2d
Dep't 1915). The court conceded that the right of a director to inspect and ex-
amine the corporation books is unquestioned. In some states the right is expressly
granted by statute. See Cal. Corp. Code § 3o04.
2168 A.2d 310 (Del. Super Ct. 1961).
3Traditionally the proper remedy used to enforce the inspection right is a writ
of mandamus. The writ requires, as a matter of pleading, that a director needs
only to show that he has demanded an inspection and that the demand has been
refused. See 5 Fletcher, Corporations § 2251 (Rev. Vol. 1952), and cases cited therein.
'He contended that under Rule 1a(f) of the Superior Court of Delaware, a
defense is insufficient and subject to being struck when it is not a valid defense; or
where it is not germane to the issues in the case; or where it is not responsive to
the claims to which it is interposed. Del. Super. Ct. (Civ.) R. 12(f). See Fowler
v. Munford, 48 Del. 282, 102 A.2d 535 (1954).
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right .to inspect the corporate books only so long as his purpose is not
adverse to the interest of the corporation. If his motives are improper
then the right to inspect ceases to exist. The -court denied Farber's
motion to strike on the ground that it admitted his improper motive,
which constitutes a sufficient defense in law to deny him the right to
inspect.
At common law both the director and the stockholder were ac-
corded the right to inspect the books, records and documents of the
corporation.5 The right of the director has often been termed an
absolute and unqualified right,c while the right of the stockholder has
been qualified.7 Although the inspection rights of a stockholder and
a director have much in common, they are based upon different prin-
ciples.
The right of a stockholder to inspect the books and records is an
incident of stock ownership and the corresponding interest in the
assets and business of the company.8 This equitable ownership gives
uSee generally Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951); Annot., 174 A.L.R. 262 (1948);
Annot., 8o A.L.R. 1502 (1932); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 1373 (1929); Annot., 22 A.L.R. 24
(1923).
6State ex rel. Watkin* v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Drake v.
Newton Amusement Corp., 123 N.J.L. 560, 9 A.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Mitchell v.
Rubber Reclaiming Co., 24 Ad. 407 (N.J. Ch. 1892); People ex rel. Muir v. Throop,
12 Wend. 183 (N.Y. 1834); Davis v. Keilsohn Offset Co., 273 App. Div. 695, 79
N.Y.S.2d 54o (lst Dep't 1948); State ex rel. Wilkens v. M. Ascher Silk Corp., 207
App. Div. 168, 201 N.YS. 739 1st Dep't 1923), aff'd 237 N.Y. 574, 143 N.E. 748
(1924), rehearing denied 237 N.Y. 630, 143 N. E. 770 (1924); People ex rel. Leach v.
Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div. 77, 1o N.Y.S. iso8 (1st Dep't 19o7); Halperin v.
Air King Prods. Co., 59 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Machen v. Machen & Mayer
Elec. Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212, 85 Atl. 1oo (1912); State ex rel. Aultman v. Ice, 75 IV. Va.
476, 84 S.E. 181 (1915). See 5 Fletcher, Corporations § 2235 (Rev. Vol. 1952); Ballan-
tine, Corporations § 165 (rev. ed. 1946); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 76 (1951)-
'State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 Atl. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931);
News-Journal Corp. v. State ex rel. Gore, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271 (1939), afF'd 1
So. 2d 559 (1941), aff'd per curiam 8 So. 2d 493 (1942); Albee v. Lamson & Hubbard
Corp., 320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946); In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E.
1103 (1899); Tate v. Sonotone Corp., 272 App. Div. 103, 69 N.Y.S.2d 535 (ist Dep't
1947); see Miller v. Spanogle, 275 Ill. App. 335, 340 (1934) (dictum); Cravatts v. Klozo
Fastner Corp., 205 Misc. 781, 133 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (dictum). See
Bartels and Flanagan, Inspection of*Corporate Books and Records in New York by
Stockholders and Directors, 38 Cornell L.Q. 289 (1953); Note, 18 La. L. Rev. 337
(1958); Note, 41 Va. L. Rev. 237 (1955).
8Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (i9o5), affirming 27 Utah 248, 75 Pac. 624
(19o4); Hobbs v. Davis, 168 Cal. 556, 143 Pac. 733 (1914); State ex rel. Miller v.
Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 At. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931); State ex rel. De Juluecourt v.
Pan American Co., 21 Del. 391, 61 At. 398 (Super Ct. 19o4), aff'd mem. 63 Atl.
1118 (igo6); Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp., 404 Ill. 440, 89 N.E. 2d 374 (1950):
Wise v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 285 Ill. App. 40, 1 N.E.2d 536 (1936); Klein v. Scranton
Life Ins. Co., 137 Pa. Super 369, 11 A.2d 770 (194o); Kuhbach v. Irving Cut Glass
Co., 220 Pa. 427, 69 Atl. 981 (19o8). Cf., State ex rel. Dixon v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe
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the shareholder the right to inspect for all "proper purposes"
9 neces-
sary to protect his interests as a shareholder. On the other hand, a
director stands in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its
shareholders. 10 To perform properly the duties imposed by this dual
relationship, a director must have a right to inspect the corporate
books and records." Moreover, the right of inspection is also essential
in order for the director to protect himself from potential personal
liability.12 Consequently, it is apparent that a director inspects in order
to perform his duties intelligently and prudently, while a stockholder
inspects to protect his individual interests. Accordingly, a director
generally has a wider and more extensive right of inspection.
Recognizing this distinction, it is evident that the "absolute" right
of inspection enjoyed by a director, as opposed to the "qualified" right
granted a stockholder, is based on the director's fiduciary function in
supervising, managing and preserving the corporation.
The majority of courts, adhering to the doctrine prevailing in New
York, have expressed the view that a director has an absolute and
unqualified right of inspection and that his motives are immaterial.1
3
The principle is stated in State ex rel. Wilkins v. M. Ascher Silk
Corp.:'
4
Line Co., 42 Del. 423, 36 A.2d 29 (Super. Ct. 1944); State ex rel. Foster v. Standard
Oil Co. of Kan., 41 Del. 172, 18 A.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1941). See 5 Fletcher, Cor-
porations §§ 2213-22264 (Rev. Vol. 1952). See also note 5 supra.
DSee note 8 supra.
'0"It is fundamental that directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corpor-
ation and its shareholders, and that their primary duty is to deal fairly and justly."
Yasik v. Watchtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (1941); Drake v. Newton
Amusement Corp., 123 N.J.L. 560, 9 A.-d 636 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Cf., Lebold v. Inland
Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 675 (1942) (director owed
duty to minority shareholders on dissolution). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-35 (Repl. Vol.
196o) (refers to directors fiduciary relation to the corporation and to its share-
holders).
"People ex. rel. Bellman v. Standard Match Co., 2o8 App. Div. 4, 2o2 N.Y.S.
840 (2d Dep't 1924); People ex rel. Leach v. Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div.
77, 101 N.Y.S. iio8 (1st Dep't 1907); People ex rel. McInnes v. Columbia Paper Bag
Co., 1O3 App. Div. 208, 92 N.Y.S. 1084 (ist Dep't 19o5); Machen v. Machen & Mayer
Elec. Mfg. Co., 237 Pa. 212, 85 At. 1oo (1912); State ex rel. Keller v. Grymes, 65
W. Va. 451, 64 S.E. 728 (19o9). See Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 41 (1951.
"'According to the weight of authority, it seems the directors of a corporation
may be charged with negligence for a failure to inform themselves of matters
shown by the books of the company, but there is respectable authority to the
contrary." 3 Fletcher, Corporations § io6o (Rev. Vol. 1947) and cases cited therein.
See Ballantine, Corporations § 62 (rev. ed. 1946).
"See note 6 supra.
'20o7 App. Div. 168, 201 N.Y.S. 739 (1st Dep't 1923), aff'd 237 N.Y. 574, 143
N.E. 748 (1924), rehearing denied 237 N.Y. 63o, 143 N.E. 770 (1924).
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"[S]o long as [he] remains a director, he is entitled to, and his
duty is, to keep himself informed of the business of the cor-
poration, irrespective of his motive; otherwise, the right of a
director desiring to inspect will be dependent upon his being
able to satisfy the other officers of the corporation that his mo-
tives were adequate."'1
These jurisdictions indicate that removal from office is the appro-
priate remedy to use where a director's actions are hostile and inimical
to the interests of the corporation.10 Since a director's right to examine
the corporate books is co-existent with his term of office, upon the
expiration of that term or removal from office, he loses his right to in-
spect. 17
A small minority of jurisdictions qualify the right, limiting it to
inspection for "proper purposes."'s In this form the rule closely ap-
proximates the right granted to stockholders at common law to inspect
only for "proper purposes."
The rationale of the principal case and other jurisdictions quali-
fying the inspection right of a director is based on the reasons giving
rise to the right of a director to inspect. It is inconsistent, the court
says in the principal case, to say that "a director has an absolute right
to inspect the records of a coriporation so that he may better perform
his obligations to protect the corporation, and in the next breath say
this right is absolute and remains inviolate even though such exami-
152o1 N.Y.S. at 74 o . See Javits v. Investor's League, Inc., 92 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup.
Ct. 1943).
laDavis v. Keilsohn Offset Co., 273 App. Div. 6 95, 79 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1st Dep't
1948); People ex rel. Leach v. Central Fish Co., 117 App. Div. 77, io N.Y.S. 11o8
(1st Dep't 19o7); Halperin v. Air King Prods. Co., 59 N.Y.S.2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
'Overland v. Le Roy Foods, Inc., 279 App. Div. 876, 11o N.Y.S.2d 578 (2d
Dep't 1952) affd mere. 3o4 N.Y. 573, 107 N.E.2d 74 (1952) (director removed);
Cravatts v. Klozo Fastner Corp., 2o5 Misc. 781, 133 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(director resigned); Hymes v. Riveredge Printers, Inc., 131 N.Y.S.2d 2oo (Sup. Ct.
1954) (director removed). But see Cohen v. Cocaline Prods., 3o9 N.Y. 119, 127
N.E.2d 9o6 (1955) (director failing to be re-elected has a qualified right to inspect
the books covering the period of his directorship); Application of La Vin, 37
N.Y.S.2d 161 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (ex-director entitled to examine the books up to the
date of his removal from office).
Removal as a remedy presents practical difficulties and is not always effective.
The remedy is criticized in Bartels & Flanagan, Inspection of Corporate Books and
Records in New York by Stockholders and Directors, 38 Cornell L.Q. 289, 314
(1953).
2BHemingway v. Hemingway, 58 Conn. 443, 19 At. 766 (1890); State ex rel.
Pischall v. Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952). See Stone v. Kellogg, 165
Ill. 192, 46 N.E. 222 (1896) (dictum); Strassburger v. Philadelphia Record Co., 335
Pa. 485, 6 A.2d 922, 924 (1939) (dictum). See 5 Fletcher, Corporations § 2235, (Rev.
Vol. 1952); 13 Am. Jur. Corporations § 1025 (1938). See also note 25 infra.
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nation is conducted for an improper purpose hostile to the interests
of the corporation '" 19 Similar reasoning is used in State ex rel. Paschall
,. Scott:20
"[W]hen a director, driven by hostile and improper motives,
seeks to examine corporate books and records, he cannot do so
under a claim of duty. On the contrary, his purposes and action
are entirely inconsistent with such duty. The basis of the right
which a director has to examine corporate records-the perform-
ance of corporate duties-is then wholly lacking, and thus the
right itself no longer exists." 21
The minority rule seems to be founded upon sound reasoning. If a
director cannot sustain the burden of showing that inspection is for a
proper purpose and is not hostile or inimical to the interest of the
corporation he should be denied the right to inspect. As asserted in
Davis v. Keilsohn Offset Co. 22 in a concurring opinion:
"[A] person ought not to receive the aid of a court order for
an inspection of the books and records of a corporation as a
director, if it be established that he has disqualified himself
from continuing to act in that fiduciary capacity toward the
corporation." 23
Delaware, in adopting the minority rule, goes as far as any juris-
diction has in qualifying a director's right, and this may be indicative
of a current trend. Apparently even the New York courts, as indicated
in Gresov v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp.,24 have recognized that there
" 68 A.2d 31o 312 (Del. Super. Ct. g6i).
' 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952).
n247 P.2d at 549.
2-273 App. Div. 695, 79 N.Y.S.2d 540 (ist Dep't 1948).
"79 N.Y.S.2d at 542.
229 MiSC.2d 324, 215 N.YS.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. 1961). In holding that a director
of a foreign corporation doing business in New York "has an absolute, unqualified
right to inspect its books and records" the court states, "Respondent's contention
that this rule is inapplicable where inspection is sought for purposes inimical to
the interest of the corporation is not questioned." The court held that an inspection
sought for the apparent purpose of ousting present management is not considered
to be an act of bad faith detrimental to the corporation. 215 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
In certain unusual circumstances the right 'has been restricted by the New
York courts. Posen v. United Aircraft Prods. Co., 201 Misc. 260, 111 N.Y.S.2d 261
(Sup. Ct. 1952) (inspection denied where director engaged in national defense
work did not have federal security clearance); People ex rel. Bellman v. Standard
Match Co., 2o8 App. Div. 4, 202 N.Y.S. 840 (2d Dep't 1924) (former director of
dissolved corporation denied the right to inspect). Cf., Javits v. Investor's League,
Inc., 92 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (membership list denied).
See Melup v. Rubber Corp. of America, 181 Misc. 826, 43 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup.
Ct. 1943) (while describing the right as absolute the court admitted there must
be exceptions to it.) See also Ballantine, Corporations § 165 (rev. ed. 1946) (the view
1962]
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may be cases where the right of inspection should be qualified.
In conclusion, the minority view appears to be more practical
when the right to inspect is examined in light, of the ever changing
complexities of modem corporate structure and interlocking director-
ates. It reaches a fair and justified result by making it impossible
for a hostile director to use his office as a means of carrying improper
motives into execution, while preserving the right of inspection intact
and unqualified where a director seeks inspection in good faith and
in the proper performance of his duties.
ALLAN GMON
ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
While the use of arbitration only recently entered into the field
of domestic relations, controversies regarding it are already appearing
in the reported cases. The recent case of Lasek v. Lasek1 upholds an
arbitration clause in a separation agreement between husband and
wife. The court granted a stay in proceedings at law brought by the
wife for payments, in order to give effect to a clause requiring arbitra-
tion of "any dispute between the parties hereto with respect to the
provisions of the agreement .... ',2 While arbitration in domestic rela-
ti6ns is a relatively new coRcept, it seems to be quite well established
in the state of New York.3 The same is not true however in the ma-
jority of states, even thought this concept seems to be particularly ap-
plicable to such a litiguous matter as domestic relations.
In the Lasek case, the wife by bringing an action at law for the pay-.
ments was attempting to avoid the arbitration clause. The court, how-
ever, held her bound by the clause, saying, "Having so chosen to
arbitrate their differences, neither may avoid the choice on the ground
that the other has failed to offer an excuse for the alleged breach."
4
The refusal of the husband to make the payments was arbitrable, for
the court felt the clause was "sufficiently broad to encompass a dis-
is expressed that inspection should be denied "when necessary to prevent abuse
by him or his representative").
1x3 App. Div. 2d 242, 215 N.Y.2d 983 (lst Dep't 1961).




pute arising from a simple refusal to comply with the separation
agreement .... 5
The primary impediment to this practice in other states is the
rule that a clause providing for the arbitration of future disputes is
not enforceable. 6 The reasoning given for this rule is that such clauses
oust the courts of jurisdiction,7 or are void as against public policy.8
States such as New York which allow a future dispute to be arbitrated
say, "The arbitration clauses in the separation agreement provided a
substitute for the usual legal forum, in which the parties might have
their differences resolved, in relative privacy, by self-chosen judges." 9
These jurisdictions provide that arbitration clauses may be invali-
dated "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract."' 0 This protects the rights of the parties where
arbitration is involved, the same as where parties agree to settle a
claim out of court. Since adequate protection for the parties is pro-
vided by the right to invalidate an unfair arbitration clause in a
contract, and it is desirable to support methods of settling contro-
versies amicably, provisions for settling future disputes by arbitra-
tion should be upheld.
There is little authority supporting the use of an arbitration
clause in a separation agreement. Lindey on Separation Agreements,"
cites only cases from New York as supporting this practice.21 While
this is a new concept, it seems the states which now allow arbitration
of future disputes may adopt the practice.
The court states in the Lasek case, "Their right to agree upon
arbitration of matters relating to marital support and maintenance
under a subsisting separation agreement is not questioned, nor is it
qbid.
'Hughes v. National Fuel Co., 121 W. Va. 392, 3 S.E.2d 621 (1939); Duval
County v. Charleston Eng'r & Const. Co., soi Fla. 341, 134 So. 509, 516 (1931);
LaKube v. Cohen, 304 Mass. 156, 23 N.E.2d 144 (1939); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Mayfield, 225 Ala. 449, 143 So. 465, 467 (1932); Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 126
Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694, 70o (1934); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95
(1923).
7Corbin v. Adams, 76 Va. 58, 61 (188); Merchants Grocery Co. v. Talladega
Grocery Co., 217 Ala. 334, 116 So. 356, 359 (1928); W. H. Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co.,
i9o Cal. 625, 214 Pac. 38 (1923); Johnson v. Brinkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P.2d 1132,
1139 (1936).
'Dunning v. Dunning, 114 Cal. App. 2d 110, 249 P.2d 6og, 612 (Dist. Ct. App.
1952).
9215 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
'0N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 (1961); Manufacturers Chem. Co. v. Caswell, Strauss
& Co., Inc., 259 App. Div. 321, ig N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1st Dep't 1940).
2Lindey, Separation Agreements & Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 29 (1g6i).
='Id. at 368-74.
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questionable."' 3 The earlier case of Braverman v. Braverman14 held
the clause valid, but inapplicable because the dispute the husband
sought to arbitrate was clearly not one the parties intended to en-
compass in the agreement. The Braverman case shows the attitude of
the New York courts that arbitration is enforceable when the clear in-
tent to do so is manifested. Approval of the practice of using arbi-
tration clauses in separation agreements seems firmly established by
the case usage in New York.
The New York statute is one in which future disputes are arbi-
trable.15 The courts have interpreted this statute to enforce the choice
to arbitrate, once the clear intent to do so is found.1 6 As the court
stated in Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co.:
"Parties to a contract may agree, if they will that any and all
controversies growing out of it in any way shall be submitted
to arbitration. If they do, the courts of New York will give ef-
fect to their intention."1 7
This is the logical result of the clause to arbitrate. The parties have
agreed freely to the arbitration clause, and there is no reason not to
enforce their agreement.
There appears at present to be scant usage of arbitration in refer-
ence to marital disputes. For the states which now allow enforceable
arbitration of future disputes by a statute similar to that of New York,
the adoption of this concept should cause little difficulty. In states
having less modern statutWs18 which deny the right to arbitrate a
future dispute, there is an apparently simple method to authorize this
concept without reference to statutory changes, which are always pos-,
sible.19
The most effective and easiest method would be by court ap-
proval of the clause in a decree approving the agreement. Possibly
this procedure has not been sufficiently considered by counsel. By in-
corporating the arbitration clause specifically, or the agreement gen-
erally, the court would be able to make arbitration binding on the
parties. Since it is well established that incorporation of a separation
23215 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
"9 Misc. 2d 661, 168 N.YS.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
15N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448 (1961).
"Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N.Y. 13o, 19o N.E. 2o8 (1934).
17252 N.Y. 284, x69 N.E. 386, 391 (x929).
"28Va. Code Ann. § 8-503 (Repl. Vol. 1957); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5499 (1961);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-5o6 (1956).
"An excellent guide for this change is provided by the proposed Uniform
Statute on Arbitration of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Handbook of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 162 (1955).
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agreement into a court decree gives it the same force as the decree, 20
this rule would also apply when an arbitration clause is involved. Per-
haps, incorporation by reference, or approval of the agreement contain-
ing the clause would be sufficient.
The use of arbitration in separation agreements is at present
relatively untested because of the lack of instances in which it has
been judicially noted. Much is written about the current congestion
prevalent on court dockets. Courts themselves should relieve this con-
gestion whenever possible.2' Incorporation of the arbitration clause
of a separation agreement into a court decree and subsequent en-
forcement thereof would aid in relieving this problem in the field of
domestic relations. This practice might be applied also to resolve
disputes arising when alimony payments need to be adjusted to meet
changing circumstances. It is submitted that an arbitration clause in
a separation agreement is a tailor-made technique for settling marital
disputes in a private forum.
JOHN H. TATE, JR.
REMARKS ABOUT APPEAL AS PREJUDICIAL
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Remarks in court in a criminal case regarding the right of a de-
fendant to appeal raise the question of whether such remarks lessen
the jury's sense of responsibility with resultant prejudice to the ac-
cused. This problem was dealt with in State v. Clark,' a recent rape
case from Oregon in which the defendant was convicted and appealed.
The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:
"If the defendant here is dissatisfied with the rulings of this
court as to the law, he has the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court and that Court can correct any mistakes which this court
may make as to the law of the case...2.2
The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the conviction stating that
-IRichards v. Richards, 85 Ga. App. 6o5 , 69 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1952); Davis v.
Davis, 229 Ind. 414, 99 N.E.2d 77 (1951).
21"Finally, any doubts as to the construction of the Act [arbitration] ought
to be resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to ac-
cord with the original intention of the parties and to help ease the current con-
gestion of court calendars." Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959).
2362 P.2d 335 (Ore. 1961).
2Ibid.
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while, the giving of the instruction was error, it was not prejudicial
error so as to justify reversal. However, the court noted that the possi-
bility of prejudicial error in certain situationg was sufficiently great
to warrant discontinuance of the practice of giving the instruction.3
Although the court did little to explain the decision, it did state
that the challenged instruction was not made "with the intent to
cause a jury to shirk its responsibility in deciding the facts, but rather
with the intent to impress upon the jury its responsibility to accept
the law as it comes from the court.' 4 The court said that it is not every
error that justifies reversal and pointed out that in view of the entire
record there was no probability of prejudice in this case. 5
Although remarks in court concerning a defendant's right of ap-
peal are generally undesirable, there are two views in the United
States as to whether the giving of such instructions constitutes revers-
ible error. Under one view a conviction will not be reversed unless
the appellate court finds there was the probability of prejudicial error,6
while under the other view, the possibility of prejudicial error results
in automatic reversal.7 .
Jurisdictions in accord with the principal case simply take the
view that remarks concerning a defendant's future relief do not con-
stitute substantial harm so as to warrant reversal.8 The Oregon Su-
preme Court seems to couch its decision in terms of probability. That
is, even if the instructions complained of had not been given, the
jury probably would have found the defendant guilty.9 California
explains in a similar situation that "the jury in all probability would
have rendered a verdict of guilty."1°
Those jurisdictions which take the view that such instructions auto-




Fiorella v. City of Birmingham, 35 Ala. App. 384, 48 So. 2d 761, 766 (195o);
People v. Danford, 14 Cal. App. 442, 112 Pac. 474 (191o); State v. Satcher, 124 La.
1oi5, 5o So. 835 (909); State v. Seaman, io N.J. Super. 439, 77 A.2d 284 (195o); State
v. Leaks, 126 N.J.L. 115, 18 A.2d 3 (1941).
7-folt v. State, 2 Ga. App. 383, 58 S.E. 511 (1907); People v. Silverman, 252
App. Div. 149, 297 N.Y. Supp. 449 (2d Dep't 1937); People v. Santini, 221 App.
Div. 139, 222 N.Y. Supp. 683 (1st Dep't 1937); People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427,
8 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1936). Cf., Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797
(1935).
8State v. Seaman, supra note 6 at 286.
9362 P.2d at S36.
"People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364, 369 (1939); People v.
Stembridge, 99 Cal. App. 2d 15, 221 P.2d 212, 217 (1950).
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sider such matters as appeal, because the knowledge of future review
by other authorities may lead the jury to evade its responsibilities and
compromise on the question of guilt. The possibility of lessening the
seriousness of the jury's determination is based upon the theory that
if the jury incorrectly convicts an innocent man, the mistake may still
be corrected by a higher court." This is the New York rule on the
propriety of giving instructions similar to 'those in the principal case.
In People v. Silverman the New York court held that prejudice arose
from references to the defendant's right of appeal stating that "if the
jury made a mistake the error might also be cured by an appeal."'12
The logic of such reasoning is not of recent origin. The early Georgia
case of Hodges v. State noted that "the fact that a defendant, in a
criminal case, may take up his case to the Supreme Court is no reason
why he should not have meted out to him, by the Court and Jury, the
full measure of his legal rights."' 3
The courts following the New York rule seem to couch their
opinions in terms of "possibility" of prejudice to the accused. The
test is whether the remarks "might have"'14 or possibly did influence
the jury in the verdict returned as to its nature, character, degree, or
amount. The significance of possible injury to a defendant is recog-
nized in a Georgia statute that makes a mistrial mandatory if reference
is made in court to subsequent relief open to the accused.15
In a similar although not identical situation, the prosecution's re-
marks to a jury regarding appeal have been held to constitute re-
versible error. Due to the nature of our adversary system this situation
arises more frequently than that in the principal case, but the possible
effect upon the jury seems indistinguishable. Analogous to the question
raised in the principal case, there are two main views. Those juris-
dictions that follow Oregon would say that such remarks are unneces-
sary and improper but not so prejudicial as to justify reversal.16 Juris-
dictions adhering to the New York rule would reverse and remand.
In the New York case of People v. Esposito the prosecutor said, "I
wish to call your attention to the fact that defendant can appeal from
"Kelly v. State, 21o Ind. 38o, 3 N.E.2d 65 (1936); Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88,
161 N.E. 375, 383 (1928).
1-77 A.2d at 287.
is 5 Ga. 117, 118 (1854).
ilPait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 386 (Fla. 1959); McCall v. State, i2o Fla. 707,
163 So. 38 (935)-
'
1
Ga. Code Ann. § 27-22o6 (Supp. 1961); Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 157, 91 S.E.2d
16 (1956); McKuhen v. State, 12o Ga. App. 75, 115 S.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 196o).
'"Norris v. State, 16 Ala. App. 126, 75 So. 718 (1917); State v. Merryman, 78 Ariz.
73, 283 P.2d 239 (1955); People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 88o (1932).
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this decision of yours to the Court of Appeals, but the prosecution can-
not.".1 7 The appellate court reversed the conviction. In another New
York case, People v. Johnson, the court held that the jury has nothing
to do with appeals and that the jurors have a sufficient task to per-
form in finding the truth and returning a verdict without regard to
alternate consequences.' 8
However, in the area of remarks by prosecutors a distinction may
be made from the situation presented in the principal case in that
errors by counsel in making such remarks can sometimes be overcome
by the court's admonishing the jury to disregard them.19 On the other
hand, some courts feel that withdrawal of the remarks by the court
does not cure the error committed, and hold that the impression of
such remarks on the minds of the jurors entitles the defendant to
a new trial.2 0
Reviewing courts are frequently confronted with the determina-
tion of whether improper remarks made during the course of a trial
are prejudicial or merely harmless. Occasionally, the conclusion is
quite obvious. For example, the misreading of a defendant's Christian
name in the charge is clearly incorrect, but not reversible error.21
whereas the failure to instruct as to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
constitutes prejudice.22 Unfortunately, not all errors are so easily
classified. In some situations one judge may consider particular re-
marks prejudicial while another would consider them harmless.
When either court or counsel have made improper remarks about
a criminal defendant's right to future relief, the New York rule re-
quiring reversal is preferable because it insures to the accused an
absolutely impartial trial.2 The "possibility" of prejudice as a
basis for remand seems more in keeping with other well-established
protections provided for the criminally accused, such as the require-
ment of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is buttressed
by the shielding presumption of innocence. The use of a "probability"
test, as in the principal case, may result in a trial in which the reason-
2"224 N.Y. 370, 121 N.E. 344, 346 (1918). See also People v. Friedt, 28o App.
Div. 836, 113 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't 1952); People v. Teiper, 186 App. Div. 830,
175 N.Y. Supp. 197 (4th Dep't 1919).
8284 N.Y. 182, 3o N.E.gd 465 (1940).
"State v. Benjamin, 309 S.AW.d 602 (Mo. 1958); Gray v. State, 191 Tenn. 526,
235 S.W.2d 2o (1950).
'4State v. Hawley, 229 N.C. 167, 48 S.E.2d 35, 36 (1948).
2rState v. Gilliam, 351 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. 1961).
=Pollard v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 488, 237 S.W.2d 3O (1951).
"People v. Johnson, supra note 18.
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ing of the jurors is infected by unnecessary and detrimental impres-
sions. It would be better if nothing was introduced into the trial that
suggests to a jury that its verdict is inconclusive.
2 4
PETER JOHN DAUK
DETERMINATION OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE
FOR INSURANCE PURPOSES
The recent federal case of Harper v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co.' deals
with the problem of determining the actual cash value of a building
under a policy of insurance covering damage by windstorm. The pol-
icy contained an 8o per cent co-insurance clause,2 so that the insurer
was interested in establishing a high actual cash value, so as to bring
the co-insurance clause into operation, and the insured wanted to estab-
lish a lower value for the property. The insurer urged adoption of
the theory of replacement cost less depreciation while the insured,
in all probability, argued for the adoption of the broad evidence
rule.
In the absence of a controlling Virginia decision, the court used the
broad evidence rule to determine actual cash value. The broad evi-
dence rule permits the introduction and consideration of any evidence
"People v. Esposito, supra note 17.
l199 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Va. 1961).
2 The purpose of the co-insurance clause is to compel the insured to carry
an amount of insurance at least equal to a specified percentage (usually 80%) of
the value of the property by requiring him to bear part of any loss incurred if he
fails to do so. For example, assume that an insured has a policy for $5o,000, with
an 8o% co-insurance clause. The actual cash value of his property is $ioo,ooo, and
he suffers a loss of $40,000. The amount of insurance required by the co-insurance
clause is $8oooo. Since the insured is only carrying five-eighths of the required
amount, the insurer will be liable for only five-eighths of the $40,000 loss (S25,ooo)
and the insured will have to bear the remainder of the loss ($15,oo). See Pearl
Assur. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 239 Ala. 515, 195 So. 747 (194o); Buse v.
National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 96 Misc. 229, 16o N.Y. Supp. 566 (Sup. Ct. 196).
The co-insurance provision, from its very nature, can only take effect where the
loss is partial. Templeton v. Insurance Co. of North America, 2o S.W.2d 784
(Mo. Ct. App. 1947). Where, for example, the amount of insurance equals the
specific percentage of the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss
or where the loss is total, the insured will recover in full, but not in excess of the
amount of the policy. Hence, by the terms of the co-insurance clause, the liability
of the insurer may vary with changes in the value of the property. For a discussion
of the background and function of co-insurance, see Templeton v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 201 SAV.d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); Aldrich v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 195 App. Div. 174, 186 N.Y. Supp. 569 (1st Dep't 1921).
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logically' tending to the formation of a correct estimate of the value
of the property at the time of the loss.
3
Actual cash value is a term susceptible of various interpretations.
The courts have said there is no single criterion applicable to all cases. 4
Generally, actual cash value depends on the nature of the property
insured, its condition, and other circumstances existing at the time
of the loss. 5 With respect to buildings, however, the courts have de-
veloped three general criteria or tests.6 They are: (i) market value,
(2) replacement or reproduction cost less depreciation, and (3) the so-
called broad evidence rule.
One view is that actual cash value means the market value of the
property at the time of the loss. The court in Butler v. Aetna Ins. Co.,7
which involved the loss of a grain elevator, said that actual cash value
means the market price of the property at the time of the loss "and
where there is no established market the market price must be esti-
mated at such amount as in all probability would have been arrived
at by fair negotiations between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser
desiring to buy, taking into account all considerations that fairly might
be brought forward and reasonably given substantial weight in such
bargaining."8 The difficulty with this view9 is that the value of a
building is often dependent upon the marketability of the land on
which the building is situated. If there is little market demand for
the land, the building will also have a lower market value. 10 Buildings
are not ordinarily bought and sold in the market separately from the
land and- so do not have a market value apart from the land, in the
strict sense of the term."' For example, one might have an insured
'Harper v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Va. 1961).
'See, e.g., Canadian Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonsay Hotel, [19231 3 D.L.R. 1ooi
(Can. Sup. Ct.). The trial court in this case had ruled that the test of actual cash
value was replacement cost less depreciation. This was unanimously reversed on
appeal, on three different grounds.
Featherston v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1956);
Castoldi v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 265, 154 A.2d 247
(Super. Ct. 1959); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Martineau, 26 Tenn. App. 261, 170 SAV.2d
927 (1943).
lAnnot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711 (1958).
164 N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214 (1934).
"256 N.W. at 215.
OIt would appear that in cases where there is no established market this test
would result in substantially the same actual cash value as derived through the
use of the so-called broad evidence rule.
" See, e.g., State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333 (189o); Britven v.
Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 13 N.W.2d 791 (1944).
"Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d 487 (1937); McAnarney v.
Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928).
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building of the value of $ioo,ooo in an undesirable location. And if
there was little demand for land in that location, the building might
not be sold at all; yet, the building might still be worth $loo,ooo to
the owner for business purposes. Hence, most courts reject market
value as the sole test for determining actual cash value, but allow it
to be considered along with other evidence.
12
Another test adopted by a number of courts is replacement or re-
production cost less depreciation. 13 it would appear that in most cases
the cost of a new building of the same material and dimensions as
the one destroyed, less the amount the destroyed building has de-
preciated through use is readily ascertainable. By applying this test
one can estimate with reasonable accuracy the actual cash value of a
structure. The main objection to this test, however, is its inflexibility
where a structure has become obsolete. 14 For example, in McAnar-
ney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co.,15 the insured owned a brewery which
was no longer economically useful for producing malt because of the
passage of the National Prohibition Act. The court rejected as the
sole measure of damage the cost of reproduction less physical depre-
ciation. 16 Clearly, in such a case, if the building could no longer be
used for producing malt, its value to the owner would be considerably
lessened and the exclusive use of the reproduction cost less physical
depreciation may well result in the determination of an excessive total
actual cash value.
The tendency on the part of a substantial number of courts has
been to adopt what is termed the broad evidence rule.17 The main fac-
22State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333 (189); Castoldi v. Hartford
County Mut. Fire Ins. CO., 21 Conn. Supp. 265, 154 A.2d 247 (Super. Ct. 1959); Smith
v. Aflemannia Fire Ins. CO., 219 Il. App. 506 (192o); Britven v. Occidental Ins. Co.,
234 Iowa 68z, 13 N.V.2d 791 (1944); Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d
487 (1937); McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928);
Third Nat'l Bank v. American Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S.W.2d
915 (1943).
1 Knuppel v. American Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 163 (7 th Cir. 1959); Svea Fire & Life
Ins. Co. v. State Say. & Loan Ass'n, i9 F.9d 134 (8th Cir. 1927); Boise Ass'n of Credit
Men v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 Pac. 523 (1927); Smith v. Al-
lemannia Fire Ins. CO., 219 Ill. App. 506 (1920).
"See 37 Yale L.J. 827 (1928).
Ug47 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928).
Ui59 N.E. at 9o4.
1TBritven v. Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 13 N.W.2d 791 (1944); Eshan
Realty Corp. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 25 Misc. 2d 828, 2o. N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct.
196o); Gervant v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 3o6 N.Y. 393, 118 N.E.2d 574 1954);
Sebring v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 103, 237 N.Y.S. 12o (4 th Dep't 1929);
McAnarney v. 'Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928); Rochester
Am. Ins. Co. v. Short, 207 Okla. 669, 252 P.2d 490 (1953); Citizens' Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Fire Ins. CO., 86 Vt. 267, 84 Ad. 970 (1912).
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tors to be considered under this rule in determining actual cash
value were pointed out in the leading case of McAnarney v. Newark
Fire Ins. Co.18 The court said:
"Where insured buildings have been destroyed, the trier of fact
may, and should, call to its aid, in order to effectuate complete
indemnity, every fact and circumstance which would logically
tend to the formation of a correct estimate of the loss. It may
consider original cost and cost of reproduction; the opinions
upon value given by qualified witnesses; the declarations against
interest which may have been made by the assured; the gainful
uses to which the buildings might have been put; as well as
any other fact reasonably tending to throw light upon the
subject."' 9
Factors such as rental values or income, expenses in connection with
the operation of a building, and the valuation placed upon the
building by public listers have been held admissible as bearing upon
the question of actual cash value.20 In the case of a destroyed dwelling
house, the jury was sent to the neighborhood in which the residence was
located with the instruction to view the entire neighborhood with
regard to its character as a consideration affecting the value of the
property.
2 '
. A modem application of the broad evidence rule is illustrated in
the case of Thorp v. American Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co.,22 in which
the actual cash value of a motion picture theatre was in issue. The
trial judge, in addition to instructing the jury to consider the factors
set forth in -the McAnarney case,23 also advised the jury to consider that
during the building's entire existence as a theater it had lost money in
its operation, despite good management; that it was affected by a
water condition which wet the theater and its contents; that there
was no sewerage system in town; that the effective drawing power
of the theater was limited to a three or four mile radius; that the
average daily receipts for six weeks prior to the fire were less than
$45.00; that some sixty-six theaters in the area had been closed down,
abandoned, or converted to other uses in the period shortly before and
subsequent to the date of the trial; that the theater had no air-con-
ditioning; and that the increase in the distribution of television sets
"247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928).
"159 N.E. at 9o5.
"Citizens' Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 86 Vt. 267,
84 Ad. 970 (1912).
2 Rochester Am. Ins. Co. v. Short, 207 Okla. 669, 252 P.2d 490, 492 (1953).
0212 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1954).
2247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928).
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had adversely affected the income of motion picture theaters at the
time of the fire.24 In other words, the broad evidence rule permits a
wide latitude in the ascertainment of actual cash value. Depending on
the circumstances the application of the rule may be favorable either
to the insurer or the insured. For example, if in the above case the
business climate and conditions surrounding the theater had been
very good, the jury might have found a higher actual cash value.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case adopted the
most equitable rule. However, since recovery under casualty insurance
policies is predicated upon the actual cash value of the property at the
time of the loss, it is important that both insurer and insured remain
aware of the actual value of the structure. As was pointed out above,
where the policy contains a co-insurance clause, the insurer may try to
show that the actual cash value is great enough so as to make the in-
sured a co-insurer. On the other hand, of course, the insured will want
to introduce evidence tending to show a low actual cash value so as
to avoid being a co-insurer. It is. important, therefore, that both
parties and especially the insured, be cognizant of the factors con-
sidered in such a determination. For the insured may wish to increase
or reduce his insurance coverage in accordance with changes in the
actual cash value. Hence, it is suggested that for the protection of the in-
sured he should make a periodic review of the factors which go to




The tenancy by the entireties has a long history at common law
as an incident of the concept of the legal unity of husband and wife,
it being a form of joint ownership that can only be vested in a hus-
band and wife.' As a result of the abolition of the unity of spouses
many jurisdictions have completely abolished this type of ownership,
others have extensively modified it, while some retain the tenancy
with most of its original characteristics. 2 The peculiar characteristic
2112 F.2d 821, 825-26 n.7 (3d Cir. 1954).
'Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929); 2 Tiffany, Real Proper-
ty § 431 (3 d ed. 1939).
-For an excellent discussion of tenancy by the entireties and classification
into groups see Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24 (1951)-
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of a tenancy by the entireties is that each spouse has the possibility
of becoming the sole owner of all the property by surviving the other.
One spouse cannot defeat this right by a unilateral act; in other words,
both must consent to any disposal of the property.3 As a result of the
limitation on alienation only joint creditors are able to reach the
property in satisfaction of a debt.
4
Virginia is one of the jurisdictions which still retains the ten-
ancy by the entireties in its original common law form.5 What ap-
pears to be a case of first impression in any state concerning one
incident ofthe tenancy arose in a bankruptcy proceeding in Virginia in
which a joint creditor sought to reopen a closed estate for consolidation
with the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding of the other spouse. In the
case of In the Matter of Rezd,6 a husband and wife owned property
by the entireties. The husband upon filing a petition in bankruptcy
was duly adjudicated a bankrupt, and on May , i96o, he was granted
a discharge. The estate was closed on August 16, 196o. On October
18, i96o, his wife filed a petition in bankruptcy. A joint creditor, who
had not participated in the earlier proceeding, moved to reopen the
husband's estate for consolidation of the proceeding with that of
his wife, so that property held by entireties could be reached. The
'Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, io3 Ad. 94 (1918); McCubbin v. Stanford, 85
Md. 378, 37 At. 214 (1897); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass., 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929);
Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
In Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 149 S.E. 615 (1929) the court denied a partition
of land held by the entireties because there is no separate interest in either tenant.
The seismn is "per tout et non per my"
"[T]he survivor of the marriage, whether the husband or the wife, is entitled to
the whole, which right cannot be defeated by a conveyance by the other to a
stranger, as in the case of joint tenancy. " 2 Tiffany, Real Property § 430 at
218 (3d ed. (1939).
4Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931); In re Kearns, 8 F.2d 437
(4th Cir. 1925); Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, 1o3 Atl. 94 (1918); Frey v. McGaw, 127
Md. 23, 95 Ad. 96o (1915); Jordan v. Reynolds, io 5 Md. 288, 66 At. 37 (1907);
Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N.C. 682, 125 S.E. 490 (1924); Martin v. Lewis, 187 N.C.
472, 122 S.E. 18o (1924).
If judgment is obtained by an individual creditor he has only a potential lien
based on the contingent expectancy of that spouse surviving and the creditor cannot
complain of a conveyance. Kenn v. Palumbo, 6o F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1932); Wylie v.
Zimmer, 98 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
The creditor of the husband can levy and sell the property and the purchaser
has a right to immediate possession, but this possession is subject to being defeated
by the wife surviving. Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 4o3 , 164 N.E. 613 (1929); Raptes
v. Gheros, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927).
5Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24 (1951); Ritchie, Tenancies by
the Entireties in Real Property with Particular Reference to the Law of Virginia,
28 Va. L. Rev. 6o8 (1941) contains a discussion of how to create tenancy by the
entireties m Virginia and the applicable statutes.
G198 F. Supp. 689 (WD. Va. 1961).
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District Court granted the motion, basing its decision on an interpre-
tation of Section 2(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides for
reopening an estate upon showing of good cause.7 The bankrupt
ar gued that the court should not exercise its discretion to reopen the
estate because the petitioner was barred by laches, since he failed to
seek a stay of discharge until a judgment against the joint debtors
could be obtained in a state court. The court rejected this argument on
the ground that laches was a good defense only when third persons
would be injured by granting the relief sought,8 and here there was
no possibility of injury to third persons.
The purpose of a bankruptcy proceeding is twofold: 9 to relieve
the debtor of a hopelessly indebted situation, and more importantly,
to enable creditors to receive as much by way of payment as possible.
In order to achieve these ends, title to property held by the bank-
rupt passes to the trusteeO to be administered in the most advan-
tageous way. However, the trustee receives title only to property which
is capable of being transferred by the bankrupt at the time the petition
is filed.' Since property held by entireties is incapable of being trans-
ferred by one of the spouses, it does not pass to the trustee.12 Hence it
is not available for the payment of the bankrupt's debts, and the in-
dividual bankrupt receives his discharge without losing his interest
in property so held.
Several techniques have been used by the courts to enable joint
creditors with good and valid claims, who would otherwise have their
claims against the bankrupt extinguished if a discharge was granted,
to reach property which did not pass to the trustee. In the leading
case of Lockwood v. Exchange Bank13 the creditor was the holder
of the bankrupt's joint note which waived a homestead exemption.
This property did not pass to the trustee under Section 7o(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act.14 The creditor petitioned for a stay of discharge
,Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(8), 52 Stat. 843 (1938), 1i U.S.C. § ii(a)(8) (1958).
'Brust v. Irving Trust Co., 129 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
OPhillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1931).
"-Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § i1o(a) (1958).
"Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913); Kerin v. Palumbo, 6o F.2d 480 (3d Cir.
1932); Dioguardi v. Gurran, 35 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1929); In re Kearns, 8 F.2d 437
(4th Cir. 1925); Wylie v. Zimmer, 98 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Bankruptcy Act §
70(a)(5), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), U.S.C. § iio(a)(5) (1958).
"2Kerm v. Palumbo, 60 F.2d 480 (3d Cir. 1932); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d
764 (4th Cir. 1931); Dioguardi v. Curran, 35 F.2d 431 (4 th Cir. 1929); In re Kearns,
8 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1925); Wylie v. Zimmer, 98 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Pa. 1951);
Vonville v. Dexter, i18 Ind. App. 187, 76 N.E.2d 856 (1948).
1190 U.S. 294 (1903).
'Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § i1o(a) (1958).
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until judgment on the note could be obtained in a state court, and he
could levy on the property. The court granted the stay because the
creditor had a valid claim but since the property did not pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy, his only remedy was in the state court. The
court reasoned that to grant a discharge knowing that the creditor had
a claim on this exempt property would be tantamount to legal fraud,
for once the discharge was granted the debt would be barred.15
In Phillips v. Krakower,16 which is heavily relied upon in the
principal case, there was a petition filed seeking a stay of discharge
until the holder of a joint note could obtain a judgment on it in a
state court. The makers of the note owned property by the entireties,
and one of the tenants was a bankrupt. Therefore, the only way the
joint creditor could reach the property held by the entireties, title to
which did not pass to the trustee, to satisfy his debt was to proceed in
a state court. The court held that if the discharge was granted before
the state court judgment was obtained the bankrupt's liability on
the note would be extinguished, thus precluding the creditor from
subjecting the property to payment during the bankrupt's lifetime
because of the tenancy by the entirety. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the stay should be granted in order to avoid this consequence.17
Essentially the same principles are involved in the principal case
as in the Lockwood and Krakower cases. Although the creditor in
Reid was not seeking a stay of discharge, the discharge already having
been granted, he was seeking a decree to reopen the estate and to
consolidate it with that of the wife's in her bankruptcy proceedings.
Nevertheless, the cases are similar in that creditors would lose a valid
claim if the relief sought is denied because in all three the property
sought to be reached had not passed to the bankruptcy trustee for
administration. In other words, in all three cases creditors were peti-
tioning the bankruptcy court to use its broad equity powers to sub-
ject property, which has not passed to the trustee, to payment of a
valid claim which would otherwise be lost.
Bankruptcy courts have always exercised broad equitable powers
concerning the bankrupt's estate, but prior to 1938 an estate could
be reopened only if it appeared that the estate had not been fully
administered.18 The Chandler Act broadened the power to reopen
1'i9o U.S. at 3oo.
146 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. i93i).
"7Id. at 765, "We cannot conceive that any court would lend it- aid to the
accomplishment of a result [legal fraud] so shocking to the conscience."
a'Kinder v. Scharff, 231 U.S. 517 (1913); In re Schreiher, 23 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.
1928); In re Chapman, 55 F.2d 965 (N.D.N.Y. 1930).
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an estate by adding the last clause to Section 2(a)(8) by which an estate
can be reopened "for cause shown."' 9 Thus the powers of the court
with relation to reopening estates were greatly increased, and now
the reopening may be granted or refused in the discretion of the
court, exercised on principles of equity.20 However, this discretion
should be exercised sparingly and only in unusual circumstances lest
the bankrupt will never receive the assurance of a finally settled
estate.
As pointed out by counsel for the bankrupt the creditor could
have followed a procedure like that outlined in Krakower by moving
for a stay of discharge until judgment could be obtained on the note
and the property subjected to payment of the claim. The creditor
could have also entered into the proceedings and received a dividend.21
However, notwithstanding the failure to seek a stay or file a claim, the
creditor should not be denied his request to reopen the estate under
the circumstances shown in the Reid case. The husband's discharge
included his obligation in the joint debt held by the petitioner, so
that the only chance of satisfying the claim was dependent upon the
wife's contingent right of sole ownership. This position was apparently
at the creditor's choice.
When, however, the wife subsequently filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy, as she did here, and is allowed to proceed to a discharge the
creditor would be left holding a good claim without any remedy to
satisfy it, and the bankrupts' still retaining all their property held by
the entireties. To allow such a result, merely because the creditor
failed to avail himself of a more expeditious method of obtaining
satisfaction, would be tantamount to fraud upon the creditor.
Therefore, the court should exercise its discretion and allow the
reopening of the first estate and then consolidate it with the one
presently in bankruptcy. This was done by the District Court in the
Reid case so as to enable a joint creditor holding a good claim to
reach joint property. To have held otherwise would be tantamount to
condoning fraudulent bankruptcy proceedings.
GARNET L. PATrERSON II
19Bankruptcy Act § 2(a)(8), 52 Stat. 843 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § ii(a)(8) (1958).
"Grand Union Equip. Co. v. Lippner, 167 F.2d 958 (2d Cir. 1948); In re Stein,
III F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); In re Ostermayer, 74 F. Supp. 8o3 (D.N.J. 1947);
In re Kneg, 37 F. Supp. 559 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
"Ades v. Caplan, 132 Md. 66, io3 At. 94 (1918).
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CITIZEN'S ARREST
The traditional requirement of a warrant to arrest for a breach
of the peace not committed in the presence of the arresting party can
occasionally hamper police officers in maintaining order. A patrolman
often arrives upon the scene after an altercation has ended, but be-
fore order has been restored. The officer then cannot make an arrest
until the proper warrant has been obtained. If he arrests without a
warrant, the arrest may be annulled by the courts and the arresting of-
ficer sued for false arrest or false imprisonment. In an apparent effort
to extend protection to officers who arrest for misdemeanors without a
warrant, the highest court of New York, in the case of People v.
Foster,1 recently found an unusual type of citizen's arrest.
People v. Foster arose out of a New York City street-fight in which
the defendant, a Negro girl, battled with a woman shopkeeper whose
daughter allegedly had taunted her. After first blows had fallen, the
defendant and two companions left the scene to summon one of their
parents. When they returned, the shopkeeper, a Mrs. Salzberg, had
retreated into the building and locked the door. Several dozen po-
licemen arrived to find the defendant outside the shop loudly abusing
Mrs. Salzberg before the many onlookers. The officers arrested the
defendant upon the complaint of Mrs. Salzberg. The defendant was
convicted of disorderly conduct and appealed to the New York Court
of Appeals on the ground that the arrest without a warrant was illegal
because the underlying assault for which the defendant was arrested
had not been committed in the officer's presence.2
Speaking for three members of the court, Judge Desmond found
that the underlying breach of the peace was still in progress when
the officers arrived on the scene, and thus the arrest without a war-
rant was permissible and, secondly, that the shopkeeper had made a
"citizen's arrest" of the defendant. 3
The citizen's arrest was based on the theory that the police took
11o N.Y.2d 99, 176 N.E.2d 397, 217 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1961).
'The court, in affirming the conviction, struggled to justify the arrest, with
three of the judges basing the decision on two alternative grounds; a fourth mem-
ber of the court concurring in the holding on one ground only, and the three re-
maining judges dissenting.
rIhe dissent's criticism of the first basis of the decision-that of a continuing
breach of the peace-is that since the defendant left the scene between the initial
altercation and the later disorder which was in progress when the police arrived,
the original assault could not possibly be continuing. The majority opinion ignores
the departure of the defendant, which would seem to make the first ground for
the decision untenable.
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the defendant into custody following an arrest by Mrs. Salzberg. This
theory may prove to be a novel and extremely useful device for ac-
complishing arrests for misdemeanors without a warrant. The facts
of X ,olpie v. Foster do not suggest that Mrs. Salzberg intended to
arrest the defendant. There is no indication that the shopkeeper
mentioned an arrest or made any move to effect one, nor was the
defendant conscious of having been arrested by Mrs. Salzberg. Indeed
during the entire period when Mrs. Salzberg might have arrested
defendant, a locked door separated the two women.
The two New York cases 4 cited in the principal case involved
valid initial arrests carried out by private individuals in accordance
with the settled requirements of a legitimate arrest, the police officers
taking into custody individuals who had been previously arrested. But
they do not support People v. Foster, in which the facts show that the
defendant was arrested solely on the basis of an unsworn complaint,
which under these circumstances is clearly illegal.
A proper citizen's arrest includes all the elements common to
valid arrests in general, but civilians may lawfully apprehend criminals
without a warrant only in well-defined circumstances. To constitute
an arrest, there must be an intent to arrest, under real or pretended
authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention which is so under-
stood by the one arrested.5 A private person making an arrest must
always give notice of his intention, 6 unless the arrestee knows or
ought to know under what authority the arrest is being made.7 Unless
there is statutory authority, neither an officer nor a private citizen
may arrest for a misdemeanor unless it constitutes a breach of the
peace committed in his presence.8 A private person may arrest for a
felony which has in fact been committed, provided he has reasonable
grounds for believing the arrestee guilty of committing it.9
Many states have given statutory authority to officers' 0 and to
'People v. Ostrosky, 95 Misc. 1o4, 16o N.Y.S. 493 (Nassau County Ct. 1916);
People ex rel. Gunn v. Webster, 75 Hun. 278, 26 N.Y.S. ioo7 (5th Dep't 1894).
'Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99 (i o th Cir. 1947); Melton v. State, 75 So.
2d 291 (Fla. 1954); State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. iooo
(1924); Lester v. Albers Super Market, Inc., 94 Ohio App. 313, 114 N.E.2d 529 (1952);
Neapolitan v. United States Steel Corp., 149 N.E.2d 589 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1956).
8Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); ALI Code Crim. Proc. 249
(Official Draft 1930).
'Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S.E. ioi8 (1893); Croom v. State, 85 Ga. 718,
it S.E. 1035 (i89o).
'ALI Code Crim. Proc. 231-33 (Offical Draft 1930).
DALI Code Crim. Proc. 240-41 (Official Draft 193o).
"°ALI Code Crum. Proc. 232 (Official Draft 1930); Warner, "Investigating the
Law of Arrest," 26 A.B.A.J. 151, 152 (1940).
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private11 individuals to arrest for certain types of misdemeanors com-
mitted in their presence, although not amounting to a breach of the
peace. But almost nowhere is an officer,1 2 and' never a private indi-
vidual,13 permitted to arrest for misdemeanors not committed in his
presence, purely on the basis of suspicion or unsworn complaint.
Private individuals rarely exercise their authority to arrest. A
survey of cases reaching the appellate courts in the last two decades
discloses that, on an average, less than three cases a year have arisen
involving citizen's arrests. These cases fall primarily into two cate-
gories; those involving government agents who find themselves in an
"arrest" situation without a warrant and fall back on citizen's arrest
to apprehend their man;1 4 and those where retail store managers
use citizen's arrest to detain suspected shoplifters.15
Only a handful of cases have arisen in recent years involving the
traditional concept of an individual's arresting for a crime commit-
UState ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 255 Pac. iooo (1924);
ALI Code Crim. Proc. 238-39 (Official Draft 1930).1
2A number of courts have held that statutes authorizing arrests without war-
rants for misdemeanors not committed in the presence of the arrester are un-
constitutional as an unlawful search. See In re Kellam, 55 Kan. 700, 41 Pac. 96o
(1895); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W 579 (1889); Gunderson v.
Struebing, 15 Wis. 173, 1o4 N.W. 149 (19o5). But see Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo.
326, 197 S.W. 68 (19i7).
1ALI Code Cnm. Proc. 238. (Official Draft 193o).
uIt should be noted that these arresters are trained in methods of arrest and
,their actions remain basically those of law enforcement officers. United States v.
Burgos, 269 F.gd 763 (2d Cir. 1959) (federal customs officers arrested alien);
Richardson v. United States, 217 F.9d 696 (8th Cir. 1954) (federal agents made ar-
rests for narcotics violation); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 195o)
(federal agents made arrests for espionage); Dorsey v. United States, 174 F.2d 899
(5th Cir. 1949) (federal agents arrested holder of illegal sugar ration coupon);
United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1944) (federal agents made arrests
for narcotics violation); United States v. Hayden, 14o F. Supp. 429 (D. Md. 1956)
(federal agents arrested operator of illegal still); United States v. Guller, 1o F
Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (federal agents made arrests for narcotics violation);
United States v. Chodak, 68 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1946) (federal agents made arrests
for violation of price ceilings); United States v. Strickland, 62 F. Supp. 468
(W.D.S.C. 1945) (federal agents arrested holder of illegal gas cupons); People v.
Burgess, 17o Cal. App. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 524 (1959) (state investigators arrested a
driver's license examiner); Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 91 N.V.2d 756 (1958)
(constable arrested a traffic offender); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484,
45 A.2d 235 (1946) (state officers made arrests for auto theft).
"Montgomery Ward g: Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4 th Cir. 1952); Sima v.
Skaggs Payless Drug Center, Inc., 92 Idaho 387, 353 P.2d io85 (196o); Jefferson
Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947); Banks v. Town, Inc.,
98 So. ad 719 (La. App. 1957); Lester v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 94 Ohio App.
313, 114 N.E.gd 529 (1952); Pilos v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 319 Mass. 475, 66 N.E.2d
576 (1946); Ira v. Columbia Food Co., 360 P.2d 622 (Ore. i96i); Martin v. Castner-
Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 181 S.W.2d 638 (1944).
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ted in his presence and delivering the culprit to the authorities. 16 The
crimes for which the arrests have been made have generally been
varieties of breaches of the peace, with the arrester subduing the
trouble-maker until the arrival of authorties. In some cases the person
making the arrest was part of a posse organized in the classical manner
to track down a thief.17 Citizen posses are rare, however, having been
replaced by more effective professional policemen. A plausible explan-
ation of the scarcity of common law citizens' arrests would be the
fact that few citizens are fully aware of their authority to arrest and
fewer still are willing to risk the prosecution for false arrest which
will likely result if the arrest is adjudged unwarranted.
The decline of arrests by private individuals should not be con-
idered altogether undesirable. Except in rare instances official law
,u'Iforcement agencies are capable of making necessary arrests with-
out civilian aid. At the same time there seems to be no need to ex-
tend the law of arrest as it applies to police officers. Perhaps they
should be given the power to arrest for any misdemeanor committed in
their presence, whether or not it constitutes a breach of the peace.
There seems to be no justification, however, for permitting an arrest
for a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the arresting
officer, as was the case in People v. Foster Such an arrest invades
"the sacred right of an individual to be protected from an arrest
founded upon mere oral complaints where petty crimes of the mis-
demeanor type are involved. ."Is
WVILLIAm H. CLARK, Jr.
28Lma v. Lawler, 63 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1945) (citizen's arrest of unruly
sailor); Ogulin v. Jeffries, 121 Cal. App. 2d 211, 263 P.-d 75 (1953) (woman ar-
rested man for attacking her); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 702, 221 S.V.2d
682 (1949) (citizen's arrest of man shooting into bus, killing the driver); Com-
monwealth v. Lussier, 333 Mass. 83, 128 N.E.2d 569 (1955) (thief arrested by citizen
as he ran from robbed liquor store); Bellinger v. State, 2o6 Misc. 575, 134 N.Y.S.2d
104 (1954) (hotel operator arrested trouble-maker in parking lot); Oklahoma Ry.
Co. v. Sandford, 258 P.2d 604 (Okla. 1953) (bus driver arrested intoxicated motorist);
Wingfield v. State, 81 Okla. Crim. 146, 16o P.2d 945 (1945) (citizen's arrest of
prowler); Commonwealth ex rel. Garrison v. Burke, 378 Pa. 344, io6 A.2d 587
(1954) (citizen's arrest of burglar).
2TState v. Parker, 55 Mo. 916, igg S.W.2d 338 (1947).
"From Judge Frossel's dissent in People v. Foster, supra note i at 399.
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EQUITABLE PROTECTION BY INJUNCTION
FOR BUSINESS REPUTATION
Where individuals are harmed as the result of libelous publica-
tions the resort to a court of law for damages may be sufficient redress.
However, in the case of the libel of a business, damages may not be
adequate and restraining the publication by an injunction in equity
may provide the only complete relief available.'
In the recent case of Mayfair Farms, Inc. v. Socony Mobile Oil.,2
two plaintiffs, both restaurant operators, sought to enjoin the publica-
tion of defendant's motoring guidebook, a small part of which rated
restaurants upon certain standards not set forth in the publication
itself.3 The basis of plaintiffs' complaint was that while the rating
experts employed by defendant had information which warranted
placing their restaurants in the highest category, the restaurants were
nevertheless given inferior ratings.4 The Superior Court of New
Jersey denied a temporary injunction pending the hearing of the
issues at law for three reasons: (i) the plaintiffs' rights to equitable
relief were not clear'as a matter of law,5 (2) the ultimate error com-
In most cases it is impossible to determine the extent of the damages arising
from a business libel, therefore the remedy at law is speculative if not inadequate.
See Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 142 Fed. 919, 922 (6th
Cir. 19o6) (dictum); Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F.2d 273 (N.D. Okla. 1931);
Kwass v. Kersey, 139 W. Va. 497, 81 S.E.2d 237 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
2172 A.2d 26 (N.J. Super. sg6i). In the principal case the plaintiff cannot
establish the cause of a falling off of its trade or the failure of its business to
increase, except in cases where some tangible situation exists which is obviously the
cause of business decline. On the other hand, the business volume of the plaintiffs'
may increase, but how much greater the increase would have been had it not been
for defendant's dissuasion is a matter of conjecture.
31d. at 27. "The basis for the rating given to a particular restaurant is not
explained in the guide...."
'The symbols used in the guide book are as follows:




""-excellent, worth a special effort to reach
** ***-outstanding--one of the best in the country
Plaintiffs' restaurants, Mayfair Farms and Pal's Cabin, were given a good and better
than average rating respectively." Id. at 27
,172 A.2d at 29. "New Jersey has for many years subscribed to the principle
that an interlocutory injunction should not issue if a plaintiff's asserted rights are
not clear as a matter of law." Citizens Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R.R., 29 N.J.
Eq. 299 (Ct. Err. & App. 1878); General Elec. Co. v. Gem Vacuum Stores, Inc.,
36 N.J. Super. 234, 115 A.2d 626 (App. Div. 1955); Noble Co. v. D. Van Nostrand
Co., 63 N.J. Super. 534, 164 A.2d 834 (Ch. Div. ig6o). Contra, Note, 40 Marq. L.
Rev. 191 (1956) and cases cited therein.
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plained of was that of ratings, a matter of judgment and opinion,
and therefore not a justiciable issue,0 and (3) the result of the in-
junction would be to deprive the public of the extensive material
co:tained in the guidebook. Under New Jersey procedure the plain-
tiffs' allegations are taken as admitted for purposes of ruling on a mo-
tion to dismiss. Since certain allegations were sufficient to state a
cause of action, the court overruled the defendant's motion to dis-
miss. This left the plaintiffs with only a remedy at law for damages
for injury incurred by the publication.
Until recently, the use of an injunction to enjoin a business libel
has been exercised only in exceptional cases. 7 However, the familiar
language of an equity court that "equity has no jurisdiction to en-
join a libel"' is becoming "the power does exist and can be used in
proper circumstances." 9 Where the power is recognized, the matter
seems to be clearly one of discretion.
As a guide in the exercise of this discretion the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts and one writer 10 have recognized and arrived
at a triangular balance that recognizes the interests of the pub-
lisher of the alleged libel, the public, and the party seeking relief.
In Krebiozen Research Foundation v. Beacon Press, Inc.," the plain-
tiff was denied injunctive relief against publication of a book which
criticized the effectiveness of plaintiff's drug as a cancer cure. The
case is distinguishable from the principal case in that the objective ap-
praisal of medicinals by the doctors based upon independent research is
not akin to opinion ratings of restaurants. Furthermore, considera-
'See Restatement, Torts § 627 (1938). The caveat to this section is noteworthy:
"The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether one who holds himself out as
able to give to intending purchasers ... information in regard to... the quality of
lands, chattels, or intangible things may be subject to liability for publishing to
an intending purchaser... an inaccurate opinion disparaging the other's prop-
erty.., if he fails to exercise reasonable care ... or reasonable competence in form-
ing his opinion .... "
-Factors bringing some cases within the exception are continuousness of the
act, malice and inadequacy of the remedy at law. Cf., Carter v. Knapp Motor Co.,
243 Ala. 6oo, ii SO. 2d 383 (1943) (display of plaintiff's car as a "White Elephant"
enjoined); accord, Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937).
'See, e.g., Francis v. Flinn, i18 U.S. 385 (1886); Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1886); Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass. 69(0873);
Wolf v. Harris, 267 Mo. 405, 184 S.W. 1139 (i16); Marlin Fire Arms Co., v. Shields,
171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (19o); Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931).
0172 A.2d at 3o.
"0See, Comment, 36 B.U.L. Rev. 644, 647 (1956). It is suggestetd that the prin-
cipal case might well be the exceptional case that the writer depicted as "but a
matter of conjecture."
1334 Mass. 86, 134 N.E.2d 1 (1956)-
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tions of health and safety were involved in the Krebiozen case so
that the public interest in the discussion of cancer cures outweighed
the plaintiff's interest in protection against an alleged libel.12 This
decision shows that a petitioner seeking to enjoin a libel must sat-
isfy the court that his interest in being protected from irreparable
injury outweighs the public interest in the publication.' 3
The exercise of discretion in deciding whether to enjoin a busi-
ness libel presents a more difficult problem since the public interest in
publication is not so strong. Therefore, an additional factor may be
necessary to overcome the lack of precedent, and at the same time
supplement the triangular balance as a guide in the exercise of this
discretion.
It is submitted that a consideration of the gravity of the unfair-
ness resulting if temporary injunctive relief is denied may be the ad-
ditional factor necessary to prompt courts of equity to extend their
jurisdiction to enjoin a business libel.
An analogy is to be found in the use of injunctions to enjoin unfair
competition.' 4 The development of this action to protect the busi-
ness assets of reputation and good will shows that equity does enjoin
business libels under a different equitable theory.'5 Because of the re-
luctance of equity to enjoin a libel as such, it has expanded the action
of unfair competition. 6
Originally equity would enjoin the passing off by the defendant
'1134 -N.E.2d at 6. "In this case it is clear that the public interest in the dis-
cussion of the subject of cancer ... [is] paramount." Accord, Willis v. O'Connell,
231 Fed. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1916); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp.
376 (D.D.C. 1957)-
"See note io supra.
1"'The law relating to unfair competition has a threefold object: First, to
protect the honest trader in the business which fairly belongs to him; second, to
punish the dishonest trader who is taking his competitor's business away by unfair
means; and third, to protect the public from deception." Mitchell H. Mark Realty
Corp. v. Major Amusement Co., 18o App. Div. 549, 168 N.Y.S. 244, 247 (1st
Dep't 1917).
15Cf., Old Investors' & Traders Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N.Y. Supp.
245 (Sup. Ct. 1928). See, Defuniak, Handbook of Modern Equity i n6 (2d ed. 1956)
where the author points out, "Some courts. . have termed the wrong a "disparage-
ment of property," or "disparagement of a business" and thus, by avoiding the
terms "libel," "slander" or "defamation," have neatly evaded many difficulties
presented by precedent as represented in the older cases." See Pound, Equitable
Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916).
. "Old Investors' & Traders Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N.Y. Supp. 245
(Sup. Ct. 1928) (disparaging statement by competitor and publishers-both en-
joined); Cf., Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, io6 F.2d 229 (ioth Cir.
1939); Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 Yale L.J. 13o4,
1305 (1938)-
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of his goods as those of the plaintiff. This element of passing off was
required.17 This protection was subsequently extended to cases where
the defendant did not appropriate plaintiff's good will for himself, but
his action had the purpose or effect of aiding others in such appro-
priation.'s In Old Investors' & Trading Corp. v. Jenkins, 9 the alleged
disparagement, contained in a circular sent to plaintiff's customers,
was enjoined despite the fact that the publisher was not a competitor.
The court said: "While... the court could not enjoin the mere pub-
lication of a libel, it could, provided the facts of the case warranted,
issue an injunction against the defendant from mailing or otherwise
sending to customers of the plaintiff false and misleading circulars
of reading matter which would take away plaintiff's business by unfair
means and deceive the public."
20
This indicates that injunctive protection may be granted when
the action is labeled unfair trade competition even though the plain-
tiff and defendant are not competing in the narrow sense. This is
manifest in the language of some courts to the effect that "there is
no fetish in the word competition. The invocation of equity rests
more vitally upon the unfairness."
2'
In Burke Transit Co. v. Queen City Coach Co., 2 2 the defendant,
a transporttation corporation seeking to take over plaintiff's business,
was alleged to have circulated false statements to the effect that
plaintiff was unreliable, in failing financial condition and intending
to go out of business. The defendant contended there was no right
to restrain by injunction such slanderous statements affecting the
plaintiff's business and that he had a remedy at law. The court dis-
posed of this by saying:
"But when it appears necessary for the protection of plaintiff's
business or property rights, and it is alleged that the system-
atic circulation of false statements seriously affecting these
rights will work irreparable and continuing injury, injunctive
17Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Grinsberg & Bros., 25 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1928) (passing
oil, injunction granted); Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Houston Printing Co., ii F.zd
834 (5th Cir. 1926) (no passing off, bill dismissed).
'SRalston Purina Co. v. Saniwax Paper Co., 26 F.2d 941 (W.D. Mich. 1928);
Old Investors' & Traders Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup.
Ct. 1928); Cf. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd. v. Guggenheimer, 69 Fed. 271 (C,.D.
Md. 1895).
10133 Misc. 213, 232 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
2'Id at 247.
"Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 30o Fed. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924); See
Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 115, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (Sup. Ct. 194o).
29228 N.C. 768, 47 S.E.2d 297 (1948).
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relief may be granted pending final determination of the
action."
23
In the principal case there was no threat by the defendant seeking to
take over the plaintiff's businesses. However, there is little significance
in distinguishing between a defendant who induces old customers
not to carry out their contractual obligations, as in the Burke case,
and the defendant who persuades new customers not to enter into con-
tractual relations, as in the principal case. "One practice is as unfair
as the other, and in both cases the growth and success of the plain-
tiff's business are seriously affected." 24
Another factor to be considered is the purpose and effect of the
publication sought to be enjoined. In Mayfair Farms the primary
reason for denying the temporary injunction was the defendant's
interest in immediate distribution of the publication as part of its
summer advertising program.25 Since the public interest involved is not
so great as in the Krebiozen case, the argument for the granting of the
temporary injunction in order to preserve the status quo is greater.
2 G
In cases where the petitioner seeks to enjoin the publication of an
alleged business libel, the exercise of discretion in the denial or is-
suance of a temporary injunction must be based upon sound princi-
ples of equity. As suggested in the Krebiozen case, even though the
remedy at law is inadequate, the nature of the publication may be
such that public interests must prevail over private. However, where
the public interest is of less weight, equity may well issue a temporary
injunction in order to preserve the status quo pending the hearing of
the issues.
GERALD LEE KESTEN
247 S.E.2d at 299.
ssDerenberg, Trade Mark Protection and Unfair Trading 143 (196).
The court states in the opinion: "It is obvious that a prompt decision as
to an injunction is of great importance to the defendants who plan to launch at
once, if not enjoined, a widespread campaign of advertising and selling, a cam-
paign which will be timed for the commencement of the summer touring season."
Query whether public or in fact private interest has outweighed the plaintiffs'
interest in the preservation of the status quo pending the hearing upon the issues.
172 A.2d at 27.
26Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. Numanna Laboratories, 215 F.2d 382 (7 th Cir.
1954); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 2o6 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953);
City of Newton v. Levis, 79 Fed. 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1897). An examination of these
cases leads to the conclusion that the court in exercising discretion to issue or deny
the temporary injunction should not be bound by the number or complexity of
untried and unsettled questions of law, but rather the necessity (or lack of neces-
sity) for preserving the status quo. See Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co. v. Bradley,
1o8 Wis. 467, 84 N.W. 870, 877 (i9o0) (temporary injunction granted to preserve
status quo) "Not only does the discretionary power exist to protect a party against
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